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## Recognition, Rights, Redistribution

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**VERA MESSING, MÁRIA NEMÉNYI AND DOROTTYA SZIKRA***

# Recognition, Rights and Redistribution. Introduction to the Honorary Issue of Intersections. EEJSP to Celebrate Júlia Szalai

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This special issue of Intersections. EEJSP is dedicated to some of the central concerns of contemporary sociology: recognition, rights, and redistribution. These are three interrelated and often contrasted subjects that have occupied a special place in the works of Júlia Szalai, one of Hungary's leading sociologists. Szalai, besides being an early pioneer of sociological research in her own country, is also well known outside Hungary for her international and comparative investigations of inequality and poverty, her research on ethnic minorities, and especially the Roma, as well as her work on the welfare state. Her research has involved close co-operation with colleagues from all over Europe from Scotland to Sweden, from Slovakia to Romania and Serbia. This is why, besides a special issue being dedicated to her in Socio.hu: Social Science Review in Hungarian, a 'twin-issue' of Intersections. EEJSP is also being published to allow her friends and colleagues from around Europe to celebrate Júlia Szalai on her birthday. Intersections. EEJSP and Socio.hu are both on-line social science journals based within the Hungarian Academy of Sciences where Szalai started her research career in the 1970s, and where she has served as Professor Emerita in recent years while also teaching and undertaking research at the Central European University. These two journal special issues thus also symbolize the gratitude of the Center for Social Sciences, and within this, the Institute for Sociology, to Szalai for the teaching and inspiration her colleagues and friends have received from her for nearly half a century.

These two publications at the same time reflect the versatility as well as the international and national embedding of Júlia Szalai's work.

Engaging with the research of the great masters – Zsuzsa Ferge, Ágnes Losonczi, István Kemény – who walked ahead of her in the profession, Júlia Szalai fleshed out the issues, research fields and methodological tools she would later work with during the early years of her career. She proved at an early stage how keen she was on conducting detailed investigations that mixed thorough analysis of statistical and research data with the use of qualitative sources, especially in-depth interviews. Thus, she was inquiring into the inequalities inherent in the distribution of labor within the family based on time-use surveys as early as the 1970s. Using statistical data and in-depth interviews she studied the reasons for the expansion of the capacity of kindergarten, which she found was driven rather by demands of the socialist economy than the actual needs of families, women and children. Her investigations into the "diseases" of the Hungarian healthcare system (mid-1980s) foreshadowed her later

work in social policy accomplished around the time of the regime change, in which she so insightfully criticized the flaws of the social security system.

Júlia Szalai was a seasoned professional by the time of the regime change. The transformation that fundamentally shook up Hungarian society and rearranged social structures turned her attention towards excluded social groups – the losers of the transition – who had suffered from the elimination of the state, the introduction of the market economy, and the reconfiguration of large redistribution systems. In this period, the bulk of her research discussed issues of social exclusion, vulnerability and solidarity: she explored this field from several perspectives, typically using a wide array of theoretical and empirical social historical and comparative methods and a variety of approaches. Júlia Szalai thus became known in Hungarian sociology and social policy especially as an expert on state socialism, and then, with regard to the post-socialist era, as a professional specializing in the state redistribution system and the system of social provisions. Her research on the welfare state during the early 1990s was often carried out in close co-operation with her colleague and friend Bob Deacon, who sadly passed away in 2017 (*Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist Welfare?* Aldershot: Avebury, 1990). She later turned to issues of privatization and informal relations within and outside of the welfare system and social security, as her work with Terry Cox, a long collaborator of Szalai's illustrates (e.g. *Transition, Privatisation and Social Participation in Central Europe*. Genf: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1992). Her discussions of the changing relations of interests and anomalies in social security (see, for example: Social Transformation and the Reform of Social Security in Hungary, in *Czech Sociological Review*, 1993) included an in-depth analysis of the changes in welfare redistribution since the regime change. In her work, Júlia Szalai describes how the principle of equal rights and related institutional practices were eroded and broad sections of society marginalized as a result of struggles for state redistribution, contributing, ultimately, to the division of society. Szalai's often-cited research concludes that those excluded from large redistribution systems have become trapped among the increasingly obscure relations of local-level social policy (see, e.g.: *Poverty and Degradation of Social Rights: The Case of Hungary.* Harvard Working Papers. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2001).

Closely related to her studies in social policy, another important theme in Szalai's scholarly work focuses on marginalization and exclusion on social and ethnic grounds. She studied these issues typically as the lead researcher of comprehensive national and international comparative research projects. Thus, she has conducted important research into gender-, social-, class- and ethnic-based discrimination and its background mechanisms reflected in the actions of mediating persons and in institutional practices; the rights and disenfranchisement of excluded social groups; and issues of political engagement. Investigating the often-intersecting inequalities and exclusionary processes that affect the Roma and women led her to engage with the issue of recognition and also to a fruitful and long-lasting collaboration with one of the greatest sociologists of gender research, Barbara Hobson (*Conflicting Struggles for Recognition: Clashing Interests of Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Hungary.* 2003.)

Her papers and edited volumes produced in yet another fruitful collaboration with Ágota Horváth and Mária Neményi that have occupied an important position in Hungarian sociology, academic thought and discussions of public policy, representing important sources for several generations. Publications in question include *Cigánynak születni* (English: Born to be Gypsy) (2000), *Kisebbségek kisebbsége* (English: The Minority of Minorities) (2005), her most recent volume *Egymás szemébe nézve. Az elmúlt fél évszázad politikai törekvései* (English: Looking Each Other in the Eyes. Political Efforts Over the Past Half a Century) (2017), and *Faces and Causes of Roma Marginalization in Local Contexts* (2014) which analyzes the situation of Roma in an international context.

Szalai's work in the field of social exclusion includes a research project that she has coordinated together with Violetta Zentai and Mária Neményi and that may have been the most outstanding one of recent years. It involved nine partner countries and explored how ethnic differences contributed to the diverging prospects for minority ethnic youth and their peers in urban settings. (EDUMIGROM). The results of the project were published in the book *Migrants, Roma and Post-Colonial Youth in Education across Europe* by Palgrave in 2014. She acted as lead researcher in another European research consortium that examined the causes and patterns of early school leaving (ReSLEU). Szalai has authored several important publications discussing the mechanisms and consequences of teachers' low expectations towards children who belong to the Roma community or other stigmatized groups, as well as those which analyze how racial prejudices are reflected in teachers' grading practices.

However, Szalai's research interests are much broader. She has not only been concerned with the victims of processes of social exclusion that extend through several centuries and survive different regimes; processes which entrench social relations and inhibit mobilization. In collaboration with Mihály Laki she has also investigated those individuals who occupy the highest positions of the social hierarchy, repeatedly conducting research among entrepreneurs in Hungary (see: The Puzzle of Success: Hungarian Entrepreneurs at the Turn of the Millennium. In: *Europe-Asia Studies,* 58(3): 317-345, 2006).

Besides its thematic richness, Júlia Szalai's work stands out for its methodological diversity, as well: although originally an economist with a background in mathematical statistics, she has never allowed any single method to limit the research opportunities inherent to her inquiries. She has moved with ease among the requirements of the most "hardcore" statistical techniques just as she has in the realm of qualitative methods. Not only is she widely educated in methodological terms but, as with any really good sociologist, she primarily sees the problems that need to be explored and understood and the phenomena to be explained and adjusts her diversified toolbox to meet these needs, rather than vice versa.

Finally, perhaps the most significant message conveyed by the two special issues is Julia's tremendous importance for us not just in professional but also in human terms: our research and personal friendships have often evolved together, overlapping and mutually reinforcing one another for several decades.

The twin issues of the two journals honoring Júlia Szalai reflect the thematic, methodological and disciplinary pluralism of her work. The special issue of Intersections. EEJSP is introduced by an essay by Barbara Hobson (University of

Stockholm), in which the author, looking back on the history of collaboration with our laureate describes how, in analyzing the situation of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, Júlia Szalai engaged with the debate of redistribution versus recognition paradigms outlined by Nancy Fraser, expanding this important theoretical framework in sociology and adopting it to social contexts outside the Western world.

Terry Cox investigates Szalai's concept of the 'bifurcated welfare state' and reflects on it from the context of the debate around Esping-Andersen's ideal types of welfare state regimes, and especially the issue of stratification. He concludes that the bifurcated welfare state offers a means of understanding the key features of hybrid welfare states in East Central Europe.

Mariann Dósa explores the relationship between welfare and citizenship. First, she reviews the most important theoretical approaches and argues that shifting our focus to an alternative perspective – viewing welfare as an agent of citizenship socialization – provides a more comprehensive picture. She convincingly claims that the undemocratic, disempowering institutional characteristics and practices of the post-transition welfare regime in Hungary diminish recipients' perceptions of democratic subjectivity.

Judit Durst and Zsanna Nyírő analyze the 'hidden costs' of upward mobility, especially for Roma women. They explore the personal experiences of the impact of moving class through educational mobility via an extensive set of interviews conducted with young Hungarian Roma women who have obtained higher education diplomas. They furthermore pay special attention to influential ethnic support groups and organisations and address the question what effect they have on the costs of upward mobility in terms of the mobility of the interviewees.

Zsuzsa Árendás, Vera Messing and Viola Zentai discuss the issue of Roma inclusion in the labour market, focusing on a specific group of highly qualified young Roma within the context of the business sphere. The authors present the first results of new research into the obstacles and opportunities of Roma youth who apply to work at transnational companies. Their interviews with HR officers and young Roma job-seekers give a unique insight into the issue of the disadvantages of highly qualified Roma youth, as well as the dilemmas that multinational companies face in relation to the recruitment, selection and employment of young, educated Roma.

Finally, Gábor Erőss salutes Júlia Szalai with a review of a recently published book that she - together with Claire Schiff - edited and which summarizes the results of a vast, Europe-wide comparative research effort on the mechanisms of racial differentiation in education, and its consequences.

The twin special issue of this one – Socio.hu – is celebrating Júlia Szalai with 10 articles published in Hungarian which mirror the thematic, disciplinary and methodological diversity of the work of the laureate. The Socio.hu special issue starts with an essay from Ágnes Losonczi, a defining Hungarian sociologist who has been a mentor and long-standing colleague and friend to Júlia Szalai since the 1970s. Research articles in the special issue discuss recognition politics in theoretical terms as well as in the case of the Roma in Hungary (Csaba Dupcsik and Roza Vajda); issues related to social policy, such as the reform of pension systems in 11 EU countries (Simonovits & Domonkos) and the welfare state (Éva Voszka); the case of the emergence and strengthening of entrepreneurs after the system change (Mihály Laki);

innovative educational experiments for Roma (Ágnes Kende); the role of personal networks in the migration of rural Roma (Tünde Virág); solidarity in Hungarian society amid the refugee crisis (Margit Feischmidt); and, finally, practices of the communist state's secret service regarding the compromising and defamation of people considered 'enemies' (Judit Takács).

Special thanks must be given to the reviewers who have – sometimes working to very short deadlines – undertaken the reviews, to Róza Vajda for her help with translation, and to István Hegedűs for the immense technical support.

**BARBARA HOBSON** *

# Revisiting Recognition and Redistribution and Extending the Borders: Júlia Szalai's Contribution

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## Abstract

This article revisits the recognition and redistribution debates emerging from Nancy Fraser's 1995 agenda article underscoring the dangers in the rise of identity politics and displacement of economic justice in postsocialist age. Júlia Szalai has been a crucial actor in reshaping the research on recognition struggles, and I will focus on the important contribution of her research on the Roma. Looking beyond dichotomy in recognition and redistribution, Szalai's research has highlighted the interplay and overlapping configurations in recognition struggles: their institutional and historical embeddedness and their emphasis on political agency and voice. Her analysis of the multiple and interacting processes of exclusion of the Roma in Central Europe, including the spatial, educational and employment dimensions and the lack of political representation, reflect a near congruence in misrecognition and malredistribution. Her research highlights shifts in the discourse from the cultural wars to the redistributional wars in neo-liberal market economies between those who have lost status and income in the dominant population and the most vulnerable (minority and migrant populations). Finally, Szalai's research and writings have extended the theoretical and empirical borders on recognition struggles, engaging with the frameworks of intersectionalities and capabilities both of which offer lenses for revealing complex inequalities and the tensions within the paradigms for social justice that have inspired my own research.

*Keywords:* Recognition, Redistribution, Segregation, Exclusion, Roma, Júlia Szalai.

This article revisits the recognition and redistribution debates emerging from Nancy Fraser's (1995; 1997) agenda articles underscoring the dangers in the rise of identity politics and the displacement of economic justice in the postsocialist age. In the current era of global inequalities and precariousness and social movements targeting the one percent, the assertion of a paradigm shift, the cultural replacing the material, appears overblown. Nevertheless, the dilemmas and tensions within recognition/redistribution still resonate though they have taken on greater complexity in research over the last decade. Looking beyond the binary in Fraser's approach to recognition (1997), researchers underscored the interplay and overlapping configurations in recognition struggles: their institutional and historical embeddedness, and their emphasis on political agency and voice (Hobson, 2003). Júlia Szalai has been a crucial actor in reshaping the research on recognition struggle; I will focus on her important contribution.

I begin with the essays in *Recognition Struggles and Social movements* (Hobson, 2003), based upon a project that evolved from four years of dialogue among an interdisciplinary group of scholars, of which Júlia Szalai was a key participant, addressing a region and a group, the Roma in Hungary, which was under-researched. Through rich contextual studies, the book challenged assumptions in the recognition/redistribution debates. Then I focus on Júlia Szalai's research on the Roma within this project and reveal how she has nuanced the recognition/redistribution framework in her subsequent projects and writings. Her account of the Roma in Central Eastern Europe, represents a paradigm case in which there is congruence in misrecognition and maldistribution. Finally, I conclude with how Júlia Szalai's research has extended the theoretical borders in the recognition paradigm, through her integration of intersectionalities and capabilities, both of which are frameworks that are highly relevant to the research terrain, and have inspired my own work on capabilities and social justice.

## *Challenging the Binary*

At the outset, the Recognition Struggles project confronted the binary in recognition/redistribution debates (Hobson, 2003: 1-3: Phillips, 2003: 263-267). Was recognition the fundamental, over-arching moral category, potentially encompassing redistribution (Honneth), or were the two categories fundamental and mutually irreducible (Fraser) (Honneth and Fraser, 2003)? Should the emphasis be on the social psychological cognitive processes that are mirrored in the experiences of disrespect and exclusion or the structural institutional settings where these processes are played out in lives of marginalized groups? However, when these concepts were applied to empirical cases, the waters became muddied and distinctions between these two positions blurred; dependent on which groups experienced marginalization and exclusion, within which social and political contexts, and the borders limiting the discursive universe where causes and remedies are interpreted. The essays in Recognition Struggles revealed interplay between maldistribution (the inequitable distribution of economic resources) and the misrecognition (the devaluation of members of a group based on their identities).

A crucial dimension linking these domains is group agency — collective action and mobilization mirrored in the title of the book based on our project research, Recognition Struggles and Social Movements — and their effect on if and how individuals within the group can exercise rights, have access to social welfare and challenge discrimination and disrespect. These aspects of recognition struggles are sacrificed in Fraser's Weberian approach, in which misrecognition is wedded to institutional patterns of status subordination that prevent the individual from participating fully in different spheres of life (Fraser, 2003). She has defended this shading out of political voice as a response to the problem of reification of identities that beset the politics of recognition.[1] However, to take this position is to throw out the baby with the bath water rather than engaging with the dilemmas in recognition struggles (Philips, 2003; Yuval Davis, 1993; Young, 1990).

The essays in Recognition Struggles address the dilemmas in political voice, making visible the links between recognition, agency and power across several dimensions. Authority and authenticity, enabling subjects to speak for themselves is a core dimension of recognition and empowerment of the misrecognized (Phillips, 2003 Young, 1990; 2000). This aspect of recognition struggles is featured directly in the case study of Valiente (2003), where a mothers movement in Spain mobilized to destigmatize their drug addict children as well as gain state resources for them. Valiente argues that in speaking for their children, these mothers preempted agency from their children. Hobson (2003) analyzed the framing of gender equality by feminist political actors in Sweden, defining the boundaries of gender equality, marginalized migrant women's voice.

Szalai (2003) addressed the question of representation and who speaks for the group within the context of the limits of the constitutional framework for minority rights in Hungary. The weak institutional framework for minority self-government left little space for protecting the rights of those in their community: leaders of Roma communities faced an impossible choice: either they could challenge the institutions of the majority government risking the demise of local minority representation or become complicit (act as 'smoothing agents') for policies that would undermine their constituents' social and citizenship rights (Szalai, 2003: 206-207).

Other authors engaged with misrecognition and the dialogues between groups and their claims for recognition. Lake (2003) confronts struggles in dialogue between feminist groups and aboriginal women in Australia where feminists appropriated the concept of colonization to dramatize how the Australian historical malestream narrative had denigrated women. They were fiercely criticized by aboriginal women, the colonized. Kulick and Klein (2003) reveal the tensions between gay rights activists seeking legitimacy and transvestite prostitutes in Brazil, the former seeking to distance themselves from this 'scandalous group' and the latter situating themselves within the movement for recognition of gay rights. In presenting the competing claims for recognition among the Roma and the women's movement Szalai (2003: 205-210) revealed how groups striving for recognition can work against each other and reproduce the dynamics of power and dependency in welfare assistance. After the

[1] Years after Recognition Struggles was published, Fraser (2005) modified her position integrating the political as the third dimension of justice. However, her ambivalence toward collective agency, group identities and political voice remains unresolved (Fraser 2009).

withdrawal of the all-encompassing state, a decentralized welfare bureaucracy, paved the way for women entering the new profession of social work as administers of welfare services. Roma community leaders challenged the authority of these women and challenged their capacities to decide on the issues involving the Roma. These competing recognition struggles weakened the position of both (Szalai, 2003: 208-209).

Williams (2003) and Hobson (2003) brought the trans-national dimension into focus as a facilitator for dialogues across recognition struggles. Williams' chapter (2003) in particular highlights the role of trans-national NGOs. Despite differences in participation parity in the European Women's Lobby (the more established and highly resourced) and the Black, Minority, and Ethnic Women Project (a fledging group), these groups gave voice and visibility to women's issues that were not addressed in the EU Migrants Forum.

All these aspects of recognition struggles are elaborated in Szalai's future research. Although skeptical of recognition as a useful analytical tool in our early discussions, Szalai has become one of its proponents, taking the conversation further than all of us, extending the theoretical and empirical borders.

## *Recognition Struggles in Historical Socio-political Context*

The context-specific nature of recognition struggles is highlighted by all the contributors in an edited volume; however, Szalai's rich historical and contextual analysis of the social exclusion of the Roma provides the clearest example of the interplay of misrecognition and maldistribution, woven into the narrative of the pre- and post-Soviet Regime in Hungary (Szalai, 2003). She underscores the continuity in racial ethnic discrimination of the Roma as well as its contextual specificity. Tracing the roots of Roma exclusion in the Soviet era, she begins with the non-recognition of ethnic minorities where mandatory assimilation meant a suppression of ethnic and minority languages and cultural identities. Although the Roma were constructed as workers in the socialist economy, Szalai reveals that distinctions persisted between the Roma and majority population in Hungary. They were guaranteed employment, housing and other benefits accorded to workers in the socialist economy; nevertheless they were excluded from 'rewards and opportunities' that the majority had access to in the informal economy. This placed them at a great disadvantage in the transition to the market economy after the fall of the old regime. The Roma lacked access to social and economic resources enjoyed by large segments of the Hungarian population, such as tools and equipment for extra employment social networks for selling and trading goods (Seleny, 2006). Szalai (2003 and 2014) makes the important point that the exclusion of the Roma from this potential opportunity for gaining a foothold in the new market economy was not just the result of structural inequalities but also a conscious political strategy to appease the dominant majority, who would also feel the brunt of liberalized market structures. Nearly 40 per cent of jobs were lost after the transition to market economy, while only 10 per cent have been replaced (Szalai, 2013a: 13). The competition for welfare resources evolved in what Szalai refers to as the bifurcated welfare state (Szalai, 2013b) in which the majority of welfare funds were directed towards private businesses in the liberalized market economy. The creation

of middle class jobs in the welfare sector offered opportunities for those who lost their jobs as a result of the restructuring. They became the administrators determining which claims were justified and which were not in the new system of meager means-tested welfare provisions. Here the lines were clearly drawn in which the Roma formed the bulk of perceived non-deserving poor and poverty was identified as a Roma problem attributed to their character flaws and their poor attitude toward work (Szalai, 2003; 2014a). As was true in the American welfare system, deservedness was constructed in terms of types of entitlements (Boris, 1995; Fraser and Gordon, 1994), pensions and social security and benefits were the legitimate channel for state expenditures; welfare, became a derogatory term for those on the dole, viewed as freeloaders, intertwined with race.

In Hungary, this same two-track system was put in place. In fact, the shift from a universal to a rigorous means-tested system, did not result in a shrinking welfare state expenditures, after the transition to market economy but rather an expansion; the social security index rose to 177 per cent after 2005 (Szalai, 2013b, 13), alongside the drastic reductions in social assistance. Hence, the competition for minuscule resources between the vulnerable from the dominant majority and Roma intensified.

## *The Many Faces of Segregation and Inequalities*

Through her analysis of the many faces of segregation in her subsequent research Szalai offers a multi-dimensional lens for understanding the near congruence in misrecognition and maldistribution in the exclusion of the Roma (Szalai, 2014a; 2016). Segregation acts both as a process mirroring stigma and discrimination against the Roma, and as an outcome, producing the structural barriers inhibiting full participation in the community in employment, education and political representation.

Spatial segregation exists across settlements in small regions, some of which have become Roma only localities, where the poorest and most marginalized reside. These communities are marked by the 'dilapidated appearance of the houses, streets and public spaces' (Szalai, 2014a: 137), their lack of infrastructure and services and inferior schools. Non-Roma living in these areas are stigmatized (*gypsy-ized*) (Szalai, 2014: 137), maintaining the ethnic borders and reinforcing the physical and social distances between the majority and minority. Moreover, residential segregation is compounded by the isolation of these communities from transportation services, resulting from privatization of public services, so that markets as well as lobbying groups determine who will be served. This circumscribes the employment opportunities open to the Roma, the third face of segregation, in which the Roma are forced take the worst jobs in the informal private sector without contracts and social security protections or assigned low-wage dead end workfare jobs (Szalai 2014a: 151; 2016). In the public discourse, cultural traits rather than structural forces are explanations for the marginal position of the Roma in the labor market.

Another dimension of segregation that Szalai (2014b) elaborates is in sphere of education, which has received the most attention from international actors. Pressure from the EU (in the accession negotiations) and international NGOs led to a reduction of special schools for Roma in Central European Societies (hereafter CES)

and their prohibition in Hungary. Nevertheless, new ways of retaining ethnic borders persisted and preserved status differences, mainly through tracking the Roma into special classes or programs, which label them as other and lesser (Szalai, 2194a). According to Szalai's research a third of Roma children of compulsory age did not attend school, defined as 18 years in 2011 (Szalai 2014a: 147; 1 and Schiff, 2014b: 74). These different aspects of segregation make visible the near congruence in misrecognition and maldistribution in the social exclusion of the Roma.

## *Political Participation and Voice*

Political participation illustrates another example of processes shaping Roma exclusion. Taking her starting point on how minority rights were inscribed in the 1993 Hungarian Constitution, Szalai emphasizes the fact that these rights were aimed at protecting the cultural rights of 13 national minorities. This left little space for Roma to challenge the forms of discrimination and exclusionary processes that were sustained and would be intensified in the shift toward a neoliberal market economy: their disadvantage in employment, education and social entitlements (Szalai, 2008; 2014a). As Szalai notes, the Roma increased political representation in the 1990s in Hungary (as was true of all minority groups). De-centralization, which could have enabled them to take a major role in promoting Roma rights and concerns; nevertheless, this was thwarted (2014a). First by a law, which restricted who can claim minority identity, and second, by the Roma's dependence on the municipalities (the local majority) for allocating resources. With little perceptible change in their situation, trust in local representatives declined and interest in the political sphere waned (this also occurred in Romania with different political initiatives and structures for increasing the Roma's political influence; Szalai 2014a). What can be gleaned from this outcome is that political representation is not equivalent to political voice, specifically in recognition struggles when the group is highly stigmatized, has weak capabilities, and is spatially and socially segregated from the dominant majority.

This brings us back to a key dimension in recognition struggles highlighted by Philips (2003) in her epilogue as well as the other essays in *Recognition Struggles and Social Movements* on the importance of group agency and collective voice, missing in Fraser's frame of status subordination.[2] Szalai's analysis of the tensions within the politics of difference, when it comes to the Roma, reveals that when cultural rights are the main frame for recognition, other claims for social rights, inclusion and membership are shaded out; nonetheless addressing misrecognition of a cultural group necessitates collective voice for political visibility and the representation of its members.

These multiple faces of exclusion and segregation work in tandem inhibiting Roma from achieving full citizenship. Despite the recognition of the international community of the need for breaking the cycle of exclusion and segregation in launching the Decade of the Roma, the question remains why there has not more change and what are the possibilities for activating recognition struggles that could

[2] Iris Marion Young (1990) in her pioneer work on Justice and the Politics of Difference prioritized the political representation of a social group, arguing that it is essential for achieving recognition and redistribution. Well-known is Fraser's critique of this position (see: Fraser, 1997).

transform institutions and alter daily practices. Júlia Szalai's research provides crucial perspectives on both these questions when confronting the dilemmas and complexities in recognition struggles and how they are played out in the case of the Roma.

## *Dilemmas and Challenges in Recognition Struggles*

Szalai's fine-grained analysis of the Roma social movement makes visible more generally the challenges in recognition struggles mirrored in the tensions and hierarchies within them: (1) how do these movements create and sustain solidarities; and (2) how do they ensure that their voices and influence in policies being heard in the initiatives to improve their condition when global actors are speaking for them and trans-national institutions distributing the resources for development programs.

There are many constraints in creating solidarities within a marginalized group; however one that has be overcome is the fragmentation in identities that hinders collective response to exclusion. Hence, the tendency of the better off Roma in Central European countries to distance themselves from the plight of the poorest and most marginalized Roma, undermines a crucial component in successful recognition struggles, the creation of group solidarity. For instance, the Roma established in settlements can be hostile to new migrants (the poorest of the poor). This distancing occurs even among Roma representing their constituencies in settlements who seek to be accepted by the majority. Furthermore, some local Roma politicians have abandoned the Roma party altogether motivated by their desire to have more influence in policymaking. This lack of solidarity not only weakens the capabilities of Roma to challenge discrimination and exclusion, but also reinforces stereotypes.

Fraser's caution against group politics and collective identities needs to be reassessed when considering social exclusion of the Roma. Speaking in one voice for a group can result in the reification of identities and shade out diversities and differences within a group, still cultural frames affirming self-worth that transcend differences are central to mobilizing devalued and misrecognized groups. Here Honneth's (2003) emphasis on the psychological subject and social dimensions are salient for the recognition struggle of the Roma where stigma and shame are internalized and self-realization of one's own experiences of devaluation are connected to a group membership. At the same time, self-affirming cultural frames are central to mobilizing misrecognized groups.[3] In her analysis of ethnic communities, Szalai (2014) highlights the importance of a shared historical narrative, which can create cohesion within a group and legitimate their movement for social rights and citizenship among the broader public.

This aspect of reclaiming and recasting the historical narrative has been central in the early phases of various recognition struggles: in the feminist movement, books with titles such as *Herstory* (Ashby et al., 1995); and projects, such as Marilyn Lake's rewriting of the Australian history viewed from the double lens of women's exploitation and their contribution to the national narrative (Lake, 1995; Grimshaw et

[3] Pride is a central trope in LGBT struggles for recognition; transcending distinctions between respectable/non respectable; 'Black is beautiful' became linked to black empowerment and struggles for respect.

al., 2000). The emergence of Afro-American history in the US provided an alternative reading of the national narrative and is now an established research topic in most American universities, with its own canon of literature and numerous journals. It has even become part of the curriculum in secondary education, officially recognized during the Black History month.[4]

The Roma in Europe have not had the same impact on European educational institutions and to do so would necessitate a redrafting 'history from scratch'; a grievous exercise that would require the courage to re-evaluate memories and 'deeply ingrained national values' (Szalai, 2013a: 137) of the majority population, not feasible in the current climate in many Eastern and Central European countries where there has been a rise in nationalist movements.

Within the context of marginalization and exclusionary processes, Szalai concedes that affirming cultural difference can result in exclusion and disadvantage, specifically minority languages within schools that weaken the chances of minority youth to compete with majority youth. However, she also notes that for some groups, segregated ethnic communities can offer youth a 'safe haven' against discrimination and disrespect establishing their own schools and neighborhood centers (Szalai and Schiff, 2014b: 239; Szalai, 2014: 277-278). Nevertheless, these safe havens also limit broader contacts with the majority. This is expressed by ethnic youth in many European countries reflected in their desire to achieve higher education and better positions in the labor market, while at the same time feel the pull of the community for protection against racism (Szalai and Schiff, 2014b: 79),[5] This dilemma over claims for cultural difference and integration is less salient for the Roma in Hungary, where forced assimilation under the Soviet Regime erased their language. Furthermore, the extreme poverty and marginalization in segregated Roma communities cannot provide protections or resilience against discrimination for their youth (Szalai, 2014b; 240-241); for those who seek to achieve respect and wellbeing, not voice, but the exit option is the path most often taken, which results in a void in leadership in their communities.

## *Authority and Voice*

Who speaks for the group can reflect hierarchies across gender, class, ethnicity and education can shade out plurality and difference within collectivities (Hobson, 2003: Introduction), as well as weaken the capabilities of the potential of the group for greater participation in public discourse and policy. This is particularly true when the authorities to speak for them are professional experts, outside the group. There are instances when marginalized groups cannot speak for themselves and rely on others, i.e. the undocumented who risk deportation or women in Saudi Arabia who are totally under the guardianship of relatives. However, most often, subordinated groups are not willing to give up their voice and authorize experts to speak for them. Undeniably, transnational actors at the EU level and working in international NGOs have given voice to the plight of Roma and allocated resources for development projects that

[4] See: http://www.history.com/topics/black-history; Accessed September 2017.

[5] Vincze (2014: 204-205) discusses this dilemma within the context of the Roma in Romania, in terms of the strategies of ethnic identification and the ambiguities of belonging.

would improve their situation. Still, these experts inadvertently contribute to perpetuating the assumption of the majority populations in Central European societies that the Roma lack the capabilities to govern themselves. For example, according to Szalai, NGOs in charge of EU initiatives for investments in infrastructure and education for the Roma, have not included the Roma in planning or implementation (Szalai, 2014a: 158). Hence, providing them with good jobs not only would increase skills but also lead to the creation of other jobs for Roma; these forms of inclusion would serve to legitimatize the Roma as active agents for making change in their communities. Transnational actors can be a venue giving agency and voice to groups with less resources, as seen in the Black, Ethnic and Women's Migration Project supported by the European's Women's Lobby (discussed by Williams, 2003). However, this example may be more the exception than the rule for the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as the Roma, who are highly dependent on NGOs for access to economic and social resources. There is an abundant literature on the ways in which NGOs interpret and translate the experiences of those who are objects of their development programs to fit a narrative of the victimization and weak capabilities of aid recipients that their donors expect to hear (Gal et al., 2015).

## *Beyond Recognition and Redistribution: Taking the Conversation Further*

The challenges and dilemmas in the recognition paradigm have encouraged many of us in the book project to seek other frameworks for explaining complex inequalities that emerge from misrecognition and maldistribution. Two frameworks, intersectionalities and capabilities, integrated and elaborated in Júlia Szalai's work, have inspired the theoretical and empirical directions in my own research.

Current theorizing on intersectionality in the social sciences has moved beyond an additive approach (gender plus class plus race) toward a complex use of intersectionality as an analytical tool for revealing complex inequalities shaped by multiple identities and intersections in gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexualities, and disabilities (Collins and Bilge, 2016). Moreover, there has been an institutional turn in the intersectional approach that focuses on social processes and social systems (McCall, 2005; Choo and Ferree, 2010) shaping inequalities. This approach assumes that the individual is situated along different axes of geographical, economic, social, citizenship, and migrant status, embedded in different institutional contexts. More emphasis is laid upon broader social processes and their effects, such as welfare state restructuring, neoliberal policies, global capitalism, and migration flows, all of which need to be understood in terms of variations in situated agency and differential power resources (Collins and Bilge, 2016).

The transition economies (Central Eastern European countries) provide a laboratory for analyzing how macro processes shape multiple interacting dimensions across a range of social dimensions such as gender, class, ethnicity, age, and their intersections, and how these are constituted within dominant institutions and hierarchies (McCall, 2005; Choo and Ferree, 2010). Anticipating this evolution in theorizing intersectionalities, Szalai's analysis reveals how the shift to market economy and the emergence of neoliberal policies shaped destinies and power relations,

reflected in the intersections in class and gender, minority statuses and ethnicity. The emergence of private markets, entrepreneurialism and government subsidies benefited high-skilled men more than women. The revamping of the welfare system from universalism to needs-based means-tested, opened up a career path for women without jobs after the regime change who became the administrators of a system that etched out the ethnic divide in welfare provisions solidifying the association between Roma and the undeserving poor (Szalai, 2013a).

In some of Szalai's recent work on recognition, based upon a large-scale Framework 7 European project on ethnic differences and education in several European countries (EDUMIGROM, of which she was project director), the intersectional framework is explicit. She and her collaborators elaborated and contextualized the ethnic ceiling education in several European societies, focusing on the salience of national discourses on structures within ethnic communities (Szalai, 2014b). Here differences in new and old ethnic communities are visible; the latter prevalent in France and the UK, have provided a greater sense of cohesion, as well as resources and networks for employment. Residential segregation by class is an important factor hindering educational opportunities of ethnic youth, most pronounced in the situation of Roma where residence mirrors social exclusion and where class can be disaggregated in degrees of poverty and marginalization. Internal migration is another process shaping intersectionalities and inequalities (discussed above), resulting from the displacement of Roma from desirable areas for development where the majority population now resides. Internal migration has created distinctions between old and new Roma communities.

Alongside the intersectional contextual approach, Szalai has incorporated the concept of capabilities in her research on ethnic youth and school leaving (see: 2014a and 2014b). With its emphasis on situated agency and its dynamic multi-dimensional framework (Hobson, 2017), the capabilities approach offers another lens for analyzing exclusion and marginalization of ethnic minorities. The blending of these two frameworks, intersectionalities and capabilities, is found in both Júlia Szalai's and my work, resulting from the dialogues and research exchange we have had over the years. In our research, the constructions of nationhood, citizenship and social membership are bound up with the differences across social groups and within them (Szalai, 2014a; 2014b; Hobson and Lister, 2002; see also Williams, 1995). This was obvious Szalai's analysis of the citizenship rights of minorities from other countries, the more privileged, versus the Roma, a minority who have been settled in the Hungary for centuries (2014a). In my research on migrants in the care/domestic sector, the prospects for inclusion reflect differences in capabilities, between old and new migrants, between European (East versus West) and non-European (Hobson et al., 2018). Class and education also matter in social membership and inclusion of migrant care workers, whether one's training is from a preferred country (Western Europe, North America). In fact, while educational attainment is assumed to enhance capabilities, the skills and educated achievement of migrants in our study were often not recognized. Migrant status was also an important dimension shaping capabilities; whether one was documented or undocumented, particularly in societies with a low tolerance for informal work, most notably in Scandinavian countries (Hobson et al., 2018). As is evident in Szalai's study of the Roma, in our study of trans-national

migrant domestic workers, agency and choice was interconnected with ethnic stereotypes and racial hierarchies; those from African countries often received less pay; some of the clients employing domestic workers stated their preferences for young, light-skinned, blond women (Spanish interviews of employers of domestic workers) and nearly all would choose native born rather than migrants (Hobson et al., 2018).

Underscored in both Szalai's study of ethnic youth and education (2014b) and in our study of domestic workers, agency and capabilities for making alternative choices, the essence of the capabilities approach is dependent upon laws and policies of the state, but also community resources and networks (Hellgren, 2015). Furthermore, in both our cases, a lack of political voice in unions or politics weakened the capabilities and agency for making change.

Within the narratives of the Roma and the domestic workers, the experiences of disrespect and discrimination were pervasive. Having respect is one of Sen's core functionings (achievement for wellbeing and quality of life). Respect in Sen's framework is also intertwined with other capabilities: having employment, completing one's education, having a decent place to live (Sen, 1993) and overcoming mal-redistribution, which entails major structural change. Here we come full circle back to the interplay in recognition and redistribution.

Szalai's studies of the Roma bring into stark relief the importance of overcoming the recognition and redistribution dichotomy and creating a synthesis between them in order to understand the marginalization of groups and strategies for achieving social justice. As Phillips has argued, these two frames exist in nearly all movements for social inclusion. Even in movements at the end of the continuum, such as LGBT rights, considered to be the pure type of recognition politics (Fraser, 1995), there has been an emphasis on claims for social resources including access to social rights, such as pensions and parental leave, since partnership and marriage has been legally recognized by many countries. At the other end of the spectrum are the Roma where there is near congruence in recognition and redistribution struggles in which cultural stereotypes are harnessed to justify inequalities in employment, schools, and political voice and representation, and in which structural change and redistribution of public goods are crucial for breaking these stereotypes and ending cycle of poverty.

As is obvious from this celebration of Júlia Szalai's contribution to the debates of recognition/redistribution, whereas the cultural wars in identity politics dominated the 1990s, in this century, recognition struggles are interlocked with distributional wars, reflecting the growing divide between rich and poor in many advanced capitalist societies. Júlia Szalai's research resonates, as we witness the competition and tension between disadvantaged minorities and the growing numbers among the majority with insecure futures and precarious employment, which is one factor considered in the rise of populist right. Misrecognition is experienced by both marginal groups, among racial/ethnic minorities and those in the majority population. Elites have played the race/ethnicity/religion card: dividing precarious white workers from blacks and creating an ethnic and religious backlash that reverberates in nationalist movements

among the native-born majority, thus inhibiting solidarities and movements for greater redistribution.

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TERRY COX *

# Bifurcation and Stratification in Post-Socialist Welfare Regimes

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## Abstract[1]

The essay assesses the work of Júlia Szalai on the concept of the bifurcated welfare state as a contribution to the debate on welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. It locates her work in the context of the debate around Esping-Andersen's ideal types of welfare state regimes and sees the bifurcated welfare state as offering a means of understanding the key features of hybrid welfare states in East Central Europe. The essay then examines evidence in support of the concept and explores possible ways in which the idea may contribute to the research agenda on welfare regimes.

*Keywords:* Welfare state, Welfare regime, Bifurcation, Stratification, Dualisation.

[1] The ideas explored in this essay are the outcome of discussions with Júlia Szalai in recent years. I am also grateful for the comments of Dorottya Szikra and two anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of this essay, although the particular interpretations here are mine and cannot necessarily be attributed to Júlia or the reviewers, and any errors of interpretation or fact are mine alone.

In the course of her distinguished career, Júlia Szalai has made a number of significant contributions to developing a sociological understanding of a wide range of social changes since the 1980s in Hungary and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including entrepreneurs in post-socialist Hungary, and issues of social rights, social welfare, education, gender, ethnicity and poverty. Underlying her analyses of these social issues has been an understanding of a deepening social division at the basis of societies in the CEE region in emerging welfare regimes. As proposed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990: 2), 'to talk of "a regime" is to denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy a complex of legal and organisational features are systematically interwoven'; and although each society comprises a unique set of characteristics in detail, a way to understand their systematic character is to develop typologies of the key features whose combination helps us to understand the way peoples' livelihoods and life chances are shaped.

The particular contribution of Júlia Szalai to this endeavour has been to explore the tendency towards what she has described as a bifurcated welfare state in CEE countries, whereby those in more influential positions in society are successful in gaining an advantage or defending existing privileges in the provision of welfare, leading to the creation of two distinct segments of society with very different and unequal rights and entitlement to shares in the distribution of welfare. Originating in the work of scholars in the US to describe inequalities in welfare provision there, Szalai has adapted and developed the concept to provide an analysis of key features of an emerging systematic complex of arrangements, or welfare state regimes, which typify the provision of welfare in Hungary and other CEE countries.

This essay proceeds by first discussing welfare provision in CEE countries in the context of the welfare regime literature, then examining Júlia Szalai's ideas on the bifurcated welfare state and evidence for the latter in more detail, and finally by assessing her work as a contribution to theories of welfare state regimes.

## *1. The Welfare Regime Debate and Central and Eastern Europe*

Since the early 1990s a growing body of scholarly work has sought to discuss the transformation of 'state socialist' welfare arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the context of their wider transition to market economies. Key questions concern the extent to which governments are involved in the provision of public welfare or the regulation of private and market-based welfare arrangements; how governments 'redistribute income, either through insurance schemes that mitigate risk or through spending on basic social services that are of particular significance to the poor' (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008: 3); and what consequences such choices have for the extent and character of inequality, social exclusion and poverty in a given society.

Research on welfare in the region has included studies of the politics of social policy (Cook, 2007; Cox, 2007; Cox and Gallai, 2012; Offe, 1993; Orenstein, 2008; Potůček, 2008), changing pensions policies (Fultz, 2002; Orenstein, 2008; Szalai, 2004), the influence of international organisations on welfare policies in the region (Deacon and Hulse 1997; Orenstein and Haas 2005), welfare assistance (Braithwaite et al., 2000; Nelson, 2010; Ringold and Kasek, 2007), and empirical studies of the

consequences of changing welfare provision for the poverty, income inequality and security of different social groups (Dudwick et al., 2005; EBRD, 2011; Emigh and Szelényi, 2001; Smith et al., 2008; Swain, 2011; Szalai, 2006). Further studies have focused on the forces shaping the emergence of post-socialist welfare provision in terms of long-term historical legacies (Cerami and Vanhuysee, 2009; Inglot, 2008) and the immediate political needs of post-socialist ruling political elites in managing the high costs of the economic transition, reducing welfare spending and dividing and pacifying competing social groups (Vanhuysse, 2006; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012).

A further significant theme in the literature on the new social welfare arrangements in CEE countries concerns the question of how they relate to the wider literature on theories of welfare state regimes or welfare regimes, including whether they represent a new post-socialist type of welfare state regime or a hybrid type (or types), combining aspects of existing types that have been developed to understand societies outside the CEE region.

In recent research on welfare in CEE countries in terms of welfare regimes a range of arguments has been put forward about whether post-socialist countries in general approximate any of the types identified in the existing literature, whether they typically combine elements of more than one type, or whether a new post-socialist welfare regime is emerging (Fenger, 2007; Ferge, 2008; Hay and Wincott, 2012). Some scholars have suggested that different new post-socialist regime types can be identified; for example, separately for Russia, the Baltic countries, Central Europe, and South-East Europe (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). For Cerami (2006), the provision of social welfare in East European countries combines characteristics of the pre-communist Bismarckian welfare state, based on social insurance schemes that compensate employees for loss of income in adverse social circumstances, the more universalistic system of communist regimes, and post-communist market-based elements. Similar views stressing the hybrid nature of CEE welfare arrangements are proposed, for example, in Cerami and Vanhuysse (eds.) (2009), where the newly emerging post-communist arrangements are described as combining different elements typical of different mature welfare states elsewhere in Europe and beyond. Also, for Inglot (2008) CEE countries have developed some heterogeneous tendencies, but all from a common basis in Bismarckian systems that were then adapted at various times, both under communist rule and in the post-communist period, to cope with new emergencies in welfare provision. Inglot suggested CEE welfare states may be seen as 'emergency' welfare states, referring to their provision of welfare according to cycles of (economic and political) crises, rather than modes and sources of redistribution. Similarly, Szikra and Tomka (2009) also stressed the volatility of CEE welfare states that has resulted from frequent (paradigmatic) reforms following changes of government. Recognising this diversity, Kovács et al. (2017: 194) in a recent review of the literature suggested there is now a consensus among scholars concerning the hybrid nature of CEE welfare states.

However, underlying the emerging consensus on hybridity a major methodological theme running through this literature (as with the welfare regime literature more widely) has been the issue of identifying the most appropriate methodology for identifying different types of welfare state regime. As noted by Aspalter (2012), one approach has been to construct ideal types of the kind originally

proposed by Max Weber. Here the strategy of enquiry, based on deductive reasoning, is to identify key features of an ideal type to use as a yardstick in comparison with more complex reality and to produce hypotheses for empirical analysis. This may be contrasted with real types that are constructed through a process of inductive reasoning to reflect the patterns in which a range of empirical characteristics cluster together to form recognisable regularly occurring types.

Some of the most comprehensive CEE welfare state regime studies have adopted a real typical analysis. Pioneering work of this kind includes that by Fenger (2007), who used a combination of macro-economic, socio-economic and trust indicators to delineate three different types of CEE welfare state, comprising a former Soviet type (including both Russia and the Baltic countries), a post-communist European type (including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as well as Bulgaria and Croatia), and a developing welfare state type (including Romania, Moldova and Georgia).

A more recent example is provided by Kati Kuitto (2016) who carried out a comparative statistical analysis of European countries, including ten CEE EU-member countries,[2] across three dimensions of welfare provision: first, in terms of the organisational principles of welfare provision (that is, whether welfare provision was financed mainly from social contributions collected from employers and employees along the lines of a Bismarckian approach, or whether welfare was financed mainly from tax revenue along Beveridgean lines); second, welfare policy emphasis (whether welfare support was targeted towards cash spending on specific categories such as old age pensions and sickness benefits, or towards social services); and third, decommodifying potential (the degree of generosity of support that effectively compensates for loss of income from labour or other markets).

Using data about the ten countries for the period 2005-2007, Kuitto found 'the results negate the emergence of a unitary Central and Eastern European model of welfare and, instead, verify the emergence of differing hybrid models of welfare across the post-communist countries' (Kuitto, 2016: 162-63). All the CEE countries relied on social contributions from employers and employees to finance welfare, with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia relying on them particularly strongly. They all approximated the conservative corporatist type by emphasising spending on old age benefits and health care and awarding low importance to social services. In terms of decommodification, they all provided working age unemployment and sickness benefits, with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia doing so more generously than the other countries of the region (Kuitto, 2016: 162-64). Furthermore, outside the usual social security focus of the welfare regime typologies, 'social services play only a marginal role in the financial commitment of governments [...] [and] to a great extent are either transposed to market-based solutions or back to responsibilities of families'. This has occurred alongside 'liberal tendencies of privatisation' including the 'increasing individualization of social risks' in some fields of welfare such as social care (Kuitto, 2016: 176).

Kuitto suggests her findings support 'views characterizing the CEE welfare states as hybrids. [...] Despite the comparably low levels of welfare effort and some

[2] Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

privatization of social security, the emerging CEE welfare states are in many ways completely distinct from [...] the ideal-typical liberal welfare model. [...] Instead, the spectrum of welfare policy arrangements [...] ranges from conservative corporatist Bismarckian to social democratic universalistic elements, with varying degrees and mixtures of each' (Kuitto, 2016: 177).

While Kuitto's research drew on data for the years immediately before the financial crisis of 2008, she notes that the impact of the crisis, EU fiscal constraints and subsequent changes in social policy in some countries in the region have affected levels of social security benefits and the amount of funding available for welfare more generally. This has made an increasing number of people more vulnerable in terms of their social security status and widened the gap between those who are relatively secure and those who are not, with implications for the overall character of welfare regimes in CEE countries. As Kuitto notes, 'The imprints of the welfare policy patterns as identified in this study therefore point to a high risk of dualization of welfare in the CEE countries, in the sense that the few labor market insiders are provided with relatively generous welfare benefits, while an increasing number of labor market outsiders are left with low levels of social assistance (Kuitto, 2016: 183-84).

A significant achievement of this growing body of research that employs a 'real typical' methodology has been the creation of an increasingly detailed and nuanced picture of the range of welfare provision arrangements in the CEE region. In its detail and comprehensiveness, Kuitto's study demonstrates the benefits of a multidimensional real typical approach in constructing regime types, taking a wide range of characteristics into account and examining how they cluster together to form regular types. However, such work also loses some of the clarity that an ideal typical approach can offer through suggesting what the key defining characteristics are that distinguish different regimes from each other in comparative analysis, and which help with formulating hypotheses to explain the occurrence and development of particular welfare regimes. Such are the advantages of an ideal typical approach, as pioneered by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990).

Esping-Andersen's work was important inspiration for research on welfare regimes in general. His ideal types of welfare state regime, initially proposed for the 'old' OECD member countries, were based on how the state in some way acted as a corrective for the worst effects of market capitalism on peoples' livelihoods by introducing a degree of 'decommodification' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). He proposed the three types of state: liberal, where the state leaves families and individuals to secure their welfare and subsistence through the market and only provides for residual narrowly targeted needs; conservative/corporatist, where the state organises or regulates insurance against loss of income from work, aimed at male workers as providers for their families; and social democratic, based on universalistic principles and providing income compensation in response to needs, irrespective of past employment history (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-27).[3]

[3] Subsequent modifications have been introduced by others to take account of a wider range of countries (Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1992); including gender differences (Anttonen and Sipilä, 1992; Sainsbury, 1996), to identify quantitative indicators and measures of the extent to which societies cluster into one or

The two key variables in the formulation of Esping-Andersen's ideal types were decommodification and social stratification, with decommodification being the main defining variable. Each different regime provides a different level of decommodification mainly through the degree of generosity of its social insurance benefits (measured by his decommodification index), either to maintain or reduce the degree to which citizens are subject to market forces in securing their welfare. At the same time, the different arrangements for the provision of social welfare can be examined both as the outcome of class relations and as an influence on patterns of social stratification. Different complexes of arrangements, or welfare regimes, could be seen as the outcomes of different class alliances, or more accurately, as the result of the interplay of class mobilisations, coalitions between classes, and state institutions for the adoption of particular policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 3-4, 58). Bearing in mind the different advantages Weberian scholars have argued that an ideal typical analysis provides for comparative research and for understanding the key social processes and relations that may explain the formation of different regimes, the delineation of ideal types of the kind proposed by Esping-Andersen can make an important contribution to understanding the formation of CEE welfare regimes. This does not exclude the idea that CEE welfare regimes may be hybrids, but that their hybrid nature can be best understood as a combination of elements of different more abstract ideal types, rather than resulting from statistical clustering of a wider range of data. In the context of the literature on CEE welfare states, the work of Júlia Szalai on the bifurcated welfare state can be seen as an important contribution to the ideal typical analysis.

## *2. The Work of Júlia Szalai*

The conceptual framework for the development of Szalai's ideas draws on a range of sociological thinkers, including especially Max Weber and T. H. Marshall.

In her sociological research Szalai has drawn on the interpretive sociology of Max Weber (Shils and Finch, 1949), including his methodological writings that call for explanations that both uncover the economic and political causes of social patterns and offer explanations 'at the level of meaning', that draw on peoples' own testimonies to show how they understood the ways of life they were leading; and in his proposals that research should seek explanations through the construction of ideal types to explore the relations between multiple variables that are part of the overall explanations of particular social patterns. There is also a clear Weberian influence in her work on contemporary post-socialist societies as the outcomes of complex patterns of social differentiation involving the interconnected nature of class, gender, ethnic and cultural differences that can be revealed by a combination of statistical and textual analyses and qualitative research based on interviews and observation.

Szalai draws on the ideas of Marshall (1964), in particular on the evolution of civil, political and social rights, and their further development by Will Kymlicka (1995). From Marshall, Szalai takes the idea that the extension of different kinds of rights across a population was a gradual process whereby social rights for all social

another type (Kangas, 1994; Arts and Gelissen, 2002); and to incorporate additional dimensions into the methodology (Bonoli, 1997; Castles, 2009).

groups were obtained through a political struggle that built on existing civil and political rights, and by implication, therefore, cannot be imposed 'top-down'. To this, a further key idea in understanding contemporary societies is the way rights can be extended in situations of greater cultural heterogeneity, for example, to ethnic and national minorities. In examining CEE societies, and particularly Hungary from the early 1990s, Szalai has sought to understand the factors enabling or constraining the extension of social rights in conditions where economic and political transition have extended civil and political rights across the population, not only in terms of class and gender, but also including ethnicity, and especially in the Hungarian context, the Roma minority (Szalai, 2013: 3-4).

These themes are evident throughout Szalai's work, but in what follows I will focus on their importance in her work on the evolution of distinct patterns of welfare provision in Hungary and other CEE societies. For Szalai, in the early 1990s in Hungary there was consensus among a wide range of different political actors in favour of dismantling the previous overweening power of the state and in creating institutions to safeguard civil and political freedoms, and making major reforms in the provision of social security and welfare (Szalai, 2012: 285). In seeking social policy reforms there was wide agreement that the imposed universalism of the communist regime had in fact 'brought about massive social injustice by routinely channelling substantial funds to the relatively prosperous strata of society', and thus wasting resources by providing funding where it was not really needed. Therefore, the aim was to create a 'new system that would not only become more targeted but also more just' (Szalai, 2012: 286). However, this was based on the assumption that economic transition would enable the development of an economy guided by principles of a social market, whereas the actual outcome was reforms based more on neo-liberal economic ideas.

In the initial context of the post-transition recession and more general pressures of globalisation and competition from international companies, domestic economic policy was geared to creating a stable capital market and giving support to local employers. For Szalai, however, 'it is above all in the realm of employment that the state's presence in welfare has been proclaimed [...]. Under these conditions it has again fallen to the state, in its welfare role, to meet the need for preventing and protecting against the risk of poverty' (Szalai, 2012: 291). As a result, the main focus of social policy was in supporting pensions and unemployment benefit for those who through their employment had made contributions to the system. Under difficult economic circumstances and the adoption of austerity policies, the main area where governments could make cuts without serious political opposition was social assistance.

Szalai has developed her ideas on social welfare and the bifurcated welfare state in a series of conference papers, books and articles over a number of years since the 1990s.[4] In some versions the argument has been confined to the provision of welfare in Hungary, although increasingly the general argument has been applied to post-socialist societies more widely. Her argument has been that a tendency towards the

[4] The discussion here draws on two of the most developed and succinct presentations of Szalai's ideas in English (Szalai, 2012; 2013). However, the most detailed expression of her views is included in her book in Hungarian (Szalai, 2007). See also: Szalai (1997) and Szalai (2006).

development of a bifurcated welfare state existed in the countries of Eastern Europe, whereby those in more influential positions in society have gained advantage or have defended existing privileges in the provision of welfare, leading to the creation of two distinct segments of society with very different and unequal rights and entitlements to sharing the distribution of welfare.

For Szalai, use of the state budget to maintain insurance-based social security for the employed and those with stable employment histories, along with selective provision of social assistance to those in need who do not qualify for social security, whether intended or not, has had a significant impact on the overall character of the welfare state in Hungary. The creation of such a dual welfare structure was a betrayal of the liberal vision of welfare reform of the early 1990s, and may actually be seen as the main defining characteristic of the emerging welfare state, thus bringing about a bifurcated welfare state.

The concept of a bifurcated welfare system has its origins in research on welfare provision in the US (Lieberman, 2002; Schram, 2010). However, a major contribution to the literature by Szalai has been to adapt the concept to what she sees as the emergence of a stable situation in CEE, where movement between the two sectors of the bifurcated welfare state has become increasingly difficult. The social policy adopted by successive governments in Hungary has accomplished 'the canalization of a significant section of the affected social groups into a sealed subdivision of welfare provisions', while for more fortunate sections of the population, 'social security benefits have provided protection against falling into poverty'. And since 'contributions have hardly been able to keep pace with the needs that these shifts imply [...] it is the central state that has been left to bridge this gap'. Moreover, 'despite initial expectations of creating a separation between state and civil society, the state has remained an agent in defining the content of social citizenship' (Szalai, 2012: 292-93). Thus, the outcome was 'the evolution of a bifurcated welfare system with hermetically separated structures of provisions for the well-integrated and the marginalized groups of society', which is not only a departure from Marshall's ideas on social citizenship and the evolution of social rights, but 'a long-term departure from the western European path' (Szalai, 2012: 299-300).[5]

The pursuit of the policies behind the formation of the bifurcated welfare state have to be understood, according to Szalai, in the context of the power relations and conflicts of interest in which those whose economic positions afford them more influence over government are able to successfully press their claims in terms of social welfare. These include claims for compensation for lost income or job stability as a result of economic restructuring and recession, along with claims by groups in stable employment or with a history of it that they are more deserving of support as a result of the contributions they have made, and sometimes even their more responsible and respectable lifestyles. Drawing on the ideas of Habermas (1994), she describes these claims as 'recognition struggles' (Szalai, 2003). Such claims match the preconceptions of those in power regarding the need for political stability and the preservation of a workforce that is either participating in, or at least is available for the needs of business. Thus, for Szalai, 'in addition to the pressures that [result from] the extra

[5] For a detailed discussion of the departure of Hungary from the European welfare model, see: Scharle and Szikra (2015).

burdens and risks of marketisation, there are also important cultural and attitude factors at play when claiming the state's long-term protection. [...] Widely varying groups consider that the time has come for the state to compensate them for their historical grievances and their decades of "lagging behind", to give them open assistance for the advancement they "deserve"' (Szalai, 2013: 7).

By putting the development of the bifurcated welfare state in the context of such conflicts of interest and political struggles, Szalai's work marks a welcome return to one of the key ideas in Esping-Andersen's original analysis: 'to identify the causes behind welfare state diversity' in the prevailing relations between classes and other groups in society. For Esping-Andersen, his three welfare regimes were the 'outcomes of distinct types of cross-class coalitions. Different patterns of social stratification were historically the midwives of different welfare state conceptions' (Esping-Andersen, 2015: 124-125). Esping-Andersen's research mainly focused on social insurance benefits and their generosity (especially the decommodification index). This is a major difference between his and Szalai's work. Szalai's in-depth research in the 1990s and 2000s mainly focused on social assistance. In this way she sought to examine how those who fail to qualify for social insurance benefits fared.

The abovementioned canalisation of the less fortunate into a sealed subdivision of welfare provision was effected, according to Szalai, by the devolution of social assistance provisions to local government, and specifically 'by calling thousands of new offices into being, with tens of thousands of decent middle-class jobs [which] [...] created a refuge for many of those made vulnerable to dismissals during the process of economic restructuring'. This had a number of implications, including the provision 'of an institutional background to enable the non-poor majority to deal with poverty as a minority problem, separate from its own "normal" affairs' (Szalai, 2012: 294), and to do so in a fragmented way where different local government bodies are required to provide assistance to those defined as being in need according to criteria that may differ from one locality to another, to be implemented by a variety of low-level officials who will bring their own judgements into play concerning who is in need through no fault of their own and who is undeserving because they do not qualify according to the criteria of 'acceptable reasons' for being in need: 'In this new order of localized welfare, the keyword is distinction, which [...] is the borderline between accepted and unaccepted forms of need. However, due to the lack of any universal norms for the assessment of need, the new decentralized arrangements leave this assessment process to the discretion of local welfare providers who establish their criteria with exclusive reference to the community in which they operate'. This, in turn, leads to the 'reinvention of the centuries-old idea of deservingness' and to the creation of a category of welfare recipients who are seen as the deserving poor (Szalai, 2012: 295).

Moreover, since such judgements are often made by ethnic Hungarian officials in relation to Roma minority welfare applicants who have no stable employment history, the system becomes not only class-biased but ethnically biased as well. Since at the time of the system change the Roma were predominantly employed in 'unskilled positions in the least developed segments of industry and agriculture', they became 'the first victims of marketisation: mass unemployment suddenly turned to the general experience of an entire minority. The majority meanwhile, did not see anything

unusual in this: cutting off Roma communities in their totality from access to employment has gradually developed into a self-justifying argument for "minoritization" – that is, for creating "other" schemes of welfare for people who are not "us"' (Szalai, 2012: 10-11).

In developing her concept of the bifurcated welfare state, Szalai has made a significant new development in the debate on welfare regimes, and in particular, has offered a new ideal typical approach in the tradition of Esping-Andersen as a contrast and a complement to the real typical approaches that have been dominant in the field. Moreover, in her own writing on Hungary she has provided evidence using statistics and interviews to illustrate her ideas. The next step, however, in line with Weber's methodology, would be to hold up this ideal type against a wider body of evidence to examine how far it is able to explain the emerging character of welfare provision in CEE countries.

In the following section I will examine some evidence from earlier studies and tentatively assess how far the bifurcated welfare state concept explains the emerging situation in CEE countries. Of course, the sources of the social exclusion of particular sections of society, and hence the basis for bifurcation, can be seen in a number of different areas of social policy (Kovács et al., 2017: 202). However, following Szalai, the focus here will be on examining the effects of how social assistance is provided, how far current welfare systems lead to the creation of two distinct segments of society with different standards of living and different life chances, and how far access to assistance is being restricted to people who are regarded by those responsible for providing assistance as deserving of it.

## *3. Assessing the Evidence: The Example of Social Assistance*

A key feature of the concept of the bifurcated welfare state is the use by governments of devolved forms of social assistance, not as part of universal welfare provision through income maintenance for all those in need in the population, but as a selective means of providing minimal assistance which in practice, if not by design, is only available to some of the poor.

Studies of social assistance in CEE countries from the early 1990s until the time of EU accession found that it only reached small sections of the population and involved low levels of funding (Ringold et al., 2007). Such findings were confirmed through analysis of more detailed data from the SaMip database of social assistance benefit levels by Kenneth Nelson (2010). To examine the question 'whether social assistance is offered at levels that enable households to leave poverty', and comparing the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (and Spain) and with all the old EU member countries together, Nelson calculated social assistance adequacy rates which compare benefits to median incomes for the year 2000. He found that 'adequacy rates among the European transition countries [...] are below the adequacy rates for the old EU democracies [and] especially in Estonia and Hungary, social assistance is far from providing adequate protection against poverty' (Nelson, 2010: 373). Moreover, the new member countries of ECE were increasingly falling behind the older EU members in terms of levels of benefits. In 1995, benefit levels in the 'European transition countries' were on average 52 per cent of corresponding

benefits in the old EU countries, and this fell to 42 per cent in 2005 (Nelson, 2010: 375).

According to another study by Silvia Avram that focused on the post-accession period, general problems were still inherent in social assistance programmes concerning attempts to target benefits to those in need. To explore in more detail the outcomes of social assistance programmes in CEE, Avram analysed micro-data from the EU-SILC survey for incomes between 2004 and 2010 for eight countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). Among her findings were that social assistance programmes in the region were rather 'wasteful' in the sense that the share of total social assistance transfers contributing to poverty reduction was 'well below half' in the worst cases of Hungary and Latvia, and 'even in the most efficient countries (Czech Republic and Estonia) the share of well-targeted spending was below 75 per cent' (Avram, 2016: 436). More generally, her conclusion was that 'variation in programme performance notwithstanding, social assistance programmes are rather ineffectual and inefficient in dealing with poverty in all eight CEE countries. [...] The low poverty reduction achieved [...] is probably unsurprising given the (very) low level of benefits and small programme expenditure typical of this region' (Avram, 2016: 438).

Further important insights into how social assistance is administered and who it reaches can be found in a wider ranging study by Serena Romano (2014) that draws on a literature review and documentary evidence as well as statistical data to explore the social construction of poverty in CEE countries. According to Romano, policies and governmental attitudes to the provision of welfare in ECE countries since 1989 have undergone some variation, both over time and between different countries. She suggests a number of factors have influenced these variations in policy making between maintaining selectivity and adopting more universalistic minimum income schemes.

During the 1990s, under the influence of international agencies such as the World Bank and the EU, governments increasingly adopted selectivity in social assistance and family policy, providing a last resort safety net for the poorest only (Romano, 2014: 130). This tendency towards selectivity began to be reversed after the adoption by the EU of the Lisbon Strategy which encouraged the adoption of a more universalistic approach as part of a social inclusion anti-poverty agenda that, for example, favoured minimum income schemes. However, since the EU exerted only the 'soft pressure' of encouragement rather than enacting any firmer directives or incentives, in practice the new policy trend was balanced, in some countries more than others, by counter-influences such as economic problems and pressure from lobbies that resisted such policy changes, such as the elderly or the middle class.

Consequently, during the 2000s and in particular the years up to 2008 covered in detail in the Eurostat and EU-SILC data analysed by Romano, there was significant variation between CEE countries in the extent to which they attempted to adopt the EU agenda or continued to follow a selectivity agenda that supported a dualistic welfare system. On the one hand, 'certain countries (such as Hungary and Poland) tried to reform the former social protection system but they found themselves unable to alter the distributive balance between different categories of welfare claimants and the remnants of the previous passive and stigmatising orientation of social assistance

measures were hard to eliminate. Others succeeded in the transposition of EU social inclusion objectives (Czech Republic and Slovenia)' (Romano, 2014: 171).

Since the financial crisis of 2008, the situation has become increasingly complex. On the one hand, according to Romano, the influence of the EU social inclusion outlook has continued to have some effect: 'with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia, most of the post-communist countries in our studies at present have a far more inclusive approach to social protection than in the past twenty years' (Romano 2014: 203).[6] On the other hand, with the 2008 crisis leading to the adoption of austerity measures in nearly all countries of the region, one of the main strategies has been restricting eligibility for social assistance 'to increase incentives to work' and constructing 'stricter boundaries between different categories of welfare claimants, that is, between deserving and non-deserving poor. A new, moralising shift is observable almost everywhere in the post-communist countries analysed in this study. The introduction of hard forms of workfare mechanisms in CEE countries, however, is of significant importance as it could easily restore the past attitude towards the unemployed parasite predominant under the communist rule' (Romano 2014: 202-03). Similarly, Aczel et al. (2014: 53) noted in Hungary and Poland that 'social policy vocabulary often describes benefit recipients as "immature" and "passive", delegitimizing the very existence [of social assistance programmes]'.

At the time of writing, evidence was mixed concerning whether a clear process of bifurcation was occurring in welfare provision, but there was evidence that in general the governments of the CEE countries had followed the World Bank advice to devolve the provision of social assistance to the local level, resulting 'in a fragmented world of many different social assistance models, different practices and different mechanisms of implementation'. Furthermore, 'the emergence of several social assistance systems [...] has been coupled with the diffusion of several different "micro" practices implemented every day by local social workers. The outcome has been that, 'even if most CEE countries have introduced guaranteed minimum income benefits as subjective rights, the actual entitlement of families and individuals to receive the benefit [sic] is more and more dependent on controlling mechanisms on [sic] the "behaviour" of the claimant [...] for example, his/her attitude towards employment, parenting, social integration and (more recently) community work' (Romano, 2014: 210-211). Thus, in some countries 'deservingness' may be constructed not only around long-term unemployment, but also around individual family behaviour; for example, when people are seen as deliberately planning to have children in order to qualify for different kinds of payments. This coincides with Avram's comment above that 'programme eligibility rules [...] often [...] tak[e] into account household composition, capacity to work and/or accumulated assets' and are based on 'local street level discretion' (Avram, 2016: 430). For Hungary, Szikra (2014: 496) notes 'the able-bodied poor have been increasingly punished for their own situation: homelessness became criminalised and social assistance withdrawn for an increasing share of long-term unemployed'.

[6] For an outline of the social policy changes in Hungary specifically, see Scharle and Szikra (2015). The former authors note for Hungary that income surveys from 2011 show 'a substantial decline in income security [...] of the lower classes as a result of tightening access' to benefits (2015: 308).

A further question concerning identity is the extent to which in practice ethnic identity, and therefore in many CEE countries, Roma identity, is targeted as an undeserving category. For Romano, while on the basis of cross-country comparative data on poverty and social assistance ethnicity is invisible, 'the ethnic dimension in the social construction of poverty constitutes a silent variable, something that cannot be seen but that is widely recognisable in discourses, legislation and in conditionalities designed to exclude those who do not comply with societal norms. [...] [T]he boundaries defining the Roma as an undeserving category of poor are quite evident' (Romano, 2014: 218). For Hungary, Szikra (2014: 496) notes that 'poverty has an increasingly "ethnic" face', with the Roma as a proportion of all poor people increasing from 20 per cent in 2007 to a third in 2012.

Overall, as noted above by Kuitto (2016: 184) post-2008 developments are potentially leading to a 'high risk of dualization of welfare in the CEE countries'. Moreover, to the extent that a dual system of provision is emerging based on different treatment for the deserving and non-deserving poor, it can be understood very much in terms of 'the construction of class interests' as suggested by both Esping-Andersen and Szalai. According to Romano (2014: 213), 'in most of the countries analysed, the pressure exerted by the middle class to transform or preserve a given pattern of redistribution played a crucial role during the transition years'. However, the ongoing process of exclusion leading to dualisation or bifurcation extends beyond class interests in that those interests that successfully lobby for a particular pattern of redistribution may extend in some countries to questions of identity and to groups defined, for example, in terms of age and family status: 'those who are considered "part of us" are more likely to receive more than those who are "not us". In the CEE countries "us" has assumed a wide range of configurations: elderly people in post-1989 Poland, families with children in Estonia, middle classes in Hungary and (to a lesser degree) in Poland and Slovakia' (Romano, 2014: 215).

To sum up, the evidence offers some support for the conclusions that across the CEE region social assistance benefits are lower than would be required to provide for income maintenance along universalistic lines and to alleviate poverty; that to varying degrees from country to country social assistance is made available selectively according to who is judged to be deserving of support; and that following the devolution of social assistance to local governments and the contracting out of some services to companies, NGOs and church organisations, there has been an increase in inconsistency, arbitrariness and informality in deciding who receives support and in what quantities.

All these tendencies suggest the potential consolidation of a stable bifurcated welfare state to varying degrees across CEE countries and especially in Hungary and Slovakia. Further research is required to reach firmer conclusions, but if economic conditions after the 2008 crisis can be seen as contributing to the dualising, informalising trends in the provision of social assistance, then it seems likely that the continuing retrenchment and austerity of recent years may have pushed the situation further towards a bifurcated system.

## *4. Theoretical Implications*

If, as suggested above, there has been a consolidation of bifurcation in the provision of welfare in CEE countries, the question arises whether this implies the emergence of a systematically interwoven complex of features that Esping-Andersen suggested was the defining characteristic of a welfare regime. The strength of Szalai's arguments concerning the bifurcated welfare state and the wealth of evidence in the work of Romano and others provides significant support for the claim to the emergence of a systematically interwoven complex, and recognition of this as a key ideal-typical feature of welfare regimes. This could offer an important focus for further thinking on the character of welfare states in CEE countries. Particularly significant is the argument that a bifurcated system entails a qualitative change in social stratification so that poor welfare recipients without stable employment histories are not only offered inferior types of support, but that they are trapped in a subordinate and insecure social category with little or no prospect of exit from it. It may well be that such bifurcation of welfare states is more present in the CEE countries than in the 'West', and that CEE welfare states are more inclined to establish such systems. Reasons for this might include, for example, the long history of neglect of unemployment benefit and social assistance systems, and the long history of Bismarckian, status-conserving welfare arrangements in CEE countries. A third reason, which is also part of Szalai's argument, is the influence of the anti-Roma sentiments of large parts of the population and (even more importantly) the political elites.

However, if this line of reasoning is pursued, a further question must then be addressed: should a bifurcated welfare state be seen as an additional ideal type, or be better conceived as a sub-type within the three or more 'main' types proposed by Esping-Andersen or others in the debate that ensued after his original proposals? The way the term 'bifurcation' was used initially in much of the literature on welfare provision in the US suggested it was a descriptive feature of the system rather than a principal defining characteristic. This would suggest that if related to ideal types of welfare regimes, the bifurcated welfare state could be seen as a feature of some liberal welfare regimes. However, in adopting and adapting the concept of bifurcation Szalai makes two further, original points: first, that the bifurcated welfare state can be seen as a systematic regime-type complex rather than simply a feature of the existing system; and second, that the existence of a bifurcated system can be observed not only within the liberal type of welfare regime, but also in CEE countries whose welfare systems originated partly in the Bismarkian conservative/corporatist type of regime.

Seeing the bifurcated welfare state as a stable element within one or other of the 'primary' regime types regarding the resulting forms of stratification would offer conceptual insights in terms of understanding the origins and consequences of different regime types. However, following Esping-Andersen in seeing decommodification as the main defining characteristic of regime types, a bifurcated welfare state could then be seen as one possible variant in terms of the system of social stratification embedded in different regime types. Bifurcated welfare states could therefore be understood as one type of hybrid welfare state, but their hybrid nature

would be best understood as combining elements of different and more abstract ideal types, rather than resulting from statistical clustering of a wider range of data.

The ideal type of a bifurcated welfare state offers a new dimension for research on welfare regimes, or more accurately, recovers Esping-Andersen's second dimension of social stratification in the construction of ideal types of welfare regime. In Esping-Andersen's original typology his three ideal types were identified primarily with regard to how states dealt with securing welfare through decommodification. Each main strategy that formed the basis of a different ideal type of regime was then also recognised as having implications for social stratification. Subsequent research was able to explore the stratifying consequences of each type, enabling empirical research into whether each strategy had consequences for equality. However, the main application of the ideal types was in research that explored in more detail the mix of policies entailed in each type and their effectiveness and efficiency in delivering welfare to different sections of the population.

In moving down from the high level of abstraction of the three ideal types and introducing more detail, researchers were sometimes confronted (as is the norm for a Weberian ideal-type based methodology) with the reality 'on the ground' of welfare systems that did not conform very closely to the ideal types proposed by Esping-Andersen. This led to the proposal for new additional ideal types (for example, those mentioned above that incorporated questions of gender and family relations, or those which applied to different regions or groups of countries). And especially in research into CEE countries after 1989, such research has focused on the question of hybrid regimes that combine different features of two or more of the ideal types proposed by Esping-Andersen or others who sought to modify his scheme. As noted above in relation to the work of Kuitto and others, this has resulted in significant contributions to our understanding of the detailed operation and consequences of the particular welfare mixes, and their effectiveness and efficiency. However, the hybridisation argument in itself does not tell us much about how these welfare states work. One important contribution of Szalai is how she shows that beyond the hybrid welfare regimes there might be some features that fit CEE countries more than non-CEE welfare states, and that there might be important variations in bifurcation among CEE states, according to, for example, the presence of large Roma minorities, or the inclination to follow the EU social inclusion agenda.

In the discourse on welfare state regimes since the 1990s the consequences of regime types (whether pure or hybrid) for social stratification has received relatively little attention – as commented on by Esping-Andersen (2015) in a retrospective review of research since the publication of his 'Three Worlds' book. However, in the context of the globalisation, liberalisation and changes in the nature of employment, with increased casualisation and the decline of stable career structures for increasing numbers of people, and especially following the crisis of 2008 and the widespread imposition of austerity policies since then, the issues of social exclusion, poverty and inequality have received increasing attention. This has been reflected in the growing focus on dualisation and its different forms and consequences in different societies in the fields of political economy and economic sociology. As noted by Davidsson and Neczyk (2009: 1), such research has explored dualisation as reflected in the 'growth of a group of people who are at risk of finding themselves at a permanent disadvantage in

the labour market and in other spheres of society'. Moreover, such dualisation is not simply developing in parallel in the labour market and 'other spheres', but the processes in each sphere would seem to be intertwined and possibly mutually reinforcing. Such interconnections were noted as early as the 1980s by Quadrango in the US where 'changes in benefits programs are related to changes in the labor process', for example by relief programs that maintain 'a pool of marginally employed, low wage workers' who can be moved as employers require between relief assistance and poorly rewarded temporary jobs (Quadrango, 1987: 123-124). Similar interrelations have also been noted in countries with Bismarkian social insurance based welfare states (Palier, 2010).[7]

In a wider ranging analysis, Emmenegger et al. (2012: 14) argued that, driven by large-scale economic trends such as deindustrialisation and globalisation and reinforced by policy choices promoting liberalisation, in different countries to different degrees there has been growth in inequality, in the incidence of low pay and in the flexibilisation of employment, and this has prompted a political struggle 'in which politically and economically stronger groups are using their power resources to insulate themselves from the negative effects of structural pressures', and this 'translates into the social policy realm'. There it can be seen in 'a process of dualization' where policies increasingly differentiate rights, entitlements and services provided to different categories of recipients' (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 8).

There are close parallels between this analysis, embedded in the political economy literature on dualisation, and Szalai's analysis of the emergence of the bifurcated welfare state. Accordingly, there would seem to be a potential agenda for research that explores these connected dualisation processes in the economic and social sphere that could yield new insights in their genesis and trajectories. As suggested above, such research aimed at providing a macro-level explanation of social processes is better served by a methodology that seeks to provide an account based on ideal type abstractions of the factors that are hypothesised to be the main determinants of the processes under examination. Although real type analysis may be better suited to providing rich and empirically complex descriptions of prevailing forms of welfare regimes, there is an important role for ideal typical approaches such as those derived from Esping-Andersen's work, and of which the work of Julia Szalai on the bifurcated welfare state is an important contribution.

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[7] While the dualisation literature has mainly focused on labour market exclusion and inclusion, the issue of new, fragile forms of employment and the private – public divide, for example in the. dualisation of health care systems, bifurcation has focused more on welfare provision, especially in the US.

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# Welfare and Citizenship: The Case for a Democratic Approach to the Welfare State

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## Abstract

The relationship between welfare and citizenship has been a key topic in political and academic discourses, and this interrelationship is still far from being unambiguous. This article reviews mainstream approaches to this relationship and argues that shifting our focus to an alternative perspective – viewing welfare as an agent of citizenship socialization – provides a more comprehensive picture. This approach broadens our understanding of the functions of welfare, being a key agent of the democratic institutional setting, and demonstrates the inextricable interrelationship between civil, political and social citizenship, thus allowing for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which apparent political inequalities are reproduced in practice. The paper discusses the functions of welfare institutions in the transition of Central and East European countries into democratic market economies and the establishment of their neoliberal political economies, with a particular focus on the Hungarian transition. The paper argues that the undemocratic, disempowering institutional characteristics and practices of the post-transition welfare regime in Hungary (such as the lack of information provided, the meagerness of benefits, the shame induced by treatment experienced in welfare offices and recipients' acute feelings of vulnerability vis-à-vis welfare administrators and politicians) diminish recipients' perceptions of their democratic subjectivity.

*Keywords:* Welfare, Citizenship, Citizenship Socialization.

## *Introduction*[1]

Pateman (1970) demonstrates how democratic citizenship became a central concept of Western political thought, and others show that it is in fact a key notion in political thinking and action outside Western democracies, too (Lister, 2003; Dagnino, 2005; Kabeer, 2005; Houtzager et al., 2007). Today's momentous social and political developments have led to a renaissance of the concept of citizenship: the resurgence of transnational migration, a flood of refugees indicating the devastation of millions, the blurring of national boundaries, and on-going discussions about EU citizenship put the concept at the center of academic as well as political discourses worldwide. And this re-emergence affects debates on the welfare state[2] as well. Discussion of the interrelationship between the welfare state and citizenship is far from new. This article reviews three key conceptualizations of this interrelationship and argues that shifting our focus to an alternative perspective – viewing welfare as an agent of the reproduction of democratic subjectivities – provides a more comprehensive understanding of both democratic citizenship as a concept and the functions of the welfare state, as well as their interrelationship. In this way this paper demonstrates that the system of welfare institutions is a core *political* instrument rather than a mere technical tool of social policies.

## *Idealist Views: Welfare as an Attribute of Citizenship*

The key theoretician of the idealistic position that views welfare as an inherent attribute of citizenship is unquestionably Marshall (1965), who conceives of citizenship as a normative ideal, that is, a 'status bestowed on those who are full members of a community [...] against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed' (92). Marshall's theoretical innovation contests the homogeneity of citizenship by describing it as a tripartite entity that emerged through a historical evolution of rights constituting civil, political and social citizenship.

By conceiving of social citizenship as a set of elements ranging from 'the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security' to 'the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (78) Marshall explicitly conceptualized social protection as an inherent part of citizenship. In this way his concept of social citizenship shifted the welfare–citizenship nexus from an either/or relation (paradigmatic in Poor Law times, when, if on the dole, the individual in practice ceased to count as a member of society) to an intertwined association in which social rights modify (though do not eliminate)

[1] This paper was written on the occasion of the 70th birthday of Júlia Szalai, a friend, a mentor, and one of the most active and influential social scientists not only in Hungary, but internationally. I am forever indebted to Juli for making me truly understand the power dynamics of poverty and inequalities, supporting me throughout the process of becoming a social scientist, and helping me not to lose focus about the true stakes of this profession.

[2] If not otherwise specified, this paper uses the term 'welfare' as a synonym for the welfare state as an institutional setting. In what follows, the terms 'welfare' and 'welfare state' refer to the encompassing design of welfare policies and institutions that cover both services and benefits.

class relations by altering the underlying principles of social and economic relations (Powell, 2002).

This view implies that the idea of citizenship is a matter of civilization in an Eliasian (1994) sense: a set of socially defined rules and norms that determine the status of individuals and social groups. That is, to be a citizen not only means having basic civil liberties, political power and civic responsibilities, but also living a 'civilized' life. And what civilized means (i.e., the norms and standards defining how the individual should live and act as a full member of the political community) have gradually been incorporated in the definition of citizenship. And in later phases of social existence, this enriched idea of citizenship has fed back into what a given society views as wellbeing and deprivation (Townsend, 1979), which in turn, had a significant impact on welfare institutions, too.

However, even though the separation of civil, political and social citizenship is valid analytically and serves the purpose of deepening our understanding of citizenship, it risks the de-politicization of welfare provision by disconnecting social rights from civil and political citizenship. Young (1990) articulates this danger by arguing that welfare institutions tend to institutionalize class conflict, and hence reduce social conflict to a competition over distributive shares, leaving structural matters uncontested. That is, the distribution of the pie is what is publicly debated, while the type and size of the pie and the method of slicing it are left to be decided upon via 'behind-the-curtains' negotiations of government and business elites. In this way, Young contends, the citizen is reduced to a client or consumer excluded from direct participation in decision-making and normative deliberation. As a result, their relationship to the state is privatized and public life is fragmented. This, in turn, depoliticizes the issues and spheres that would help to ground a functioning democratic arrangement.

Studying welfare in terms of citizenship allows for the prevention of such de-politicizing tendencies. Feminist political theory has persuasively demonstrated that the domain of the political cannot be reduced to redistribution, as such reductionist tendencies would omit essential aspects of the political (Fraser, 2003; Young, 1990). Therefore, social protection cannot be restricted to welfare benefits and in this way detached from the political questions of justice, social cohesion and representation. Citizenship is an essentially normative concept, for it is not a mere container of legal-administrative rules, but also a crucial element of our conception of polity as a whole (Faist, 1995). Therefore, citizenship not only defines what welfare provisions the individual is entitled to, but also determines the very shape of society by defining members' rights and responsibilities and the relationship of the two, as well as the relationship between the individual and the state.

## *Liberal Views: Welfare as a Prerequisite of Citizenship*

Overlapping with the idealistic perspective is a spectrum of liberal views of welfare as a prerequisite of citizenship. Liberal theories of citizenship are centered on the individual and the rights that make them a full citizen. Even though liberal authors do not deny the responsibilities entailed in citizenship, they conceive of certain rights as inalienable from the idea of the citizen and therefore detached from duties,

especially from those established by a private contract such as waged work. In the liberal approach both rights and duties are *in principle* universal, therefore neither may be contingent on the other.

A significant body of liberal citizenship literature points to the empowering effects of social rights. First of all, as the means of exerting one's rights and fulfilling their duties, they are necessary for exercising citizenship. Although civil and political rights are the entry ticket to the public sphere, they themselves are not sufficient for effective political advocacy, due to unequal power relations and access to resources (Dahrendorf, 1996). Nonetheless, a lack of social rights not only deprives individuals of the capabilities necessary for fully realizing their citizenship, but also strips them of the basic resources needed for effectively exercising their civil and political rights.

Second, making real choices – private or political – demands certain capabilities, thus full citizenship necessitates some welfare provisions that 'make available to each and every citizen the material, institutional, and educational circumstances in which good human functioning may be chosen' (Nussbaum, 1990: 203). Taking this argument further, a positive concept of freedom (Berlin, 1969) necessarily implies certain capabilities that enable the individual to realize their liberties. From this point of view, social and political citizenship are evidently inseparable, as social rights play an essential role in providing basic capabilities (Plant, 1988).

Furthermore, being deprived of 'a modicum of economic welfare and security' forces people to use their individual resources to sustain their physical existence, and the constant preoccupation with life sustenance leaves

> 'very little mental space for any general and long-term reflection on issues that go very far beyond their present predicament. [...] Need, then, and the urgency of the demands that it generates, can radically undermine the possibility of civic politics and distort the contribution that an individual participator can make' (King and Waldron, 1988: 428).

King and Waldron conclude that such a material and mental condition makes people vulnerable to political manipulation, which further prevents them from feeling and acting like citizens. Consequently, they associate the provision of welfare with a Rawlsian concept of justice, in the sense that it is a reasonable expectation that people would not agree to a socio-political arrangement that does not offer at least a safety net for those facing hardship (Rawls, 1971). And as a result, they argue, the concept of 'the citizen' must entail certain social rights, as well as civil and political rights in order for individuals to be able to exist and act as citizens.

Even though liberal theories of the interconnection of welfare and citizenship make a clear link between civil, political and social layers of citizenship and in this way effectively politicize welfare provision, I argue that the above literature implies an essentially passive conceptualization of social citizenship and, as a result, overlooks some of its crucial components.

Lister (2003) responds to this conceptual deficiency by focusing on agency as the key to reconciling traditional views of citizenship and developing a new, more inclusive concept. She argues that the traditional liberal concept of citizenship is an

essentially passive one, as it is conceived of as a status based on individual rights. Moreover, these rights are not only vested in liberal democratic institutions biased towards the interests of the powerful, but also predominantly function as instruments of negative freedom, thus are not conducive to active citizenship. Therefore, Lister argues for a synthesis of citizenship as status and as practice by centering the concept of citizenship on agency. On the theoretical level, resonating with the above arguments of Young (1990), Lister proposes an inclusive concept of citizenship based on the principle of differentiated universalism that allows for the active social and political participation of a wide range of social groups and a re-articulation of the public-private divide. This re-conceptualization would allow for an extension of political agency beyond the public sphere as traditionally conceived of, and thus broaden the scope of citizenship agency so that it includes subjectivities and activities hitherto excluded from it – for instance, bodily and reproductive rights, the domestic division of labor, the labor market, and welfare institutions.

## *Neoconservative Views: Welfare as Compromising Citizenship*

In contrast to liberal thinkers, who ground the concept of citizenship on the individual and their inalienable rights, neoconservative scholarship prioritizes the community over the individual and thereby centers the concept of citizenship on the duties and responsibilities of individuals towards the community. Mead (1986) justifies social obligations on two separate grounds. First, he argues that common duties generate a sense of equality in individuals that enhances an appreciation of community with others and hence strengthens social cohesion. Second, fulfilling certain duties legitimizes individual demands, therefore Mead posits a conditional relationship between individual rights and duties that determines one's membership in the political community. On the basis of such a conception of citizenship, he rejects the idea of welfare as an individual right. He argues that social rights make recipients dependent on welfare provisions, and in this way restrict their autonomy and compromise their citizenship.

Nevertheless, recent neoconservative scholarship diverges from Mead's rigid conditionality. Communitarian scholar, Etzioni (2011) accepts contemporary criticisms of the universal concept of 'the common good' by acknowledging its inherent particularism. Nevertheless, he maintains that it cannot be fully rejected, because it serves a number of crucial functions in society: it helps the individual to maintain a sense of identity, which is essential for human wellbeing; and serves as a force that legitimizes social norms, institutions, and control. Upon these terms Etzioni defines the good citizen as someone who accepts basic responsibilities towards 'the common good of the nation' and otherwise follows their individual preferences. However, for Etzioni this is not a strictly conditional arrangement; rather, he argues for a balanced relationship between rights and responsibilities. In his moral framework, individuals are not endowed with rights *for* pursuing certain responsibilities but 'by the mere fact of their humanity, as ends in themselves' (Etzioni in Gilbert, 2002: xv). He argues that 'one and all deserve a basic minimum standard of living' (xiv), and therefore the right to such basic necessities of life as shelter, clothing, food, and elementary health care should be detached from any public responsibilities.

Another approach in the neoconservative line of thinking is that based on the principle of *substantive reciprocity;* that is, the rule of proportional shares and dues. White (2003) argues that a lack of reciprocity is harmful to society: it harms the self-esteem of the individual who would not feel worthy if viewed as not contributing to the community. Furthermore, non-reciprocation creates a 'parasitic' arrangement in which some can free-ride while others contribute, which, in the long run, disrupts social cohesion, destabilizes institutions and therefore leads to alienation. Consequently, there may be a link between social rights and responsibilities, but this link must be based on a certain conception of fairness. White elaborates in detail the standards for civic obligations, the terms on which citizens may be required to fulfil them, and a minimum of the basic commitments of justice that together set up an arrangement of 'democratic mutual regard'. In this framework, contributory obligations are proportional to citizens' abilities and their procedural rights, and certain attributes of fairness must be assured *before* such obligations are required.

In terms of welfare, the principle of justice as fair reciprocity implies generous but work-tested provisions once a threshold of fairness is met which secures meaningful work opportunities and the elimination of brute luck poverty and economic vulnerability. That is, although White lays great emphasis on the individual's contributory obligations towards the community, in his concept of 'the civic minimum' a basic level of social rights is inherently incorporated. Hence, in his concept, a certain level of welfare provision is intrinsic and necessary to citizenship just as in the idealist and liberal views, and only beyond this minimum does the principle of substantive reciprocity start to operate.

Correspondingly, some liberal theorists do accentuate community values while arguing for the primacy of individual rights. Jordan (1996), for instance, explicitly argues that contemporary welfare societies need to find ways to reconcile individual autonomy and community interests. He demonstrates that in welfare capitalist societies communities are based on market exchange and in such proprietary communities new dynamics of social exclusion have emerged: powerful interest groups of mainstream citizens are confronted with powerless excluded people. In these dynamics, Jordan argues, welfare plays a key role as a means of intrusion and enforcement. To counter this social bifurcation, harmful for both the individual and the community, Jordan proposes a move towards educative and supportive social policies that detach distribution from production and provide every individual with the opportunity of participation. Such an arrangement, he argues, is conducive to counter-exclusive collective actions suited to diverse consumption-oriented sovereign individuals in a global environment of scarce and unequally distributed resources.

Nevertheless, neoconservative theories prioritize the thriving of the community over individual flourishing, and therefore in their conceptualization welfare provision is primarily a means of social cohesion rather than a tool of strengthening democratic subjectivities. Consequently, neoconservative arguments still highlight the obligations of citizens, paid work in particular, rather than their individual rights as the means of enhancing a sense of community. As a result, in this framework, welfare institutions are imagined to serve the common good only to a limited extent and primarily in a conditional, give-and-take arrangement; otherwise they are still regarded detrimental to citizenship for eroding people's sense of equality and community membership.

Moreover, it is also contentious to draw such a pronounced dividing line between the thriving of the community and that of the individual, as neoconservative thinkers do. When the focus is on citizenship, the individual is necessarily identified in relation to the community, and vice versa; the flourishing community that neoconservative scholars and publicists desire entails democratic subjects – that is, individuals capable of exercising their powers as citizens and hence shaping the political community they are part of. And this, I argue, necessitates rights and capabilities beyond the very minimum that neoconservative thinkers assume, such as separate minority rights, respect for civil liberties, prevention from discrimination, and conditional welfare provision.

It is also arguable that the neoconservative approach is based on a very limited conception of contribution. As demonstrated above, when it comes to civic responsibilities, neoconservative theories primarily focus on paid employment obligations and in this way fail to take account of a plethora of unrecognized contributions fulfilled by the less powerful, such as running households, performing a wide range of care work (done predominantly by women, and poor minority women in particular) or grassroots advocacy (often performed by marginalized people).

Furthermore, both liberal and neoconservative scholars overlook the broader socio-political setting in which they theorize welfare rights and civic obligations. It is highly controversial to argue for generous but work-tested provisions following the elimination of brute luck poverty and economic vulnerability and after meaningful work has been provided in an era when the global economy is built on brute luck, poverty and economic vulnerability and the lack of meaningful work opportunities for a broad social strata (Gilmore, 2007; Harvey, 2007; Piven, 2012).

An ever-broadening stream of scholarship studies the operation of welfare institutions in relation to the political economy of neoliberalism, and argues that Western societies have been undergoing the neoliberalization of welfare policies since the late 1970s. At an early stage of this process, Gough (1979) pointed out that public welfare provision had increasingly been restructured as a means of legitimizing the hegemonic economic order and related class relations. By now, a robust body of literature has demonstrated that 'welfare programs for the poor continue to operate [...] as derivative institutions shaped by pressures that arise from the polity and market', and as a result, neoliberal paternalism has become the predominant mode of poverty governance (Soss et al., 2011) and a business model of welfare provision has been increasingly dominant in these societies (Piven, 2012). Consequently, embedded in neoliberal political and economic structures, welfare institutions are increasingly focused on surveillance and discipline (Piven and Cloward, 1972; Schram and Silverman, 2012) and tend to merge the functions of restrictive and stigmatized workfare and expansive 'prisonfare' programs (Wacquant, 2009), therefore resulting in the criminalization of poverty (Gustafson, 2011) through 'the penal welfare complex' (Brin Hyatt, 2011).

For these reasons, it is important that we analyze the relationship between welfare provisions and citizenship in a framework that takes into account the broader political and economic environment in which this relationship materializes, as well as the breadth and complexity of the structure of both welfare provisions and citizenship.

For such an analysis, I propose a conceptual framework that studies the functions of welfare institutions as a means of citizenship socialization.

## *Welfare as an Instrument of Citizenship Socialization*

Explicitly or implicitly, welfare institutions serve a range of functions: they tackle poverty, provide social security, enhance social justice, induce social reproduction and stratification, or exert social control, to name but a few (Deacon, 2002; Pierson, 2006; Alcock, 2011; Daly, 2011). From the 1970s onwards a growing stream of literature has focused on the disciplinary functions of welfare institutions. Piven and Cloward (1972) investigated the functions of public welfare in the US through a historical analysis of welfare reforms and identified a cycle that starts with economic change or a market downturn that leads to the dislocation and marginalization of people in the lower echelons of the social hierarchy. This, beyond causing human suffering, poses a risk of social unrest, instability, and disintegration that enforces the government to expand relief. However, as unrest is pacified, cuts in relief follow in terms of level, coverage, as well as conditionality, masked as welfare reform. Such 'reforms', Piven and Cloward argue, above all serve for the regulation of poor people. That is, they are functional in preventing unrest, regulating and enforcing labor and transforming recipients' behavior. In this way, they shape the polity as a whole, as well as individual citizens.

Examining government policies through the functioning of 'street-level bureaucrats' Lipsky (1980) demonstrates that government institutions, including welfare, serve a number of functions beyond redistributing state resources. They exercise control, confer status and also mediate the relationship between the state and the citizen, and in this way, Lipsky highlights, have a significant impact on participants' citizenship. He points out a number of features of the functioning of street-level bureaucrats that ultimately constrain and control clients and compromise certain aspects of their citizenship, such as discretion, work pressure, ordering, classification or alienation. Some of these attributes are functional components of the system (such as discretion or work pressure), while others are a result of the tension between bureaucrats' drive to do good and the impossibility of realizing their goals under the given circumstances (e.g. relying on stereotypes or blaming victims).

This stream of literature powerfully demonstrates that certain aspects of the functioning of contemporary welfare regimes – such as shaming, discretion, infantilization, relying on stereotypes or work pressure – rather than reinforcing clients' citizenship, in fact undermine their democratic subjectivity (Lipsky, 1980; Haney, 2002; Kumlin, 2002; Dubois, 2010). On the surface, these authors seem to agree with neoconservative scholars in concluding that receiving welfare provisions potentially compromises citizenship; however, there is a significant difference in their argument. While neoconservatives blame the very principle of unconditional, universal welfare for causing dependency and in this way damaging recipients' self-respect and eroding their sense of community and membership, the above authors argue that it is particular elements of existing welfare regimes (especially their conditional, non-universal features) that compromise recipients' democratic subjectivity.

On the basis of this more comprehensive conception of the functions of welfare provision, a new approach has emerged in the scholarship of welfare institutions that links welfare provision and citizenship directly, on the instrumental level, as opposed to the above, more abstract, normative conceptions. This scholarship investigates a less explicit function of welfare provision; namely, the ways in which welfare institutions socialize individuals (claimants, recipients and the broader society) into being citizens, and in this way also shape the qualities of democracy (Szalai, 2008).

*Just institutions matter.* The catchy title of Rothstein's (1998) main work is also the essence of his argument that beyond serving their central, de facto functions, social institutions also have a significant influence on social norms and the role they play in society. Following the logic that social space and symbolic power organize the social in a dialectical manner (Bourdieu, 1989), Rothstein demonstrates that there is an iterative relationship between the institutional setting of society and the social norms prevailing therein. The actual functioning of institutions and their discursive frame determine what the driving logic of society is (e.g. moral principles or economic reasoning), and shape the resulting social norms (i.e. people's cognitive map of what others are and would do in a given situation, and what they consider good, just or fair). In other words, just institutions matter not only in the sense that they bring about just outcomes, but also because they inform social norms and in this way shape the foundations of society. Moreover, since in a social setting, norms are internalized by individuals, the shape and functioning of institutions inevitably shape citizens, too. As Rothstein put it: just (in his Rawlsian conception, democratic) institutions create democratic citizens interested in justice. Consequently,

> '[w]elfare states reflect political struggle, but they also guide subsequent political struggle. Thus, welfare states contribute to the formation of citizens' interests and ideologies in the maintenance or expansion of welfare state programs. Through these interests and ideologies, societies collectivize and socialize the responsibility of averting poverty for their citizens.' (Brady, 2009: p.73)

Therefore, when examining welfare regimes an emerging body of literature argues for shifting the focus from individual virtue, equality or self-realization to democratic citizenship, and developing a democratic perspective of the welfare state (Gutmann, 1988; Moon, 1988). This scholarship maintains that an institutional system of universal welfare provisions that guarantees procedural and distributive justice, together with a certain level of social protection, strengthens individuals' democratic subjectivity. By alleviating poverty and inequality and thus eliminating severe individual hardship and social instability, while not harming people's self-respect, such an institutional arrangement effectively promotes democratic society.

In more concrete terms, Fullinwider (1988) identifies a dual relationship between welfare provision and citizenship. He argues that, although it is highly contestable on both instrumental and moral grounds, in contemporary welfare states citizenship is a necessary precondition of receiving welfare provisions. On the other hand, citizenship is not only a legal-administrative status, but also a 'set of habits and attitudes on which the delivery and receipt of welfare services have tutelary effects, either supporting or undermining good habits and attitudes' (261). That is, welfare

provisions *teach recipients lessons in citizenship*. First, they make recipients self-supportive and in this way enable them to pursue their ends, which is necessary for developing their self-perception as citizens. Secondly, using common institutions with other members of society has an instrumental as well as an intrinsic value, which also informs recipients about their membership and their status in society; that is, their citizenship.

The logic of welfare provisions teaching lessons of citizenship has a lot in common with Mead's 'civic conception of welfare'. Mead cites conservative members of the US Congress of his time, who argue that only a system of welfare provisions that promotes self-reliance can facilitate recipients' 'developing into citizens' by enhancing their self-respect as equal, contributory members of society. However, as opposed to Gutmann, Moon, Fullinwider, or Jordan, who highlight universality and social security as key components of a welfare system conducive to democratic subjectivity, Mead and the discourses he builds on maintain that citizens are 'thoroughly schooled in their obligations' (229): consequently, duties (work requirements in particular) are necessary components of a welfare arrangement that produces citizens.

The above are theoretical arguments about the possible or desirable educative effects of welfare institutions on citizenship; however, there is also empirical evidence to support these arguments. In Sweden, a large-scale postal survey examined the impact of the institutional design of the welfare system on recipients' experience of justice, their political preferences (their support for the democratic political system and incumbent politicians) and their endorsement of state interventions (in the form of their support for the welfare state) (Kumlin, 2002). This research distinguishes three types of welfare systems on the basis of the degree of discretion of welfare institutions and the range of realistic exit options they offer to recipients: consumer (empowering), user (neutral) and client (disempowering) systems. The results clearly demonstrate that the institutional setting of the Swedish welfare state has a significant effect on each examined variable: experiences of distributive justice and voice opportunities have the most significant impact on political trust, while those who have personally experienced injustice were less likely to be satisfied with the democratic system and to trust politicians than other participants. On the other hand, the data shows that when opportunities to exert influence were poor, welfare state experiences had negative effects on political trust, no matter how satisfactory the services were. That is,

> 'voice opportunities seem to be more than mere instruments for improving personal outcomes. This finding tells us not just that people care about voice opportunities, but also something about why they care. Judging from the results, voice opportunities are not just an instrument for achieving accurate service delivery. Rather, they seem to be important in themselves.' (271)

In this way, confirming the above theoretical accounts, empirical evidence demonstrates that welfare institutions have broad political relevance for democratic subjectivity – the experiences they generate shape citizens and also have a feedback effect on the broader democratic institutional system.

Clearly resonating with these findings, empirical data collected in the US highlights further lines of reasoning why the welfare complex cannot be considered a mere technical apparatus, but a core political institution (Soss, 1999; 2002). First of all, welfare claiming is based on citizens' needs (that are inherently social, as discussed above) and these needs are directed at government personnel and institutions. Second, it affects public resources and their redistribution, therefore it is an agent of political stratification. Furthermore, it is an act and a relationship embedded in legal regulations. And fourth, claiming welfare provisions often entails some form of state surveillance over claimants and recipients that also politicizes these provisions.

Moreover, this piece of research not only demonstrates the various ways in which welfare institutions are a key domain of political action, but also shows that receipt of welfare provisions has a significant impact on recipients' actual incorporation in the polity. It affects their (broadly conceived) political activities, their self-perception as citizens, as well as their sense of political efficacy; i.e., their view of how responsive the government is to their claims (Gilens, 2012).

That is, these findings demonstrate that

> 'as clients participate in welfare programs they learn lessons about how citizens and governments relate, and these lessons have political consequences beyond the domain of welfare agencies. [They] become the basis for broader orientations toward government and political action.' (Soss, 1999: 364)

In addition to this stream of scholarship, an emerging body of empirical research, predominantly conducted in the US, demonstrates that certain types of welfare provision have evident demobilizing effects on recipients. The pioneering study of Verba et al. (1995) demonstrated that in the US there is a significant difference between the broadly conceived political activities of recipients of means-tested and non-tested benefits, even when controlling for other potential causes. While 18 per cent of the former were engaged in at least one political activity at the time of the research, the proportion was as high as 44 per cent in case of the latter. Furthermore, unlike social insurance recipients, clients of public assistance were underrepresented in every political activity measured by the researchers.

Other studies found a clear difference between the effects of universal and means-tested programs on recipients' voting behavior. First, empirical evidence shows that the greater the number of universal programs citizens have used, the greater the likelihood they vote, whereas the use of means-tested programs results in a decrease in recipients' inclination to vote (Mettler and Stonecash, 2008). In addition, empirical data also demonstrate that participants in social security programs are significantly more likely to vote than those in the means-tested, discretionary and highly stigmatized AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) scheme. Moreover, the sense of external political efficacy of social security recipients was significantly stronger than that of AFDC beneficiaries (Soss, 1999), and the TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) program, the successor to the AFDC scheme, was found to have substantial negative effects on the rates of civic and political engagement of people living in poverty (Bruch et al., 2010).

Mettler and Stonecash explain this palpable difference by pointing to the messages that recipients, as well as broader society, get from the different programs. They argue that privileged, middle-class individuals get the message from policies that target them (such as pension schemes or veteran benefits) that they are valued citizens, and therefore they are more likely to form a view of politics as a fair and open game overall. On the other hand, recipients' sense of political efficacy is impaired by the design of means-tested programs.

And Mettler (2010) demonstrates how such messages are conveyed in practice. Her research found that the majority of those who benefit from government programs (e.g. pension schemes) do not even know that they enjoy government support; whereas for those who receive social assistance it is always made very clear, and they are reminded time and again that they are receiving state support. Moreover, this fact is often made very visible by recipients employed in public spaces (as a precondition of the aid they receive), who often have to wear high visibility vests (Piven, 2012). In this way the broader public is also informed about the given individuals being subject to welfare support. In addition, empirical research also identified particular components of policies (e.g. clinical reasoning, or discourses of (un)deservingness) that often send disempowering messages to the target population (Ingram and Rathgeb-Smith, 1993).

Furthermore, Campbell (2003) provides a complex empirical analysis of the differences *across* welfare programs in the US in relation to what she calls the participation-policy cycle. She comes to the conclusion that

> '[l]ike Social Security, veterans' benefits confer resources that enhance participation, foster interest in public affairs, endow recipients with a political relevance that invites mobilization by interest groups and parties, and enhance recipient feelings of government responsiveness. These program recipients participate at higher levels than they would in the absence of the programs. Welfare recipients, by contrast, participate at even lower levels than their already modest participatory capacities would predict, largely because of the disengaging aspects of program design that relegate them to a lower tier of democratic citizenship.' (19)

In a meta study, Mettler and Soss (2004) provide a synthesis of such findings and identify a number of ways in which public policies reinforce or undermine civic capacities. First, resources extended by policies provide material incentives for political participation. In addition, policies can also play a role in building and distributing civic skills within the citizenry, just as they can supply resources for political mobilization. Furthermore, policy designs shape citizens' personal experiences with and evaluation of the government and thus influence their patterns of political belief and their processes of political learning. This study also highlights that more recent studies found so-called interface effects that shape citizens' encounters with government – for example, clients of AFDC in the US formed particularly negative impressions about government. In addition, policies can also frame the meaning and origin of social problems, therefore they convey messages about the underlying nature of the problem and in this way shape citizens' perspective of issues.

In certain cases, policies have the potential to affect the publicly perceived importance of an issue and possible reactions to it and in this way shape policy agendas. Furthermore, certain policies directly structure political participation, such as those concerning incarceration or ID regulations. Last but not least, the report also found that policies influence the ways in which individuals understand their rights and responsibilities as members of the political community. Consequently, Mettler and Soss were able to identify policies that explicitly encourage or discourage demand-making and therefore lead to over-extension or underutilization of the given policy. (For example, while the Earned Income Tax Credit actively encourages take-up, the TANF program is designed to divert and deter claimants.)

This body of evidence has significant implications. Such political inequalities deplete not only procedural fairness, but also substantive justice. Moreover, by challenging the equal worth of citizens as members of the community, capable of having a conception of the common good, and controlling their own lives through influencing collective decisions (Verba, 2003), they also have corrosive effects on democracy.

In other words,

> 'elements of policy design send messages about citizenship to target groups. Different target populations of policies receive quite different signals about their status, what sort of game politics is, and how people like themselves are to be treated by government.' (Ingram and Rathgeb-Smith, 1993: p. 16)

Therefore, this body of scholarship makes a case for the refocusing of welfare policy analysis on citizenship and democracy. The welfare institutional complex is a domain of learning citizenship and a site of developing political subjectivities so it should be studied as an independent variable when political mobilization and participation are investigated.

## *Central and Eastern European Implications*

The above analysis highlights that scholarly interest in the role of welfare institutions in beneficiaries' citizenship socialization has been manifested primarily in the US context so far, and European scholarship seems to be lagging behind in this respect. However, it is important to analyze these processes in the European context due to the deep-rooted, although increasingly fluid, differences between European welfare regimes and the US. Due to its historical specificities and particular socio-geographic, state and party structures, the US is considered a laggard in the mainstream welfare state literature in terms of the development of welfare policies and institutions (Dobbin, 2002). Nevertheless, as a result of the above-mentioned trends involving the restructuring of welfare policies in the neoliberal political economy, the once sharp distinction between welfare policies in the US and in the core European welfare regimes has become increasingly blurred.

Haggard and Kaufman (2009) point out that studying post-transition CEE (Central and Eastern European) welfare institutions is not only a particular focus of scholarship, but also 'promises to deepen our understanding of the more general

*political* processes of redistribution, insurance and service provision' (236). Based on this claim I argue that undergoing the formation of democratic citizenship at the same time as the establishment (or reformation) of welfare policies in the course of the transition, in an era when both democratic and welfare institutions are facing historical challenges globally, makes CEE welfare regimes crucial terrain for examining the interplay among the different layers of citizenship and studying the ways in which the everyday instruments of social citizenship inform individuals' civil and political citizenship.

Theoretical as well as empirical scholarship has powerfully demonstrated that welfare institutions played a pivotal role in the political strategies of CEE state-party regimes. In the first phase of regime development, social policies served economic purposes, and thus were functional in shaping and stabilizing the new system; while in a second mature or declining phase, the expansion of quasi-universal welfare provisions played a crucial role in maintaining social support for the system in spite of many destabilizing factors (Szalai, 1997; Szikra and Tomka, 2009; Tamás, 2010).

During and after the transition, welfare institutions maintained their crucial, although significantly altered, political functions. First and foremost, newly created welfare institutions were used to 'divide and pacify' the different layers of affected societies (Vanhuysse, 2006). Relatively stable provisions were offered to a wide stratum of the middle classes, but only meagre, residual social assistance for people in marginal social positions. By establishing different tiers in the welfare system, governing elites designated the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' groups in these societies, rewarding the former and punishing the latter (Ferge, 1997; Szalai, 2007; Rat, 2009). In this way, the political elite managed to contain discontent and prevent destabilization. By analyzing protest behavior in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Vanhuysse (2006; 2009) found that the segmentation of the labor force using welfare provisions prevented political alliances being created between different sections of society and therefore quietened the middle classes and older people, or at least channeled their grievances into more peaceful means. In this way political stability was secured despite increasing economic hardship, and hence the new political and economic systems of post-transition CEE societies were consolidated, at least for the time being.

Szalai (2007) compellingly demonstrates the ways in which the gradual refinement of a dual system of generous contribution-based provisions for middle-class employees and pensioners with strong social rights on the one hand, and extremely meagre, means-tested social assistance provision with high levels of discretion for disadvantaged social groups (such as the long-term unemployed or the unemployable) on the other, was established in the Hungarian context. This dual system promoted a strong and stable middle class supportive of the new regime and in this way served the function of maintaining social peace and securing the economic functioning of the regime (for instance, state pension funds served as an important fiscal asset in these countries). An important element of this class-making and economic stabilizing by welfare institutions was the employment of less educated middle-class Hungarians, mostly women, who had difficulty finding jobs in an increasingly competitive job market and thus were facing status insecurity. Thousands of these women became social workers, social assistants, or administrators of

municipality welfare offices, family or job centers, and in this way managed to maintain their middle-class status, albeit at a fairly low level (their income is still very low and their work does not receive much social recognition). On the other hand, for an increasing segment of the population in these societies, and especially for the Roma minority, the newly introduced welfare policies had disempowering consequences, such as increasing control, humiliation and stigmatization, and containing mobility-related, disciplinary and restrictive workfare measures (Szalai, 2007; Rat, 2009).

Third, the dualization of welfare provisions (Emmenegger et al., 2012) was also functional in securing the labor flexibility that the neoliberal political economy increasingly required. For example, in post-transition Hungary the system of social assistance successfully controlled and regulated the most vulnerable sections of the population, such as people facing long-term unemployment, by providing meagre benefits coupled with strict conditionality (most importantly, tough workfare conditions) and in this way ensured that they took whatever jobs they could find or needed to be done, under any terms and conditions (Szalai, 2007). Therefore, the post-transition welfare regime in Hungary established a conditional relationship between the social and civic layers of citizenship, reflecting mainstream neoconservative conceptions of the interrelationship between welfare and citizenship.

Last, together with the transforming political economy, the social conception of need was also recast in the emerging Hungarian democracy, resulting in shifting definitions of 'the needy', with a focus on their material contributions, or rather the supposed lack thereof. Research shows that the system of welfare policies was adapted to these shifts, and as a consequence, the overall conception of social assistance and the populations associated with it became increasingly stigmatized and pathologized in post-transition Hungary (Haney, 2002).

In 2013, I conducted institutional ethnographic research in northeast Hungary that explored recipients' experiences of the various elements of the social assistance subsystem of the contemporary Hungarian welfare complex and investigated the influence that each had on recipients' civil and political citizenship. In other words, I investigated what the beneficiaries had learned about their democratic subjectivity from their experiences of receiving social assistance (Dósa, 2016).

First of all, my research found that most recipients laid much greater emphasis on the duties than on the rights attached to citizenship, which clearly reflects the neoconservative conception of social rights in the contemporary Hungarian welfare regime, as demonstrated above. In addition, many recipients made a direct link between democratic subjectivity and social security. That is, they indicated that a certain level of social rights was a prerequisite of a truly democratic political establishment and the ability to be an active member thereof. However, most of the recipients who conceived of citizenship in substantive – in contrast to neutral, administrative – terms felt that their citizenship was compromised in reality. My study showed that undemocratic, disempowering institutional characteristics and practices had a diminishing effect on recipients' willingness and capability to actively exercise the civil and/or political aspects of their citizenship.

The most important of these characteristics and practices my research found were, first, recipients' lack of information about the rules of assistance provision and

their rights in relation to it. Second, the lack of material resources resulting from the extremely meagre benefits which constrained recipients' democratic subjectivity in very practical ways (such as their not being able to make phone calls, use public transport, or initiate costly legal remedy procedures at the court level), and also impaired their sense of political efficacy in many cases. Third, the shame induced by the derogatory treatment recipients experienced at welfare offices, the institutional violations of their privacy, and popular degrading discourses about benefit receipt. Last, recipients' acute feelings of vulnerability vis-à-vis both staff in the welfare office and politicians in general as a result of the futile administrative cycles they felt trapped in, their absolute lack of control over their benefits, and the authority's high level of discretion in providing these.

To conclude, I argue for a diversion from mainstream conceptualizations of the interrelationship between welfare and citizenship in favor of an alternative perspective that views welfare as an agent of reproducing democratic subjectivities. That is, as a core political instrument, rather than a mere technical implement of social policies. This shift is helpful not only for understanding the complex relationship between social, civil, and political layers of citizenship and the role of welfare policies in reproducing contemporary political inequalities, but also for identifying those actual characteristics of welfare provision that support and those that undermine democratic citizenship. In this way this approach and further research based on it have crucial policy implications.

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# With Eyes Wide Shut. Job Searching Qualified Roma and Employee Seeking Companies

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## Abstract

This article is dedicated to Julia Szalai who researches the underlying reasons, consequences and mechanisms of the social exclusion of the Roma in Central and East European societies. Her work and her writings serve as a compass for those who examine problems of social exclusion, including the authors of this article. The present paper discusses position of the Roma on the Hungarian job-market, focusing on highly-qualified young Roma within the context of the business sphere. Our knowledge is informed by the first results of an initiative which creates bridges between disadvantaged social groups and the business sector through pro-active measures. The initiative mobilizes multinational companies, business trainers, NGOs promoting social inclusion, and academics. Both the initiative and our study intend to pursue a subtle understanding of the tangible and hidden obstacles that highly educated young Roma encounter when seeking employment, and of the dilemmas that multinational companies face in relating to these prospective employees.

*Keywords:* Qualified Roma Youth, Trajectories of Exclusion, Business Recruitment Practices, Equality of Opportunities, Pro-active Employer Interventions.

## *1. Introduction*

The literature on Roma employment which discusses the reasons and mechanisms of the exclusion of Roma from the job-market is vast and manifold (Kertesi 2005, Kertesi and Kézdi 2011, Szalai and Zentai 2014, Váradi 2014). Many have analysed the different types of state policies designed to promote the employment of the Roma, and the reasons why these have not been too successful (Adamecz et.al. 2013, Messing and Bereményi 2016, Molnár 2017). Very little has been said, however, about the employment chances of highly qualified Roma, and about the employment potential of the business sector in this regard. A few studies explore career paths of highly educated Roma. For example, Durst-Fejős-Nyírő (2016) analyze life-story interviews of college educated Roma women and their preferences regarding work and family, while Kende (2007) examines career paths and future expectations of Roma university students. There is hardly any literature, however, focusing on the role of the business sector in the employment of highly educated Roma. It is beyond doubt that a new generation of Roma has grown up who cannot be characterized by a low level of education: many have obtained baccalaureates (a secondary school leaving qualification), and some have higher education degrees or other qualifications which make them competitive in the business sector. Yet, even for such candidates forms of job-market inclusion beyond public sector employment, public work, and project-related work – i.e. jobs that may provide stable income and career opportunities – appear to be beyond reach, or are very difficult to obtain.

This article provides an understanding of the nature of the obstacles standing in the way of these highly qualified Roma, who formally fulfil all requirements of the job-market and have the required schooling and skills, yet still face difficulties in finding appropriate employment. This holds true despite the fact that the Hungarian job market currently suffers from severe workforce shortages. What are the reasons for the mismatch between the capacities of this specific group of job seekers and the needs of companies? This article relies on data obtained from the research component of a project[1] designed to support young and highly qualified Roma to find employment in the business sector relevant to their qualifications.

In the first part of the paper we introduce the conceptual frames of our inquiry, and then dive into theoretical approaches that guided our work. Following a description of the data, we present the results of an empirical research which focuses on the four distinct (though significantly intersecting) roots of the disadvantaged position of young educated Roma and the corresponding corporate responses to the employment interest of educated young Roma. We conclude our article by reflecting on our results through our initial theoretical lenses.

[1] The project which serves as the source of empirical data is entitled *Bridge to Business; Bridging Young Roma and Business: Intervention for inclusion of Roma youth through employment in the private sector in Bulgaria and Hungary*. The project is funded by the European Commission's DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and is being implemented in cooperation with Open Society Foundation Bulgaria, Autonómia Foundation, and the Central European University.

## *2. Conceptual Frame and Research Path*

This study mobilizes insights from the social exclusion and inclusion literature, as well as from critical diversity studies. The former centers on social inequalities, social justice, and social mobility, whereas the latter seeks to uncover the dominant institutional paradigms and practices for managing diverse labor forces in the business sector. The former field has been widely discussed and enriched by scholarship pursued by Hungarian academia, in contrast to the latter field of studies. The authors of this paper do not represent exceptions to this state of affairs, having only started to learn about critical diversity studies. In acknowledgement of this uneven theoretical backing, our study mobilizes a dual conceptual lens to explore the opportunities, experiences and obstacles to employing members of minority groups, including the Roma, in multinational companies that operate in Central and East European localities and contexts. This dual perspective (social inclusion and diversity management in the business sector) provides the novelty of the article and may also contribute to bringing closer the seemingly worlds-apart business (micro) perspective and the social justice (macro) perspective. In the conclusions, we flesh out the main obstacles that highly qualified Roma face during their job-market integration in Hungary compared to those known from the social inclusion literature. Moreover, our conclusions move beyond the proposals related to practical diversity policy typically found in the business sphere.

Most of the literature about the social inclusion of Roma is discussed along the two major approaches that have emerged in wider political and policy thinking on equality and social justice in the last three decades: equal treatment, and equal opportunities. *Equal treatment* postulates that each citizen, irrespective of ethnic background, gender, age, etc., should receive the same treatment. This has become the defining approach in Hungary today, both in the state and the business sectors (Tardos 2011). Actors who follow this approach, however, may not realize that the disadvantages attached to minority groups do not disappear, because in a competitive situation such as job recruitment, individual characteristics originating from the disadvantaged group situation place the individual in an unfavorable position. The e*qual opportunity (positive action)* approach emerged from the recognition that equal treatment often reinforces existing inequalities, and individually centered interventions cannot compensate for or eradicate unequal chances in competitive situations. Therefore, individuals from disadvantaged social groups should be given special help and the playing ground should be levelled, paying special attention to entry points. It is acknowledged that positive action (often referred to as affirmative action) also has negative outcomes and weaknesses: this approach may correct the consequences of a disadvantaged situation or group position but it does not change the discriminative environment, or only does so partially (Tomei 2005, Heilmann 2004, Hodges-Aeberhard 1999). It does not transform wider societal practices and norms into inclusive ones. It may also generate or reinforce the stigmatization of the target group and its members, and induce resistance from the mainstream. This often results in old-new interethnic distance or conflict. Members of the majority society often perceive positive action as unfair and one that provides an undeserved advantage to minority individuals.

*Critical diversity studies* emerged as a distinctive inquiry in the mid-1990s. In broad terms, it investigates the discourses, practices, and consequences of the diversity management paradigm which started to influence and later to dominate labor management frames in the corporate world. The diversity management paradigm emerged in the 1980s in the US, and quickly spread in UK and European business contexts. It is argued that the rise of the paradigm stemmed from the failures of and discontent with the *equal treatment* and *equal opportunity* measures and regulations established in Western liberal democracies in the 1970s and 1980s. These measures were also embraced, even if not fully and unambiguously implemented, by multinational companies (Kirton and Greene 2016). Others propose that the emergence of the diversity management paradigm is a prime manifestation of neo-liberal economic and governance ideals and practices. Critical diversity studies have challenged the dominant rhetoric of diversity as a positive and empowering approach for valorizing employees' different capacities. These studies contest the instrumental view of differences inherent to the diversity paradigm and unveil how the conceptual shift from equality to diversity reflect and obscure existing unequal power relations within organizations (Zanoni et al 2010). Another related stream in the critical diversity studies literature investigates the entanglement of, or rather the split between, equality opportunity and diversity management principles from the wider perspective of inequality and fairness in terms of managing the labor force in business organizations (Tatli 2011). One may argue that critical diversity studies not only scrutinize the practical diversity management literature and its institutional outcomes but also ponder the wider issues that labor relations and critical labor studies also dwell on. Thus, of crucial concern for critical diversity inquiries and for the labor relations literature is the clash and compromise between business interest and social justice.

From among the most important recent trends in the literature, for our initiative and analysis the comprehensive accounts of the massive changes that occurred in business management discourses in the 1990s are truly instructive. Multinational companies seem to have engaged with diversity management principles enthusiastically, rather than reluctantly. Diversity management is characterized, most importantly, by a positive image and even celebratory rhetoric of *difference,* the grounds of which is often undefined, and a dominant reference to the rationale of business performance, a pronounced attention to the individual, and the voluntary transformation of the organization and its culture (Kirton and Greene 2016:127). Difference within the organization is understood as an asset which contributes to better performance and innovation. Companies that embrace diversity are theorized to be better able to attract skilled workers in an increasingly diverse labor market, reach out to diverse markets by making contact with a diverse set of customers, and improve organizational learning through exposing employees to a wider range of perspectives (Zanoni et al 2010:12). Critical diversity studies warn that the diversity paradigm may ignore deep structures of social discrimination, indirect forms of discrimination, and stubborn patterns of disadvantage. The very definition and distinction between sameness and difference continues to be defined by the dominant or power-holder group. Important differences within the social positions of groups may remain unacknowledged or downplayed, while minority groups may become

stigmatized and ghettoized, and their inferiority reasserted. The strategy of emphasizing differences is often blind to the wider societal environment, thus promoting, at best, the movement and interaction of the workforce within the organization, but doing little to removing intra-organizational barriers to employment. Legitimized by reference to business interests, at times of hardship or market competition, diversity concerns may easily be sidelined (Kirton and Greene 2016: 130-136).

In agreement with the above critical stance on the diversity management paradigm, our exploratory and simultaneously engaged approach also resonates with voices in the literature which argue that organizational actors do not simply deploy hegemonic discourses of diversity, but rather selectively appropriate them. They combine them with other available norms to make sense of diversity, their organization and their work, and to construct their own professional position on diversity (Zanoni et al., 2010:17). Tomlinson and Schwabenland (2010) reveal that the opposition between equal opportunities and diversity management is less clear cut than leading voices in the critical diversity literature often suggest (Tatli 2011). Others call for an examination of multi-layered mechanisms of diversity management to reveal the ambivalences and conceptual and practical tensions that exist in this field. Targeted empirical research on the position, dilemmas, and operation of diversity managers or HR officers may reveal more ambivalence about pure business performance-driven diversity and the potential for fostering practical change than the purely discursive analysis of high-level strategic statements (Zanoni et al., 2010). In sum, the drivers, scope, and nature of diversity business practices need to be analyzed in depth to grasp the potential and limitations of social justice and inclusion outcomes in business practices. To this end, our inquiry links the microcosms of workplace practices at multinational companies in Hungary with the wider social, political, and policy structures that shape the practices of labor market and wider social exclusion.

A relatively thin literature has emerged about the positions, inspirations, knowledge and actual interventions concerning equality and diversity in employment relations by corporate actors in the Hungarian economy. Selective reading indicates that one stream within this literature explores corporate social responsibility (CSRÖ developments in terms of their complex sets of objectives and contents. These studies mostly discuss accountability and sustainable development, and rarely the gender equality objectives embodied in CSR policies of the observed corporate actors. Another stream within the literature that is more directly relevant to our inquiry dwells on corporate thinking and action towards the inclusion of various disadvantaged groups, or specifically the Roma, whether or not this activity is driven by CSR visions. Mészáros and Várhalmi (2011) have found that the majority of corporate decision makers acknowledge the wider societal benefits of the labor market inclusion of the Roma and also promote the idea of targeted labor market efforts to that end. They, however, rarely feel inspired to actively become involved in those efforts. Most of them would not consider employing Roma, even in times of a dire labor shortage. When specifying the reasons for the lack of employment opportunities for the Roma, business leaders refer to the low level skills of the Roma and dominant social prejudices which would punish business actors who are more devoted to Roma

inclusion. Moreover, these leaders believe that improving the employment conditions for the Roma is most importantly the duty of the state.

Katalin Tardos, who has been investigating equal opportunity and diversity practices in the domestic corporate sector for several years, argues that modest development occurred in the early 2010s regarding the participation of corporate actors in addressing the low employment rate of vulnerable or protected groups in the Hungarian labor market (Tardos 2015). This development should be acknowledged, in spite of the fact that it is still a minority of actors who are engaged in targeted equal opportunity and diversity work. Based on original empirical research that embraced a large number of corporate actors and compared data gathered at two points in time (2010 and 2012), Tardos argues that compared to earlier initiatives that were triggered by anti-discrimination policies, legal regulations and European norm diffusion, company leaders report about different motivational forces, such as internal ethical convictions in the organization, and employers' satisfaction and loyalty (ibid: 190). The research also revealed that engaged actors became more conscious about the number and nature of groups that face disadvantages or who are vulnerable in terms of labor and wider social affairs. Although other target groups have received more pronounced attention, the visibility and significance of ethnic minorities has also increased. The most tangible progress was made among the large transnational companies and, interestingly, mid-size domestic companies (ibid: 191-193). The research concludes that for one-third of the corporate actors in the sample, equality and diversity principles are not yet connected with the strategic business goals of the organization; however, the awareness is on the rise on the salience of qualified and satisfied labor force at the companies' disposal (ibid: 198). A smaller group of companies, mostly larger ones and transnational enterprises, are creating innovative practices and are making their hiring and labor management policies and instruments more equality and diversity savvy.

Our active equality of opportunity project and the research embodied in it may obtain useful insights through its approach within wider critical diversity scholarship and its representatives in domestic settings. Our practical interventions and inquiry target business actors that are making a more conscious effort to engage with social diversity challenges, and are thus moving beyond the more fluid language of cross-cultural differences and encounters. We acknowledge, however, that the line between cross-cultural and diversity thinking is often blurred.

## *3. Methods*

In our article, we rely on the first results of a pilot research[2] that aims at analyzing the impacts of targeted interventions to corporate hiring practices. We are conducting quantitative impact analysis as well as qualitative and anthropological methods. This article uses the results of the qualitative research, during which interviews were conducted with Roma participants of the project, and with HR personnel at multinational companies (MNCs) which participated in the program. In

[2] The article relies on impact analysis interviews conducted within the scope of the *Bridges to Business* project.

total, 12 interviews conducted with young Roma between March–May, 2017 were used in the analysis. The interviews were scheduled at the end of a four-day training program, or later, shortly after the training. Half of the interviewees were men, all of the interviewees had obtained at least a baccalaureate, and four of them had a higher education diploma too. In terms of regional representation, participants from eastern Hungary, southern Hungary (Baranya County) and from the capital city were included in equal proportions. From the above description it is obvious that our interviewees hardly represent the Roma youth in Hungary: they are highly qualified compared to the majority of this segment of the population, therefore some of their work-related experiences may be different from the average, or rather specific. However, their stories shed light on the social selection mechanisms which Hungarian youth of Roma ethnic background face during their daily experiences.

Another part of the qualitative data was obtained through interviews with six HR representatives; typically the HR personnel responsible for diversity and equal treatment at the partner MNCs. The same statement can be made about these organizations as about the Roma interviewees: they hardly represent the totality of the world of business companies in Hungary, as their participation in a Roma employment program indicates their above-average awareness and commitment to company diversity and inclusion. We also used our field observations and information obtained during our participation on the training sessions of the program.

During the interviews with partner-company representatives, we tried to map the company approaches to diversity. Due to the relatively short time since the program was launched and the time of our interviews, in addition to the lack of hired Roma employees, the interviewed company representatives (mostly working for HR departments) spoke about their impressions with Roma applicants in general, and not about participants of the specific program, which we were following. The same applies to the interviews with Roma participants who spoke about their employment and job-seeking experiences with companies in general, not with the partner companies.

## *4. Results*

In our analysis, we identify factors that contribute to the disadvantages that prevent even a group of relatively well-positioned members of the Roma community from applying for open company positions. The analysis is based on four key background factors shaping individual trajectories. We first introduce the experiences of the Roma youth after which we examine how the HR representatives of companies perceive and react to these experiences.

### *4.1 Family Background*

Through the sociological portraits of our young Roma interviewees, it can be stated that many of them are first-generation baccalaureate or diploma holders who have recently broken out of situation of poverty and social segregation. Their experience with mainstream society through elementary, secondary, and in some cases university years had a major impact on their lives. Our Roma interviewees need to rely on their own resources and find their own solutions in social situations related to their

integration. Due to the lack of a middle-class family model, there are no readily available schemes or cognitive frames to guide them. These resources cannot be substituted by a highly supportive family background and firm emotional support from home that many of our interviewees told about. Moreover, at a later stage and during a successful period of adjustment (e.g. when living in Budapest or attending university in a city), many of our interviewees reported that they found it difficult to relate to their sending environment and their families back home due to the huge gap between the two worlds: the rural Roma family with very little schooling experience, and an integrated, new life in a big city (see also Durst in this journal issue).

Our interviews indicate that while it is common for the family to foster the mobility of their children (i.e. support them to advance in different ways) at a young age, at a later stage they expect them to follow their decisions and, if necessary, return home, find employment nearby, and remain in daily contact. This expectation often comes from the simple fact that the parents need financial and social support from their grown-up child. Respondent 'Cs', for instance, became well integrated in the capital city and started working at an international organization as an intern. He had a good time, enjoyed the multicultural character of the city, and made lots of new friends. However, he had the feeling that the distance between him and his mother and grandmother – the two people who raised him and who systematically supported him to become who he is now (an educated man with two diplomas, fluent in English) – was growing. He felt guilty leaving them behind, and after the end of his internship year decided to move back to his village in eastern Hungary. It is likely that he will not be able to find a job locally which would measure up to his qualifications and career ambitions.

As suggested earlier, the parents of our interviewees had almost without exception very low level qualifications (only elementary school or basic vocational training). This implies that although family background and parental influence is important, it is not fully defining in terms of schooling career and further professional advancement. Despite receiving full support for their further studies from their closer environment, our interviewees suffered many disadvantages, for instance, in financial terms. Their families, in contrast to the families of their middle-class peers, were unable to compensate for the deficiencies of the public education system (such as weak foreign language training and IT education) or compensate for these weaknesses through paying for extra tuition. As a consequence, the young Roma end up in a disadvantaged position compared to their middle-class peers in certain areas highly valued by the corporate job-market, such as the aforementioned foreign languages and IT skills.

Many of our interviewees spoke about a kind of "commuting" between two worlds or two social realities: due to their studies or work, they often need to switch between the context of home and the context of a large-city middle-class world within a relatively short time. In other words, they do not move along a single, upward mobility track, but instead we see life stories as a series of back-and-forth steps, where geographical mobility (moving from small settlement to a town, from a countryside township to the capital city, and then from the center back home to the sending environment) go together with changing income levels and different levels of mobility. These two contexts (a middle-class, urban environment, and peripheral, rural Roma

settlements) stand worlds apart from each other: "commuting" of this sort is very tiring and often expensive, not just in financial terms but often from an emotional-psychological perspective too. We see at least three distinct strategies for coping with the related difficulties, and these may change within the lifetime of the same individual: (1) continuous switches, constant "translation" between the two worlds (not necessarily in terms of language use, but regarding behavior, habits, and information), which is quite demanding for the individual concerned; in addition, the environment is not supportive of such switches, (2) detachment from the sending environment and adjustment to the new one. During this type of a process, the young Roma person leaves his/her family environment and becomes engrossed in the new environment characterized by middle-class, urban culture and values. In our research this means that they become adopted to the new company environment and the norms associated with it, while the "left behind" context rapidly loses its relevance, and (3) the young Roma person stays in (or returns to) their home-environment and becomes an over-qualified unemployed person, or an underpaid, exploited public worker. We saw several examples of the latter. For instance, Cs., after completing an English-language graduate program, moved back to his tiny village from the capital city. Respondent Z works as a social worker within a public work program in a secondary school dorm due to the lack of any alternatives in his hometown. It is clear from the above that such 'solutions' require significant resources, while they also result in the development of useful *skills* that are required by most of the MNCs: cultural and linguistic adjustment, tolerance, openness, flexibility, the ability to switch between different worlds, and "translation" abilities, along with good communication skills.

The company responses to disadvantages related to the young Roma candidates' family background and to the skills they possess can be best described as a blind spot. Most of the companies we talked to emphasized the principle of equal treatment, and did not see that it is exactly this attitude which excludes the Roma youth from the selection process. With the exception of physically challenged applicants, the employment of whom generates explicit financial benefits for the company[3], we did not encounter any pro-active measures considering Roma, or other minority candidates, with more care and attention during the recruitment and selection procedure. When companies select their future employees they do not have the attention or allow sufficient time to deal with special circumstances such as the family background of their candidates. As HR representatives of the companies explained, they do not have the required human resources during the interview pre-selection process to consider such details. Furthermore, it is also the lack of awareness and limited nature of selection methods (i.e. use of corresponding HR tools) which leads to unexplored potentials of the applicant, in addition to the explicit performance and documented qualifications. Such potential and opportunities could be easily brought to the surface and turned into successful recruiting practices with relatively small investment through initiatives such as mentoring, thereby multiplying the initial investment. Companies do not recognize and appreciate the extraordinary investment that Roma youth from small rural settlements have made by the time they have

[3] This is due to the Act on Rehabilitation Tax 2011/CXCI, enabling companies employing more than 5 per cent physically challenged persons within their workforce to save on rehabilitation tax. This latter was approx. 1 million HUF/person/year) in 2017.

reached the baccalaureate level, often having achieved their goals through significant effort, self-discipline, and persistence. Understanding this could serve as important information when assessing the hidden reserves of a potential employee. Characteristics such as perseverance, ambition, self-discipline, communication, intercultural communication skills, and motivation could be valued at an MNC if recognized during the selection process. However, if selection takes place exclusively on meritocratic grounds and is based on performance in entry test, such qualities may stay hidden. We only met one HR representative who during the selection process claimed to consider the social background and hidden potential of the candidates belonging to minority groups.

On the other hand, we encountered a company which recognized the 'otherness' of the young Roma candidates and interpreted it in a negative way, reducing their chances during the hiring process. A representative explained about the Roma candidates as follows: "*...perhaps because he comes from another culture, promises that he will call back and he doesn't...it's a different value system, or I don't know what to call it...they are not socialized into this job-market competition, into this etiquette, how to behave...*" The HR person we interviewed referred to the norm that if an applicant accepts a different job from the one they are interviewing for, they are generally expected to call back to tell the first potential employee. It is obvious that the Roma are not the only ones who sometimes skip this step, but in their case this small mistake may easily become *culturalized* – the inaction gets interpreted as a sign of the Roma's 'cultural otherness' – a negative group characteristic, a negative stereotype (i.e. 'the Roma' don't know how to communicate 'properly'). The same HR person wondered about Roma employees in the following way: "*somehow they don't behave the same way as other candidates, this is also a serious problem, they have nothing to build upon*". A tangible ambivalence characterizes the HR representatives involved in the selection processes: on the one hand, they sense social differences, but they don't know how to handle those. They do not wish to (or cannot) invest additional energy into handling this issue, which is not necessarily a result of prejudiced thinking but often stems from lack of time, capacity, or sufficient skills and sensitivities.

### *4.2 School Experiences*

First, we should establish the fact that the schooling of the Roma youth who participated in our research is significantly different from the experience of the majority of Roma in Hungary. All of the former have at least a baccalaureate, while some of them have also obtained a university diploma or were enrolled in tertiary education during the time of the research. Thus, they represent the elite of the Roma youth, at least from the point of view of schooling success. We identified three characteristics during the interviews which were mentioned by all of this cohort, and which, we believe, are preconditions for a Roma child to reach the baccalaureate level of education. One of these conditions is a strong and supportive family background, where learning is an obvious norm and is valued. The parents of all our young respondents supported and encouraged them to study. "*I was always told by my parents that I needed to prove myself at the maximum level". "My dad told me: 'son, I have a vocation [a vocational job], you go and achieve more!'". "My parents saw the*

*key to a better life is in further studies. They didn't want me to live in such difficult conditions [doing temporary, physical work] as they do".*

The second element of schooling success, mentioned by almost all our interviewees, was a mentor-teacher relationship. This did not necessarily involve a formal mentor, but often a teacher who supported them from early on. One interviewee was helped by her kindergarten teacher, and thereby avoided being placed in the segregated Roma class 'for children with special needs' which was otherwise the default option for Roma kids. "*Only Roma kids went to the special class (kisegitő). The classrooms were in the basement ... I didn't end up in this class, I was lucky ... One of the teachers liked me in the kindergarten ... it was not even considered that I would be sent to the special class, because according to this teacher I was so smart and clever. And there I was lucky, I got a 'fairy-teacher' too."* These teachers not only paved the way for the Roma children through education, but often provided emotional support and acted as role-models. *"They continuously paid attention to me and dealt with my little soul to keep up my interest in studies, my motivation, my ability to study further"*– recalled one of our interviewees about her teachers.

The third characteristic common to the program participants is that none of them attended an ethnically segregated school or class. In some cases, they were the only Roma in their class. Nonetheless, an integrated school environment often results in conflict, especially in schools frequented by the children of the local elite. Such 'elite' town schools may support mobility for the talented children of the lower-middle classes, but it is also in these schools that ethnic discrimination appears in its sharpest forms. Many reported that one or more teachers treated them unfairly, and discriminated against them. The interviewees often spoke about their compulsion to achieve, and the need to refute negative stereotypes. "*I was warned by my parents in Class 8 that if I moved out of my village I would have to perform twice as was well as a Hungarian.*" Discrimination by teachers, which kids often call being 'picked on' (*pikkelés*), was not necessarily understood in an ethnic dimension; however, it sometimes left deep traces in the affected young person's psyche, and could irreparably affect their schooling career. Often the respondents felt that it was their Roma identity which was an eyesore to the teacher. *"My parents enrolled me into the town school, where I was the only Roma. (...) Three teachers' kids, the mayor's kid and the headmaster's son also studied in this class, they always made me feel that I was 'only' a Roma...there was a teacher who constantly nagged me, but he taught me that if someone sits in front of me saying 'hey stinking Gypsy!', I will not be much impressed."* Favoritism, discrimination and negative comments about the Roma left deep wounds: this elementary teacher ruined the respondent's self-esteem. The discriminating and derogatory behavior of the teacher and the fact that our interviewee was left out of class events such as the end-of-year performance became a psychological barrier for him, ruining not just his school performance but affecting his social behavior, even until the time of the interview. In particular, situations that require a high level of performance such as tests or interviews provoke neurotic symptoms. The respondent finally stayed at the school and later moved on to a gymnasium (a traditional high school) and to university because his talent was recognized by other teachers who supported him.

To sum up, we claim that while it is the urban 'elite' schools which represent channels of mobility for socially disadvantaged Roma children, studying at these institutions may come at a huge price: discrimination, frequent feelings of being 'different' and being made to feel 'different', loneliness in this position, and sometimes psychological trauma connected to all the previous burdens. This results in ruined self-esteem and confidence. Many of our respondents chose a strategy of fighting such disadvantages by openly subscribing to their ethnic identity and thus putting up a kind of a fence to prevent further attacks. But even such young people had to work hard on resolving the traumas they had experienced during childhood.

Even though the project targets young Roma with baccalaureates or tertiary qualifications, HR personnel from the participating companies referred to the low level of education of the Roma as job-seekers as a general trait when asked about their disadvantages. Beyond this, they could not identify other disadvantages. Meanwhile, all of the participating companies recognized the lack of self-confidence of many Roma applicants, but usually considered it an independent characteristic unlinked to being a member of a racialized ethnic minority (i.e. they considered it to be a form of shyness). Even if they suspect that applicants experience discrimination during childhood, they do not dwell on it. Companies do not feel that it is within their remit to compensate for such disadvantages, and this approach means they apply the principle of equal treatment without being conscious of their applicants' lack of equal opportunities. A company HR head, for instance, treated low self-esteem as a cultural trait. We saw one exception to this general pattern: an HR representative of an MNC 'saw through' the lack of self-confidence of these young Roma and tried to support freshly hired Roma employees by introducing them to colleagues and personally helping them to take the first difficult steps in their new workplaces. Nevertheless, such forms of support are available only to those who have already been through a color-blind selection process.

Meanwhile, an HR representative of another MNC interpreted the strategy of a young Roma intern who presented himself in a self-confident manner as being over-ambitious or pushy: "*It came across as something bizarre that someone would come in with such ambition that he wanted to move up the ladder fast, but at a big company such as ours, one has to wait patiently in the queue. This is nothing ethnic, not just about Roma, it applies to everyone."* However, taking a closer look at this story it is clear that this high-level ambition was translated into 'pushiness' in the case of the Roma intern, while in general such ambitions are inherently part of meritocratic company culture.

Another disadvantage stemming from Roma youth's schooling that frequently occurred compared to the stable educational experiences of the middle-class children is frequent changes of schools. Such instances are not identified by the companies as a consequence of discriminatory school practices, or abusive teachers. Also, Roma youth often relate to authority with suspicion due to their negative schooling experiences and frequent experience of being humiliated: "*a good boss is one who is somewhere else*", summed up one of the training participants. During a job interview, interviewers may recognize only some part of this phenomenon; namely, that the young Roma do not place themselves in the position of partners but instead behave in

a defensive, reserved way; they cannot present their skills and abilities in the expected way, or on the contrary, they overrate themselves.

All the company representatives emphasized that equal treatment is their primary consideration; they do not distinguish between candidates based on skin color, ethnicity or other personal traits. This also meant at most companies that ethnic identity remained taboo, according to a badly-defined notion of political correctness. Very few of them perceived that it is exactly equal treatment which places Roma candidates – after being humiliated at school and experiencing discrimination, so struggling with low self-esteem – in a disadvantaged position. These individuals are filtered out by the corporate recruitment system first because it does not look into the history of each candidate and interview situation. The much-emphasized equal treatment approach is responsible for reproducing the disadvantaged situation of Roma candidates: they could not compensate for an insufficient school education through private tuition, could not afford private foreign language classes, did not have a PC at home due to the weak economic status of their families. Most of the HR representatives we interviewed were not interested in the reasons for weaker IT skills or poorer foreign-language skills; they only emphasized their strict meritocratic principles and anti-discrimination measures, with the exception of one company. This company was willing to consider a slightly weaker Roma candidate (weaker than some non-Roma candidates) and to recognize other personality traits and skills deemed valuable to the company. They were also willing to help to build the qualities they perceived as lacking through an in-house training process which took place after the Roma in question was hired.

### *4.3 Geographical Distance, Segregated Living*

Segregation is addressed by the sociological literature as an ethno-social process; the lack of infrastructure and adequate public transport contributes to geographic marginalization. The latter usually results in serious mobility challenges and disadvantages in relation to employment. In terms of the choice of employment, the precarity of Roma on the job market is obvious, and is caused by the intersecting influences of geographical distance, economic marginalization and discrimination. A significant literature tells about the processes through which Roma have been pushed into deindustrialized and economically marginalized areas in Hungary in which mines and heavy industry shut down in the 1990s and workplaces are no longer available, while public services, including public transport, have diminished to the utmost minimum (for more on this, Váradi and Virág 2015; Nagy et al., 2015; Szalai and Zentai 2014; Kertesi 2005)

Interviews revealed that young Roma have to cope with the consequences of living in remote settlements, far from larger urban areas where employment is available. Even highly qualified Roma find it difficult to bridge the distance between their homes and potential workplaces. For Roma with a baccalaureate or sometimes diploma from higher education, three main options are available: stay in their locality and join a public work program (which means being underpaid and lacking job mobility), obtain employment in temporary and part-time jobs, typically in social development projects, or move to a larger city, leaving behind their relatives and

families, often in poor economic and physical health and in significant need of support. Such Roma are often forced to accept jobs which are far below their qualifications as they do not have the financial means to support their geographical mobility (e.g. to move to a larger city and rent an apartment/ room, involving significant financial capital) either individually, or within the extended family. Our interviewees often chose to stay in their communities and accept less skilled jobs such as cleaning, public work, or day work in the agricultural or construction sector. Obviously, the non-Roma living in economically disadvantaged, geographically segregated areas are equally hit by these disadvantages, but the majority of Hungarian Roma live in such areas of the country. Furthermore, we identify a strong tendency to negative self-selection: young Roma do not even consider taking jobs a bit further away from their localities, presuming that they will not be able to commute or move to another settlement if this is required by the new job. This is due to the lack of any external support, a precise assessment of opportunities, and not least, a lack of opportunities.

The issue of geographical distance turns out to be even more complex than a mere lack of economic capital. Apart from the financial and geographic difficulties described above, large cities, where there is a greater choice of jobs, Budapest specifically, turn out to be unknown social and cultural terrain for many of the Roma respondents. A lack of cultural capital and a lack of skills which would help them to navigate the urban space of Budapest is evident in case of our Roma interviewees. In addition, the visible signs of being a Roma (appearance, skin color, dress, dialect or language use) evokes negative stereotypes, judgment and rejection in some social situations, which renders the new start in the city even more difficult. It is obviously very challenging for some to leave behind the protective community of a small village and become accommodated to a vibrant urban life. The depth of these challenges is shown by the stories of some of our interviewees: several of them decided to move back to their villages, often into a shared household with their parents, from where any further moves to a bigger city are as difficult as they were originally.

As is well-known, the job market is very much network-driven in Hungary: personal contacts are essential for finding out about job openings, as well as successfully applying for these. Due to the fact that employers typically belong to the upper-middle class and were socialized in the gymnasiums and universities of Budapest and of some larger cities, rural Roma, especially if they were educated in segregated settings, have very limited access to these social networks. Our interviewees were well-qualified Roma, but many could only find jobs through ethnic networks (Roma Advanced Colleges, Roma scholarships, etc.) that serve as the core of their weak ties (Granovetter 1973). However, these jobs usually reinforce a state of dependency because most of them are project based, temporary, and exposed to politics. Some of the MNCs we interviewed partly recognize the challenges their Roma applicants experience in relation to geographical distance and have tried to find solutions to such difficulties. However, we should stress that those were rare instances. For instance, one HR representative who supported a young Roma arranged, with the support of the management of the company, for the successful applicant to receive temporary accommodation from the company until she made her home in the city. Such arrangements are not only framed at the individual level (we met with only one

such case), but even when they exist do not become systemic responses to such problems.

At most companies, financial support for commuting is the only benefit which is available. For those living in localities with poor transportation infrastructure (public transport) or at a significant distance from the workplace, this support may not be forthcoming. In other cases, and at other companies, such benefits are awarded on the basis of individual applications which means they cannot be considered systematic responses to a systemic disadvantage. Many of the companies we interviewed referred to the relocation support program advertised by the state (the Youth Guarantee Program, or benefits accessible through the 'Job-market Centers' run by the state), but we could not identify any company-level support for helping the employees concerned to access such benefits. Moreover, such benefits are almost without exception awarded under strict conditions (e.g. only the registered unemployed or those who belong to defined demographic groups can apply for them).

We found that instead of supporting the geographical mobility of employees, companies try to benefit from tapping into unexploited groups of employees by establishing new centers in the countryside, mostly in regions where no or only a few MNCs previously existed. This process, in our understanding, will be further accelerated by the present lack of qualified workforce and other negative circumstances (poor infrastructure, expensive travel and expensive rental) in the capital city which tend to tie potential employees to their place of origin.

### *4.4 Discrimination in Employment*

Many of our interviewees gave accounts of work-related discrimination that they had experienced prior to the project in their role as apprentices, during job applications and in job interviews mainly for blue-collar jobs, but the most critical time in terms of unequal treatment was during selection procedures. One of our interviewees recounted the following story which had occurred during his apprenticeship. "*I had been telling the shop manager that I was ill and was formally on sick leave, and that I would work the hours that I had missed due to my illness, but he said no* [to confirming this work as an apprentice]*. He was like that* [having a negative attitude] *explicitly, and only with me: I was the only Roma boy among the apprentices.*" In the end this respondent did not receive the related qualification because the signature of the shop manager proving that he had completed the apprenticeship, which is a condition for receiving this form of secondary school completion certificate, was lacking.

Roma who present explicit signs of their ethnicity are often rejected at the very start of the selection process even if they have the required qualifications. The career-path of A. illustrates such experiences: after continuing her education beyond obtaining a secondary school leaving qualification and acquiring additional professional qualifications she started looking for a job with, as she believed, very good chances in her local area, a small town in the south of Hungary. Despite the lack of a well-qualified workforce in the area, she was not hired and had to take on public work because – according to local norms – the most a Roma can do is this. Finally, she decided to move to Budapest in the hope of better employment where she also

experienced discriminative attitudes on several occasions while looking for a job. "*I went to work for a trial day, but when they saw that I was a Gypsy – ... you know it is written all over the faces of people in Budapest – they told me that the position was already filled*". No matter that she had good qualifications; she could only find a cleaning job because of her skin color and lack of network. Our last example highlights how widespread the racial discrimination of Roma is during the selection procedure. R., who has a tertiary-level education in finance and accounting, estimated that from ten job interviews he was asked about his ethnicity in six. His response was then followed by discriminative comments: "*I had a job interview in which they asked me "and by the way, are you Roma?" There was an employer who started telling me that the entire office is equipped with cameras and it is not possible to steal from the office*". This respondent moved to England, where he found a job in a very short time and nobody – neither security guards, people on buses nor employers – harassed him (a situations that occurred regularly in Hungary). For personal reasons he moved back to Hungary and is still looking for a job. We could continue listing examples of discrimination at length, but for now it is sufficient to establish the fact that being a 'visible' Roma reduces the chance of getting a job, even with good educational qualifications. Many young Roma become frustrated and traumatized as a consequence and give up looking for jobs that match their educational status. Those who find jobs were most likely to do so through their ethnic networks: through EU-funded inclusion (integration) projects, through Roma scholarships or support programs or minority politics, even if they would have preferred to break out from this limited network of ethnic employment.

Our interviews with multinational firms suggest that employers are rarely aware of the damage that experiences of discrimination may cause concerning the self-esteem and identity of young Roma. Even if they suspect such history, they are likely to disregard this context and think they have no bearing on it. The following quote summarizes well the typical approach and the lack of awareness about the disadvantages Roma job seekers have as a result of former experiences of discrimination: "*we do not have presumptions, we value all applicants based on their skills*". Although some of the HR people in charge of the equal opportunity strategies at firms tried to support program participants (but not those Roma who had arrived at the organizations in other ways), such support was aimed at individuals and ad hoc, rarely systematic. Most emphasized that their firm applied rigorous anti-discrimination policy. However, during the job interviews it turned out that even though our interviewees were involved in the selection process, none of them had real insight into the final selection decisions because these are made by a very small group of people (usually two or three). As equal opportunity rapporteurs they had haphazard insight into the job interviews and admitted that very often personal feelings played a role in the final steps of the selection procedure, "*even if someone gets as far as the final job interview, there needs to be a lot more happening until they get an offer: for example, it is important that "the chemistry works*" [between the applicant and their future boss].

Non-discrimination in recruitment often does not go beyond the drafting of formal documents and procedures: all of the companies we investigated have formal legal documents that are aligned with the equal opportunity act (2003/CXXV).

Complaints concerning the violation of these regulations involve formal procedures within these firms. In the course of the selection procedure, however, applicants are not aware of these internal policy documents. Procedures may address any complaints ex-post, but measures that aim at the prevention of unequal treatment are rare. Only at one of the firms did an HR representative mention that racial discrimination at the very first step of recruitment could be avoided by applying a practice common in other countries: namely, applicants' CVs should not include their pictures.

It is uncommon for companies to recognize (or disclose) the potential presence of prejudice or discrimination. They regard these phenomena rather as something that is characteristic of the external world. The following quote that contains the response of an HR representative to our question about what a Roma employee could do if they experience explicitly racialized comments at work clearly illustrates a lack of strategic thinking: "*they can handle it on their own, using professional or personal authority, or they may look for allies among employees. Finally, as a last resort they can escalate the case to their superior [...] or turn to the board of ethics with a complaint.*" A former program participant who had found a job at one of the partner companies had a bizarre experience on her first day of employment. Her boss called her in for a closed-door discussion during which he warned her that it sometimes happens that colleagues make inappropriate, even racist remarks about clients, but it is not worth taking these seriously; he argued that the comments involve only labels that are used in everyday communication but which are of no real significance.

We came across only a few instances when company HR recognized that discrimination may exist in a latent form within their firms. One of them – a company which employed some Roma but more importantly served a large number of Roma clients – recognized that prejudice and discrimination existed within the firm, and even towards clients. The organization did not stop at using the formal solutions described above but organized innovative forms of training for mid-level leaders to reveal and treat conflicts stemming from racial prejudice. Another multinational company that is characterized by a large level of diversity in all respects considered it important that it informed and educated its mid-level leaders and supported new employees from disadvantaged groups by forming mentor networks.

In sum, the quality of corporate responses to discrimination can be assessed on a wide scale. At the one end, there exist those companies which downplay or completely deny the possibility of racial discrimination on their terrain. Such companies do not go beyond meeting the formal requirements of setting up equal treatment regulations, and these documents and procedures are not or only rarely used. In the middle of this scale, we find companies which recognize the possibility of discrimination (and sometimes even its actual existence) and try to change such attitudes by organizing internal training events for employees. At the other end of the scale, we find those companies which not only acknowledge the presence of discrimination, but try to prevent it in the course of recruitment and during further phases of employment; they speak about ethnicity and race openly, and support community and self-representation.

## *5. Conclusions*

In the introduction to this paper, we promised to try to reconcile two seemingly distinct approaches concerning the employment of educated young Roma. At first glance, the approaches of social justice and business management are contradictory, as the former looks into how socially disadvantaged individuals or communities may be supported to increase their social inclusion, while the latter is interested in how the performance and financial profitability of business organizations may be increased. Concerning the disadvantages discussed in this paper, we would like to show that these two approaches are not exclusive and may even support and strengthen one another in several respects.

The life stories of educated young Roma demonstrate that the majority of them have a disadvantaged background. Almost all of them experienced unfavorable educational environments and various obstacles to pursuing their educational careers. Thus, young Roma who manage to finish secondary education (with a baccalaureate) have made extraordinary efforts compared to their peers from middle-class families. Disadvantages are not only composed of the socio-economic conditions of their families, but of the prejudice and discrimination through which the wider social environment relates to them. It is obvious that even those Roma youngsters who overcome the challenges of weak financial, cultural, and network capital, travel distance, and discriminatory treatment by teachers and peers accumulate disadvantages. They may have fragile self-confidence and low self-esteem, and are frequently embarrassed when communicating within hierarchical relations. They also suffer from a lack of sound knowledge of foreign languages and IT skills. However, these young people have well-developed skills, knowledge, and capacities that can become valuable resources for various employers, such as persistence, resilience, conflict resistance, a drive for cooperation, loyalty, and most importantly, a high level of motivation. It is a pressing problem that their disadvantages are already salient at the first stages of the recruitment process, while their potential only becomes visible over time. Therefore, pro-active employer interventions are required to offset such disadvantages.

The approach of equal treatment that is widely applied by corporate actors in Hungary is not suitable for addressing such accumulated disadvantages. The result is that young Roma often do not get shortlisted for jobs, even if they meet formal educational prerequisites. In contrast, the principle of equal opportunity (or in this case, equal access) mobilizes differential forms of treatment and positive action to compensate for these disadvantages. Positive action requires additional attention and resources in the process of workforce recruitment and selection, seemingly undermining merit-based human resource management routines. However, positive action may facilitate the employment of a competent and productive labor force in the longer term. It is essential to highlight the significance of the time horizon. Hiring young Roma may create a less obviously capable labor force at the entry point, but positive intervention may create benefits even in the medium term. Acknowledging the *time lag* between the interventions made in the present and future benefits is a key challenge that we are addressing with the corporate actors in this bridging experiment.

Notwithstanding, timing is not the only challenging element of positive action. Various unintended consequences of positive action (such as the resistance of the organizational environment, possible stigmatization of the target group, or the weakening of performance in the case of premature withdrawal of specific support initiatives for the integration of disadvantaged groups) should be addressed by equality and diversity management knowledge, procedures, and institutional practices. These become timely following the act of recruitment. Our intervention and research addresses the gap in the labor force recruitment process, but we wish to obtain at least exploratory insights about the post-recruitment features of equal opportunity action at the selected companies.

In the current economic circumstances, one cannot ignore the potential effects of the labor shortage as regards particular components of the labor force in the Hungarian economy. Our research will observe employers' reactions to this new trend in the business environment, and the subsequent opportunities for linking the inclusion of educated young Roma to white-collar jobs in the corporate sector. Interestingly, in the wider global business realm, the literature is describing a shift or partial shift from equal opportunity to diversity policies, whereas in Hungarian (and perhaps in the CEE) context, a hybrid trend appears to be emerging: progress towards equal opportunity and diversity are not set up against one other. This progress is often, but not exclusively, unfolding under the umbrella of somewhat fluid CSR objectives and narratives. CSR activities in domestic settings appear to support ethical institutional and business operations for the purpose of achieving reputational outcomes, but are often practiced as pure charity. Our experiences show that such 'benevolence' often pertains towards Roma inclusion. The current interventions we are pursuing strive to explore the opportunities for explicit equal opportunity action in organizational processes which benefit specified target groups, the general labor force in the company, and also enhance business performance in the long run. The field open to this sort of interventions does not look empty any more, but not yet particularly cultivated.

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ZSANNA NYÍRŐ AND JUDIT DURST *

# Soul Work and Giving Back: Ethnic Support Groups and the Hidden Costs of Social Mobility. Lessons from Hungarian Roma Graduates

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## Abstract

For a long time, social and public policies have presented upward social mobility as an unambiguously progressive process. However, there is a relatively new line of academic research that concerns the dilemmas, or 'hidden costs', of upward mobility. Still, apart from a few inspiring exceptions, there is a lack of empirical studies, especially in Hungary, that explore the personal experiences of the impact of moving class through educational mobility. Academic literature about stigmatised, disadvantaged minorities such as Afro-Americans and Mexicans in the U.S or the Roma in Europe suggests that the professional middle class of these groups – those who have demonstrated an exceptional range of intergenerational mobility – have adopted a distinctive upward mobility strategy to overcome the challenges that are unique to them. These challenges emerge from the difficulties of maintaining intra-class relations with poorer 'co-ethnics' (people from the communities they were brought up in), but also managing interethnic relations with the 'white' (non-Black in the U.S, non-Roma in East-Central Europe) majority. As part of this minority culture of mobility, the Roma, as with other stigmatised minority groups, create and join ethnic professional organisations to enable them to culturally navigate both worlds. Throughout this paper, we focus our attention on influential ethnic support groups or organisations and address the question what effect they have on the costs of upward mobility in the case of our Roma professional middle-class sample.

*Keywords:* Minority culture of mobility, Hungarian Roma middle class, Educational mobility, Cost of upward mobility, Ethnic support group.

> 'It was a big lesson for us...Because we caused injuries to many people. They were admitted to university with our support. But at the same time, they became alienated from their families, almost to the extent that they were disowned by the communities where they came from. There were individual tragedies deriving from the fact that mobility was not a slow, gradual, multi-generational process for them.'
>
> One of our interviewees (leader of an NGO that supports the higher education of Roma Youth)

## *Introduction*

The Roma (or as many call themselves in Hungary, *cigány;* that is, Gypsies) are one of the most stigmatised, disadvantaged and vulnerable minority groups in Europe.[1] Although this denomination embraces super-diverse, culturally and socio-economically hybrid (Tremlett, 2009) heterogeneous subgroups of people, and despite how methodically difficult it is to assess this population (Brüggeman, 2014; Messing, 2014), according to all available research papers (e.g. FRA and UNDP, 2012), there is a huge gap between the academic achievements of Roma and non-Roma populations in many European countries, with fewer than one per cent of Roma students possessing a higher education qualification (college degree). We learn from numerous insightful research studies about the social forces and mechanisms through which being a Roma means an ethnic penalty regarding educational mobility in Hungary (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2008; Neumann, 2013; Szalai, 2013; Messing et al., 2010; Papp, 2011; Zolnay, 2016). We also know, however, bits and pieces about different societal factors (such as ethnic support groups or organisations) that facilitate or support the upward mobility of Roma and other stigmatised minority groups (Székely et al., 2005; Kóczé, 2011; Berényi and Carrasco, 2017; Brüggerman 2014, Stanton-Salazar, 2004). These studies shed light on how ethnicity can be mobilised or used as 'ethnic capital' or 'community cultural wealth' (Pott, 2001; Yosso, 2005; Óhídy, 2016) in the process of social climbing through educational attainment. However, we have very limited knowledge (for exceptions, see: Kóczé, 2010; Durst et al., 2014; Berényi and Carrasco, 2017; Berényi, 2017) about what socio-economic status educational mobility brings to the upwardly mobile, and more importantly for our current topic, what the price of this mobility process is. Although social and public policies present upward mobility (especially through academic success) as an unambiguously progressive process, a new line of current academic research addresses the issue of the challenges of social climbing by analysing the 'hidden costs of mobility' (Cole and Omari, 2003: 794). In Hungary, this is a much under-researched area.

This article is written for two purposes. First, to bridge the empirical gap we analyse the personal experiences of educationally mobile Roma intellectuals through their own narratives, thereby unravelling the price of social climbing and changing

[1] We would like to thank our interviewees to share their personal experiences with us which made this research possible.

class. Second, having become aware following earlier research of the crucial role ethnic-supportive programs play in the lives of academically successful Roma middle-class individuals (Durst et al., 2014), we analyse the influence of these support groups or supportive programs on the costs of upward mobility for their Roma beneficiaries.

For this purpose, we use a subsample of 20 interviews from previous research which explored the work orientation and work-life balance of 65 professional Roma women (Durst et al., 2016) and five additional interviews with college-educated Roma men from our new pilot project. This merged sample of 25 Roma graduates consists of individuals aged 23-49 who were beneficiaries of any ethnic support group or pro-Roma non-governmental organisation that aimed at facilitating the educational mobility of young Roma (and non-Roma) people from a disadvantaged family background. From our interviewees' narratives, four hugely influential support programs emerged as having an impact on their own mobility paths: 'Romaversitas', the late Kurt Lewin Foundation's educational program, and two pro-Roma media initiatives. Throughout the paper, we focus our attention on these programs and their role in our respondents' mobility trajectory and mobility outcomes.

We call our sample the 'academic high achievers' – denoting those graduate Roma who come from a formerly less well-educated family background (where neither parent has a degree) and who are designated 'first generation intellectuals' in Hungarian mobility studies (among others, see: Ferenczi, 2003: 1074).[2] We take ethnicity as a social construct and are aware of its symbolic, hybrid and situational character (see: Gans, 1979; Tremlett, 2009, Tremlett and McGarry, 2013; Messing, 2014). In this research, however, we use the term 'ethnicity' in relation to our respondents who were purposively sampled based on their self-identification as Roma. Here, ethnicity relates to ethnic identity – a feeling of belonging or relating to a visible, stigmatised ethnic minority group.

## *Theoretical Background*

Baldwin (1985), a black American novelist, asks whether intergenerational class mobility is worth 'the price of the ticket' (1985: 5). This question is whether those who achieve middle-class status through extreme long-range intergenerational mobility (that is, become college graduates with a working class, poor family background) suffer in terms of their psychological well-being. For Afro-Americans, the literature speaks about costs which arises from alienation from their co-ethnic Blacks (Afro-Americans), and condescension from white middle-class counterparts who do not consider the new arrivals bona fide members of the middle class (Cole and Omari, 2003; Vallejo, 2012). These factors account for the acute and chronic stress experienced by many stigmatised members of minorities who have a poor family background yet succeed in majority middle-class dominated professions. According to Friedman (2016), this stress stems from the upwardly mobile individual's dislocated

[2] During earlier research on a related topic (Durst et al., 2016), we became aware of the dilemma regarding the meaning and use of this particularly context-dependent term (see: Mazsu, 2012) to which the equivalent is the category 'professionals' in Anglo-Saxon countries. Therefore, throughout the paper we use a more generally accepted term; that of 'academically high achieving' individuals instead.

habitus, or *habitus clivé* – a condition which occurs when one's 'class-inflected cultural identity' (2016: 1) suffers a sense of being out of place (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bourdieu, 2005). As Bourdieu argues (based on his own personal experience of a disrupted habitus; he was raised by a rural postal worker but climbed to be the Chair of the prestigious College du France), the academically successful, upwardly mobile class 'transfuges' are caught in a painful position of social limbo, of 'double isolation', from both their origin and destination class' (Bourdieu, 1998: 106-107, as cited by: Friedman, 2016: 10). While such 'transfuges' attempt to adopt the cultural dispositions valued in their new elite milieu, they retain a 'secret guilt' about abandoning the ties of their primary socialisation, and can never fully enjoy their success because of poorer co-ethnics left behind in poverty, who often include their loved ones and families (see also: Hooks, 2000).

Cole and Omari (2003) also emphasized that upward mobility can negatively affect the psychological well-being of the black middle-class, because many of them experience stress and frustration due to tokenism, residential segregation, discrimination and the effect of the glass ceiling constructed by majority members of society. These emotional difficulties are called the 'hidden costs of upward mobility' by Cole and Omari (2003: 794).

In a similar line, Neckerman et al. (1999) highlighted that achieving middle-class status for disadvantaged minorities is associated with problems arising from dense contact with the majority middle-class and from inter-class relations within their minority community of origin. Middle-class minorities have more extensive contacts with the majority society than their co-ethnics due to their occupational positions and other roles (e.g. consumers), so they are more exposed to prejudice and discrimination. Middle-class minorities also have more regular contact with poor co-ethnics than their majority counterparts, thus they encounter class tension (e.g. claims for support, accusations of racial disloyalty) more often. According to Neckerman et al. (1999), the response to these problems is the emergence of a *minority culture of mobility* which is 'a set of cultural elements that provide strategies for mobility within the context of racial discrimination coupled with socio-economic disadvantage' (Neckerman et al., 1999: 960). The minority culture of mobility includes knowledge, behavioural strategies and symbolic elements that help manage their relations with the white middle class and poorer co-ethnics (Neckerman et al., 1999).

Vallejo (2012) examined the minority culture of mobility among Mexican Americans and found that they use group-specific mobility strategies such as creating and joining ethnic professional organisations. These organisations provide their members with social and cultural capital, strengthen a class-based minority identity, and give cultural shelter.

This paper is written to contribute to our knowledge of the experiences of middle-class minorities from disadvantaged and discriminated groups by interrogating the issue of the role of certain ethnic organisations and educational programs or support groups in the upward mobility process of college educated Roma in Hungary. Using written documentary sources, personal accounts (narratives) of academic high-achieving Roma who were beneficiaries of these support initiatives, and interviews with leaders of these organisations, we are especially interested in the programs' effects in terms of the cost of upward mobility.

## *Research on Successful Roma in Hungary*

The vast majority of the academic literature (e.g. Kende and Neményi, 2006; Kertesi and Kézdi, 2008; Neumann, 2013; Messing et al., 2010; Szalai, 2011; Szalai, 2013; Papp, 2011; Zolnay, 2016) that discusses the school careers and educational mobility of the Roma population in Hungary focuses particularly on disadvantaged communities.

Much of the current literature on successful Roma pays almost exclusive attention to examining young people who are still participating in higher education. For example, research by Forray (2004; 2014) examined the socio-economic characteristics and motivations of the former, Mendi (1999) investigated the factors which contribute to their academic success, but the most well studied area (e.g. Kende, 2005; Kende, 2007; Bokrétás et al., 2007; Békés, 2011) is the development of the identity of university students. This work provides valuable information about the beginning of the process of upward mobility; however, it is obviously unable to explain the long-term development and consequences of social climbing.

Few studies have investigated the process of social climbing after graduation and its consequences. Székely et al. (2005) studied the educational mobility, networks, the construction of identity, typical mobility paths and life satisfaction of Roma who were not specifically graduates but at least skilled workers. Torkos (2005) – besides identifying the factors determining school success – analysed how graduation influences social integration. The results indicate that this group typically assimilates. Kóczé (2010) studied the life history of politically active, upwardly mobile Roma women with a special focus on the intersectionality between gender, ethnicity and class. Kóczé draws attention to the fact that the mobility of the first-generation Roma intellectuals is a complex process in which psychosocial factors play an important role, as well as the traditional mobility variables. The importance of family and micro-community is emphasised in facilitating upward mobility. Máté (2015) examined the identity constructions of resilient Roma intellectuals. Óhidy (2013; 2016) conducted qualitative interviews with ten Roma women graduates and found that the most important factor in their academic success is learning motivation. Szabóné (2012) investigated the sociodemographic characteristics and mental health of Roma intellectuals. Tóth (2008; 2014) examined (mostly graduate) Roma intellectuals from the United Kingdom and Hungary to identify whether it is possible to achieve upward mobility and retain Roma identity, or whether social uplift necessarily entails a dual identity or assimilation. Results show that the most common type of identity is dual identity (here, a feeling of being both Hungarian and Roma) in the case of upwardly mobile Hungarian Roma intellectuals. Tóth stated that, in the case of the Hungarian sample, the experience of (temporal) identity crisis is common. However, none of these studies systematically analysed the price of upward mobility, nor the roles of those mediators or moderators (in our case, ethnic support groups or NGOs) that may make this painful process smoother, or, indeed, unintentionally contribute to creating other mobility-related costs for middle-class Roma in Hungary.

## *Research Methods and Context*

The sample for this study is constituted of a subsample used in earlier research by the present authors (Durst et al., 2014)[3] and of a preliminary pilot study carried out recently within a new project that investigates the costs and outcomes of upward mobility.[4] The research applied a snowball sampling method to identify participants. We looked for interviewees who were self-identified Roma, and who had obtained a college or university degree. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with a total of 70 mostly female graduate Roma between 2011 and 2012, and then also during the pilot project in the autumn of 2017. The language of the interviews was Hungarian,[5] and interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. For this study we selected all those interviewees whose parents had not obtained a university degree; that is, those Roma who are upwardly mobile and who had participated in any educational program for Roma youth (a total of 25 interviews). In terms of age, interviewees ranged from 23 to 49 years old and included participants from urban and rural locations in Hungary.

Educational or pro-Roma support programs and support groups (those who state in their articles of association that they provided services for the betterment of disadvantaged Roma people) were mentioned by our interviewees as highly influential in their mobility trajectories. These programs provided a wide range of services: they not only supported the educational attainments of their beneficiaries – Roma students – but they also organised social events and gave material and psychological support to their members. There is a college of advanced studies (Romaversitas), preparatory courses for university entry, and the Szocháló Project (Kurt Lewin Foundation), and media internships among these programs. All were academically selective and most of them accepted applications from students who were self-declared Roma. All of them provided long-term (at least several months') support to beneficiaries. The programs are described in detail later in the paper.

Grounded theory was applied for the interview analysis. This supports the 'analytic interpretation of participants' worlds and of the processes constituting how these worlds are constructed' (Charmaz, 2005: 508). We used a general inductive approach to analysing the data 'that primarily used detailed readings of raw data to derive concepts, themes, or a model through interpretations of these data' (Thomas, 2006: 238).

## *Influential Pro-Roma and Ethnic Support Groups*

Many of our respondents mentioned in their narratives that without the support of the Kurt Lewin Foundation's (KLF) preparation course for university entry they would never have been admitted into higher education. KLF's program for secondary school students from poor, disadvantaged family backgrounds operated from 1995 to

[3] We are thankful to Anna Fejős, our co-author and colleague in this earlier project, for her valuable and insightful contributions to our thoughts about many issues related to the upwardly mobile Roma women.
[4] K-125 497 OTKA project entitled 'Social Mobility and Ethnicity: Trajectories, Outcomes and Hidden Costs of Mobility', supported by a Hungarian Academy of Science (NKFHI) research grant.
[5] Most interviews were conducted by the present authors, but some by Anna Fejős.

2007. The aim of this initiative was to promote the social integration of disadvantaged university students, facilitate access to higher education for those who intended to become university students, and also to support members psychologically and professionally throughout their education. The initiative had two parts: a preparatory course for university entry and the Szocháló Project (a webpage about social sciences). Most of the student participants came from the countryside and were either close to graduating from high school or had already obtained a high school diploma, or A-level qualification (*érettségi*), one or two years earlier. Both Roma and non-Roma students could apply to the program. The course was mainly designed for those students who wished to apply for the field of sociology, social policy or social work, but some students tried out for other areas of study at the beginning of the program. Later, the organisers had to narrow the choice of study and institutions due to a lack of teachers and several other factors. In the end, the program prepared students exclusively for the entry exam for the sociology, social policy and social work course at Eötvös Loránd University. The program also sought to help students outside of education by organising social events (e.g. summer camps, and year-round excursions), and by providing mentoring and emotional support to participants. Tuition was free and books and a travel subsidy was also provided. The preparatory course lasted 10 months per year, but those students who were admitted to university could continue to access support within the framework of the Szocháló Project. The aim of the Szocháló Project was to compensate for the professional and cultural deficiencies of students from disadvantaged family backgrounds by making available work on the project website. The project also included a mentoring program: younger students were mentored by older project students in terms of their studies, support for integration, and keeping in touch with their families (Ligeti, 2001) as the mentors realised how important but difficult it was for academically high achievers who suffered from the above-mentioned dislocated habitus to maintain relations with family members.

Another important 'protective agent' (Stanton-Salazar, 2004) in the lives of our upwardly mobile respondents was Romaversitas Hungary. Romaversitas was founded in 1996 by the Roma Civil Rights' Foundation (Forray and Boros, 2009).[6] Its aims, according to its founding document, are to create equal opportunities for outstanding young Roma studying in higher education by offering them training and coaching and providing them with talent management, together with financial, psychological, professional and ethical support for smoothing their transition into positions typical of middle-class intellectuals. The overarching aim of the program is to create an autonomous intellectual elite of Roma origin which will contribute to the creation of a Roma middle class through fostering a feeling of responsibility for and commitment to the advancement of this ethnic group (Arnold et al., 2011).[7] The program's stated missions include helping deal with the conflicts associated with becoming a Roma intellectual, and strengthening students' Roma identity (Arnold et al., 2011).

According to Foundation Evaluation Research 2010, there was disagreement about the political commitment of Romaversitas between those who supported the foundation's active role in the Roma civil rights movement, and those who wished to promote professionalism. In 2010, the latter approach was favoured by the then-

[6] See: the history of Romaversitas: Arnold et al., 2011
[7] http://romaversitas.hu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/alapicc81tocc81-okirat_2014-1.pdf

current management. However, by 2014 it had become clear that the foundation needed to represent an activist approach as well (Arnold et al., 2011; Héra, 2014). An employee of Romaversistas put it this way: 'Professionalism and activism go together. One without the other is worth nothing.' (Héra, 2014: 9)

Romaversitas offers a wide variety of services to its students. However, the range of services is subject to change because of the foundation's funding problems: as an NGO it relies primarily on grants, donations, and supporters (Forray and Boros, 2009; Héra, 2014). Our interviewees, former beneficiaries of this ethnic support group, reported to having received much-needed financial as well as professional support. All participants received monthly scholarships,[8] which many of them used to support their poor families at home. The program also provided personal professional assistance, including language courses, private tutors for students working on their theses or preparing for academic competitions, and mentors (older students who helped them adjust to the community of Romaversitas). Furthermore, students took part in monthly group events (called 'Open University') involving lectures and seminars. Our respondents emphasised the presence of emotional support as well: Romaversitas students can ask for psychological assistance and lifestyle coaching. The foundation also helps in their career building by offering assistance with job searching and writing grants or job applications. In addition, there are social events such as camps and film clubs. Students have to complete all the requirements of their university or college studies, maintain a grade-point average of at least 3.0, and take part in mandatory courses in exchange for the services provided by Romaversitas (Arnold et al., 2011).

Finally, a couple of our socially mobile interviewees were beneficiaries of media internship programs. One of these pro-Roma support initiatives was the journalist internship program of the Center for Independent Journalism (*Független Médiaközpont*). The aim of the project was to prepare talented Roma youngsters for a career in journalism in majority society, and it only targeted Roma students. At the outset, educational attainment was not one of the selection criteria, although later only university students and new graduates could participate. The program operated between 1998 and 2012, during which time 110 students completed it. The Roma Press Centre (*Roma Sajtóközpont*) was the initiator of the project, but the organiser was the Centre for Independent Journalism. The internship took ten months (daily 8-9 hours) and comprised two parts: a theoretical education and work at an editorial office. Students received a scholarship to cover their living expenses, and participants from the countryside also received accommodation and travel subsidies (Szabó, 2013).

The other media internship program was a Roma Scholarship Media Program (*Roma Ösztöndíjas Médiaprogram*) at the broadcaster Hungarian Television. The program operated in 2006 and 2007 and seven students completed it.[9] The aim of this initiative was to offer an opportunity for Roma journalists and presenters to appear on TV and work on TV programs (Szabó, 2013). According to Szabó (2013), the other goal of Hungarian Television was to contribute to the creation of a credible and

[8] Since the academic year 2017/18 the Foundation has no longer offered this monthly scholarship, but it was available at the time our interviewees participated in the program.
[9] http://hvg.hu/karrier/20071219_mtv_roma

positive image of Roma by using the trainees themselves. One of our respondents, a former trainee in this initiative, told us why she had joined the program and why she believed in its positive effect on the Roma community: 'During the last 20- 30 years there has been public discourse in Hungary about how much change it would bring about in public thinking if there were Roma presenters on television. I was there, one of those few media people, sitting in on a non-Roma program, in which there was not a single word about Roma. Still, I felt strongly that I was working as much for Roma issues during this time as when I worked for a Roma NGO. Just by sitting in front of the camera, showing my face.'

In the following section of this paper we address the role of these support programs on the cost of mobility, insofar as this can be unearthed from the narratives of our respondents.

## *Results*

In the first part of this chapter we introduce the costs of upward mobility which are influenced by the support groups and programs (for other costs of upward mobility in the case of Roma high achievers, see: Durst et al. 2014; 2016), while in the second part of the chapter we demonstrate how these costs are affected (mitigated or strengthened) by these programs themselves.

Among our sample, according to the narratives of our Roma respondents, one of the greatest costs of educational mobility was the phenomenon of dislocated habitus. The tension or struggle of respondent identity came from the difficulty of maintaining relationships within families and community of origin while at the same time also establishing new ties to the majority society that they encountered on a regular basis during their educational and working careers. Both the rejection of the non-Roma majority and growing distance from their original communities resulted in the feeling of many of our interviewees that they were 'in no-man's land'. They no longer felt at home in their old, 'Roma' world, nor did they yet belong to their new, non-Roma middle-class world, facilitated by their educational achievements. As one of them, 45-year-old Mona, put it: 'For the Gypsies, I am no longer Gypsy; for the Hungarians, however, I am not yet Hungarian.'

Here we must take a detour. On the one hand, among the new generation of critically thinking Roma intellectuals (artists, social scientists, media experts) one has recently been able to trace the influence of post-colonist and British cultural studies, especially of Stuart Hall's (1992) concept of 'new ethnicity' (Bogdán, 2017). This new conception of ethnicity embraced by young black British film-makers and also by some Roma intellectuals in Hungary is a product of a 'new cultural politics which engages rather than suppresses difference and which depends, in part, on the cultural construction of new ethnic identities... It is a recognition that we all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, out of a particular experience, a particular culture... We are all, in that sense, ethnically located and our ethnic identities are crucial to our subjective sense of who we are... This...is the politics of ethnicity predicated on difference and diversity' (Hall, 1992: 257).

On the other hand, the hegemonic public discourse on Roma or Gypsies (*cigány*) in Hungary is and has historically been based on a socially and culturally

constructed distinction between 'Hungarian' and 'Gypsy' (*magyar-cigány*; with the latter even being called 'new Hungarians' in certain historical periods). This distinction has been based on prejudice, ethnic discrimination and stigmatisation, coupled with the socio-economic disadvantages of the 'Gypsies' (Horváth, 2012). This historically embedded binary opposition or socially constructed distinction (Kovai, 2016) has not only had an effect on public discourses, but was also internalised by many of the Roma.

This binary opposition between 'Hungarians' and 'Gypsies' commonly appeared in the narratives of our respondents. One of them, Eszter in her mid-thirties, complained that: "It is brutal that the Gypsies think of me as gadjo [non-Gypsy], and the gadjos believe that I am Gypsy." Many of our interviewees also reported that they even felt excluded from their own families merely by becoming the only educated members of the family; a feeling which was reinforced by the stigma of 'becoming a Hungarian' (*elmagyarosodott*), or becoming a 'gadje'. "My family was happy when I got into college. Even my brothers told me what an achievement it was. But for that same reason they also excluded me somehow because they thought I had become an educated Hungarian gadje. And this is still the situation today."

Bearing this special Hungarian context in mind, with its strong and almost unbridgeable ethnic boundaries, one can better understand the feeling of being located somewhere 'in-between' (*lebegés állapota*, in: Mendi, 1999) that many of our respondents who moved class experienced. One of them likened this transitional state, or the straddling of two worlds ('Roma' and 'Hungarian'; that is, non-Roma) to a 'schizophrenic life': "I have suffered for this [to get a degree], indeed. It is like living a schizophrenic life in that you leave your roots behind where you once felt happy and good about yourself, and then come to the city where you live a completely different, bubbly, energetic life. And neither there nor here is good. Nowhere is good anymore. My other [Gypsy] colleagues have the same experience. And because my partner is not Gypsy either, this also contributes to the confusion inside me." (Dorina, a middle aged Roma woman)

Apart from the experience of dislocated habitus, another cost of educational mobility came up regularly in the narratives of our respondents in the form of a feeling of having low self-esteem. One of the overarching themes in the interviews involved accounts of choosing a university to attend. Many recounted why they did not feel confident applying to prestigious universities in the capital, Budapest, but only to their 'lighter versions' – less prestigious colleges in the countryside. Elena, for example, justified her choice of higher education institution by recalling how her mother kept saying to her, "do not dream big, they will never accept a Gypsy for law or medicine".

Last but not least, many of our respondents reported about another cost of their educational mobility: their extreme feeling of responsibility towards their disadvantaged, poor co-ethnics (Roma people from their communities) and their urge to serve them and foster their social and economic advancement (see also: Hinton-Smith et al., 2017 for internationally mobile Roma women). Eszter told us: "I like to deal with several different things, but my soul work is the Roma issue, and now I accepted a job at a Roma newspaper because there I can give something back from what I have received [from my family, my kin]." Listen to Ani as she summarises her

motivation for training and working in London as a psychologist and her desire to take home her new knowledge to help disadvantaged Roma schoolchildren with mental health issues in rural Hungary: "It bursts from my soul. To work for "Roma issues", which in my case means to help these disadvantaged children. One of them is my cousin. You cannot do otherwise. Roma for me means my family. My kin, my folks. And if they are suffering from poverty, I need to help them. Otherwise how could I feel good, even if I'm in a better position?!"

Lajos, formerly a social worker but now a small company business manager, expressed similar concerns: "Origins oblige. There is my extended family, my folks, my kin. We come from the same litter (*alom*), the same breed. And if it is not good for them [their poverty], but it is good for me, then I help them. Otherwise how could I feel good?!"

Even those who have decided to pursue their individual happiness and leave behind the needs of their Roma communities report to having some troubling feelings: "Sometimes I feel really guilty. All my Roma acquaintances from Gandhi [a charitable secondary school for talented Roma schoolchildren] work on Roma issues (*cigányügyben dolgozik*). It is only me [who does not]. I came here to England to work in a school as a teacher. As a Hungarian girl teaching history. I live my own life, feeling grateful though to everybody who helped me to get my degree. Sometimes I feel that my old teacher and friend from Gandhi feels indignant at me for not working for Roma issues. I should, shouldn't I? It is not right, is it, to live your life having left behind the Roma? But I'm good with my life now, why should I go home?!" (Laura, 35 year old Roma woman)

This troubling dilemma for educationally mobile Roma relating to having to choose between individual self-betterment and their urge (or the embodied expectation from their mentors) to work to improve the situation of Roma communities (Hinton-Smith et al., 2017) leads us to the second part of our paper which analyses the effects of ethnic support groups and organisations on the costs of upward mobility.

Our research findings indicate that ethnic support groups and pro-Roma professional organisations or programs play an important role in reducing these costs of upward mobility.

The significance of Roma support groups in dealing with the identity crisis (habitus clivé or dislocated habitus) emerged in several interviews. For instance, Lia remembers it this way:

"For me, the life-changing thing was that I got into Romaversitas from the second year of my university course. You become part of a community, where you can see that, we – Roma people – are diverse, but we have the same problems, and we are not alone. Because the process of separation from your family already started during college years. Your cousin of the same age earns a lot of money while you are still nowhere, just studying. It is another, different world when you are participating in higher education. And Romaversitas helped me get through this transitional period."

Another interviewee, Lili, also emphasises that participating in the programs of the Kurt Lewin Foundation and belonging to its community helped her overcome the difficulties of upward mobility:

"I could share the experience of my Roma identity and about the social decompression sickness which comes when you quickly rise up with classmates I met on the university entry preparation courses. That is, I experienced the dilemmas [of upward mobility] with them, and that forged us together."

Young people who typically come from ambitious, assimilated Roma families and who are not raised and primarily socialised in a Roma community do not mention that they had an identity crisis due to upward mobility. However, these supportive programs contributed to their finding or discovering their Roma identity, which was regarded as a 'good thing' by the interviewees. One of our respondents, Eva, said the following: "It is interesting that with joining Romaversitas I found my Roma identity and then, during the program, for the first time in my life, I had a Roma boyfriend.' Later in the interview she recalled: 'When I feel like belonging to some Roma community, then I think of Romaversitas. Until I got into Romaversitas, it didn't mean anything to me to be a Gypsy...When they asked about my Gypsy identity I didn't know what to say... My Gypsy identity is that my parents are Gypsy. But there is really nothing else. No language, nothing."

Tóth (2014) introduces the notion of 're-discovered identity' for this situation, defined as follows: 'there may be periods in the lives of minority people when ethnicity does not dominate [...] However, in other periods of their lives, they can discover and re-formulate it, and experience their minority identity.' (Tóth, 2014: 21-22) Our results suggest that pro-Roma supportive programs contribute to the (re)discovery of Roma ethnic identity.

As we have demonstrated above, we found that a lack of self-confidence and defeatism appears in the narratives of the majority of our graduate Roma respondents (Bereményi and Carrasco, 2017 reported similar results in the case of the Spanish Roma). This can also be considered the price of upward mobility, since a social context, 'where the level of social dissimilarity is higher along with exposure to negative stereotypes and reflected appraisals about one's group of origin' (Rumbaut, 1994: 754) may lead to low self-esteem.

We found that pro-Roma supportive programs had a positive effect on our interviewees' self-respect and helped them overcome their defeatism, as Nóra states:

"I wanted to apply for a rural college [*a low prestige institution in Hungary*] because I did not have self-confidence. But the Kurt Lewin program wanted to send me to ELTE University [*a high prestige institution in the Hungarian capital*]. Firstly, I did not want to apply to that university, since I was afraid of it. However, they said that I should try it, and finally I said OK."

Separation from family and the Roma community of origin, the place of primary socialisation, along with the rejection of the majority group may lead to loneliness and isolation. Ethnic supportive programs can also help reduce this cost: several interviewees added that they had found friends, even their closest friends, or indeed partners through participation in the program.

However, participation in the support groups or ethnic professional organisations may also increase the costs of upward mobility. Several studies (Higginbotham and Weber, 1992; Pantea, 2015; Durst et al., 2016) have revealed that upwardly mobile minorities often feel that they are indebted to the families or communities that facilitated their higher education. Hinton-Smith et al. (2017)

highlighted that their interviewees – college-educated Roma women – often experience tension regarding their wish to give back to Roma communities and the simultaneous desire to avoid this burden and have the same opportunities and free choice of job selection as non-Roma graduates. Pantea (2015) notes that holding down jobs in which individuals can 'give back' to their community typically requires significant individual effort.

The situation for the youngsters who participated in ethnic support groups or supportive programs may be complicated by the fact that these programs often emphasise the role of their members in contributing to the betterment of the wider Roma community. For example, the Charter of the Roma College of Advanced Studies (*Roma szakkollégiumok*) – a new initiative started in 2012 – summarises the aims of the five Hungarian Christian Roma Colleges and contains the following statement: 'The mission of the college of advanced studies is to educate, train and organise into the community those Roma intellectuals who are interested in social inclusion [...] and capable of a responsible social dialogue by developing their personal skills and recognising their mission. Therefore, we foster the creation of a community which can serve as a role model of successful cohabitation in our society. In this way, we support the upbringing of young intellectuals who combine professional excellence with social sensitivity and awareness. This is how we help the rise of Roma people and the Roma-Hungarian cohabitation.'[10]

This is in line with one of the missions of Romaversitas, too, as stated in their founding document: 'We aim at creating a Roma elite that feels responsible and committed to the advancement of its own ethnic group.' Of course, as one of the leaders of Romaversitas emphasised to us in an interview, it is not an expectation of the program that their students work for the Roma community. However, Romaversitas, through its institutional habitus, mediates a value system, a way of thinking which is apparent from its former students' – our interviewees'– narratives.

The other important puzzle that needs solving is the role of pro-Roma supportive programs in the mobility outcomes (the choice of study and work) of our interviewees. The role of the supportive programs in the choice of study of high achieving Roma and their admission to university can only be examined to a limited extent through the narratives of our respondents. The participants of the Kurt Lewin Foundation program (the only institution mentioned by our respondents that facilitated their transition from secondary to higher education) believed that they would not have applied to university without the foundation's support. Some of them had not even considered this to be an option, while others thought they would not have been able to prepare for the university entry exam without help. The next important step on the mobility ladder is graduation; here, the professional assistance and emotional and financial support of the programs was emphasised by almost all the interviewees.

Our results suggest that these programs have an impact on the labour market position of respondents as well. In previous research (Durst et al., 2016) we found that the jobs of most of our respondents – full-time, part-time, or at least volunteer work –

[10] Charter of the Roma College of Advanced Studies (*Roma Szakkollégiumi Charta*). 2012. (http://krszh.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Roma-Szakkoll%C3%A9giumi-Charta.docx) Accessed: 15.01.2017.

are related to 'Roma issues'.[11] The labour market segmentation of college-educated Roma is explained by their distinctive experience of a minority middle-class status and by the impact of a discriminatory social environment.

The labour market segmentation of upwardly mobile Roma intellectuals who were beneficiaries of supportive programs is even more representative of the subsample of the present research when compared to the more general cohort of college educated Roma (Durst et al., 2016): we found that all of our 25 interviewees work in the area of Roma issues. As we mentioned earlier, participation in supportive programs may strengthen the wish to give back to the community of origin, thereby fostering the intention to find a job in this field. One of our interviewees with a Roma mother but non-Roma father said the following about why she started working at an NGO that supports Roma people immediately after graduating:

'On the one hand, it probably comes from my family background; as a child, I felt that my mother and father came from different places. [...] On the other hand, I became more aware [of these inequality issues] during my time at Romaversitas. That is, those things which we felt perhaps only vaguely and were curious about became conscious there, and I began to be interested in this situation [*the difference between the situation of Roma and non-Roma people*] and the roots of it.'

Another reason for the concentration of Roma professionals in the ethnic job segment of the labour market is that supporting programs receive job offers related to Roma issues so they can help their students find a job in these areas. In addition, students themselves become involved in special networks through their program membership which can be helpful when finding jobs related to the Roma issue.

The majority of our interviewees work in the public or non-profit sector in jobs that deal with Roma issues. Since the creation of jobs in the public sector is policy- and not market-driven, these are vulnerable positions (Cole and Omari, 2003). Furthermore, public and non-profit sector jobs are characterised by lower wages and fewer opportunities than the private sector.

## *Conclusion*

Minorities who achieve upward mobility within an environment of racial discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage often face unique challenges which may negatively affect their psychological well-being. These emotional difficulties are called the 'hidden costs of upward mobility' by Cole and Omari (2003). Middle-class minorities are in a specific position since they need to manage simultaneously both their relationships with the majority society and with their poorer co-ethnics (people from their communities of origin).

The purpose of our study was to examine the role of some pro-Roma supportive groups on the hidden cost of upward mobility of graduate Roma in Hungary. We analysed the significance of the following supportive programes: Romaversitas Hungary, a preparatory course for university entry at the Kurt Lewin Foundation, and two media internship initiatives. We found that these support groups

[11] In our definition such jobs are related to the Roma issue which aim at improving the situation of Roma people living in poverty, and support the protection of their interests (Váradi, 2015).

have an ambiguous and multi-faceted effect on the costs of upward mobility: they help to overcome many of the challenges of the process of social climbing, although they may contribute to increasing some other costs.

The supportive groups helped many of our interviewees with managing their identity struggles and also contributed to overcoming their beneficiaries' low self-esteem and defeatism. Furthermore, participation in these groups represented cultural shelter, for our interviewees felt protected against isolation and loneliness by their involvement. However, we found that the feeling of responsibility to 'give back' to the wider community may have been strengthened by participation in these programs or ethnic support groups, and this motivation may contribute to participants' intention to find jobs which are related to the betterment of the whole Roma community. It is not a stated expectation of the programs that students should work for the Roma community, but institutional habitus mediates a value system, a way of thinking. Obviously, this is not the only factor that contributes to the intention of all our respondents (former beneficiaries of these support programs), to work in a position that aims – directly or indirectly – at the advancement of the wider Roma community. The interviewees' individual work preferences, their urge to provide help and to serve 'their' disadvantaged people (a need that 'arises from the soul', or as we call it, 'soul work'), along with the discriminatory practices present in majority society contribute to their segmentation in the labour market (see: Durst et al., 2016).

The problem is that positions which are connected to 'the Roma issue' (e.g. social workers, teachers, mentors, human rights lawyers; Collins, 1983) are mainly designed to serve the needs of poorer Roma, and are therefore usually emotionally difficult jobs requiring huge individual effort. In addition, because most of these positions are found in the public or non-profit sector, they are often vulnerable and offer lower wages and fewer career opportunities than the private sector.

One thing is clear from the narratives of the educationally mobile, academically high achieving Roma: Although working for the betterment of the wider Roma community is a free choice for many of our interviewees and the only area in which they wish to operate, many believe that more opportunities should be created for those who want to find a job in the private sector or in any area not related to 'Roma issues'. One successful initiative in this regard is the Integrom Program of the Boston Consulting Group and Autonómia Foundation which has helped Roma who have completed secondary education find employment in the corporate sector.[12]

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## Book Review

# Pride and Prejudice. Ethnicized education: downgraded minorities and the Nordic channels of social mobility

## Julia Szalai and Claire Schiff (eds.) (2014) Migrant, Roma and Post-Colonial Youth in Education across Europe. Being 'Visibly different'. Palgrave MacMillan.

Bourdieu starts his chapter on schooling and the inheritance of social position in *La misère du monde* with a quote from Herodotus about the Persian educational system (Bourdieu, 1993: 1091). Comparative educational studies are indeed way older than social sciences themselves. The volume edited by Júlia Szalai and Claire Schiff is part of this ancient tradition, while it renews it in many ways.

At the intersection of sociology and anthropology, quantitative and qualitative methods, education research and minority studies, this book examines the fate of ethnically stigmatized children in the school system and tries to answer a simple question with manifold answers: 'What does it mean to be an ethnic minority student in Europe today?' (p. 1). Let us insist, before we go into detail, that most of the authors in this book rightly understand ethnicity as a phenomenon inextricably combined with class, as the definition of segregation *as ethnosocial* segregation by Vera Messing shows: ethnosocial segregation is 'the situation when the school's composition is characterised by an intersection of students' ethnic minority belonging and low social status' (Messing, p. 18). Hence, the concept of class (e.g. involving ethnic relations within and between 'working class communities'; Szalai, p. 70), which is often lacking in post-1989 social scientific texts from the Central/Eastern European region, becomes an essential part of the analysis.

As a shared achievement of the participants of the 'Edumigrom Project, Ethnic Differences in Education and diverging prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe', supported by the EU's 7th Framework Program, this handbook is composed of three parts. To simplify, the first part uses sociological approaches, mixing quantitative and qualitative methods; the shorter second part applies an anthropological/ethnographic lens to various fields; while part three presents case studies (England, France, Germany, Romania, and Slovakia). Finally, Júlia Szalai — in her 'conclusions' — opens up new perspectives and reframes the problem in terms of citizenship and human dignity.

More than any other subject, the fate of Roma/disadvantaged children has been at the center of East and Central European social sciences, from Bulgaria (Grekova, 2002 and Kyuchukov, 2006) to Hungary — Budapest being the capital city of this research (for an extensive English-language bibliography of Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian anthropological literature about schools, see Erőss,

2012). Hungarian social researchers have also been especially dedicated to this topic (from Havas, Kemény, Ladányi and Szelényi through Kertesi and Kézdi to Zolnay, Berényi, Berkovits, Eröss, Kende and Neumann, as well as the Hungarian authors of this book). The volume extends this tradition to the whole continent, merging 'neo-Marxist theories' that consider 'the role of schooling in [...] the reproduction of inequalities and marginal positions' with 'ethnographic investigations of youth subcultures'. The book explicitly aims to 'fill in this gap' between Roma studies that we know of and practice in Central Europe on the one hand, and the 'ethnographic approach and the neo-Marxist paradigm of British cultural studies' on the other (Feischmidt, p. 120.)

'Visibly different' students aged between 14 and 17, their structural position and everyday school life in eight different countries, as well as Roma in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and second- and third-generation post-colonial and immigrant minorities in France, England, Germany, Sweden and Denmark were investigated. A unified survey questionnaire was administrated to over 5,000 students in over 100 schools, while in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and ethnographic observations were also conducted. However, one wishes for an explanation of the sampling technique, which included school settings with at least 'one third' of the student body being 'visibly different' (Schiff, p. 1), and may have led the researchers to overestimate school segregation and the occultation of effective integration patterns. As for segregation, it is presented as generally negative, with notable exceptions such as cases 'when separation from the majority occurs on a voluntary basis, expressed in various forms of religious or ethnic pride, in certain cases of Muslim students in Western Europe or the Gabor Gipsies in Romania' (Neményi and Vajda, p. 108).

As a worthwhile effort to move beyond the transnational studies we are used to reading which employ quantitative comparisons and/or series of case studies, the reviewed volume illustrates patterns that are common to (and differences between) Roma and immigrant youth in the 'two halves' of Europe, combining virtually all methods known to social scientists. Based on Ogbu's distinction between (voluntary) immigrant and (involuntary) racialized minorities in the US (Schiff, p. 3) the authors — albeit implicitly — agree that Roma in ECE are even more oppressed than immigrants in Western countries, while the extreme Roma segregation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia tends to confirm this otherwise bold claim.

One of the major sources of originality in the book is how it addresses students' own experiences, as well as 'the differences and the relations between minority and majority pupils who actually attend the same schools', and 'who are therefore real-life peers' (Schiff, p. 3), including practices of insult and teasing (Feischmidt, pp. 130–132) and sexual relations (Neményi and Vajda, p. 113), while the topic of interracial friendships, a focal point of the increasingly dominant network analysis approach, remains relatively untouched in this book, although Moldenhawer mentions this key element by commenting on: 'the importance of having what they [members of a minority] call "the right friends" [and an] aware[ness] of the importance of doing well in school' (p. 140).

Beyond the East-West divide, a triple classification of minority students is employed. This involves Roma pupils in Central Europe, postcolonial youth in

Britain and France, and finally, the work migrants and their descendants in countries like Germany, Sweden and Denmark. A paradoxical understanding of Sweden and Denmark prevails throughout the book, emerging as soon as in the first chapter by Claire Schiff whereby it is stated that: 'In Denmark and Sweden, despite the high degree of segregation in several of the schools observed and the prevailing inequalities [...], minority pupils did not express feelings of being stigmatised or discriminated against [...]' while the school creates 'a protective microcosm where the belief in equal opportunity and the promises of the welfare state are embraced by most students'. Similarly, Vera Messing notes that even in segregated schools segregation does not have such a devastating impact because 'teachers are aware of the special needs of their students and make conscious efforts to adapt the ways of instruction to such conditions [...] but they do this without stigmatising their students' (Messing, p. 26). Júlia Szalai also identifies good practices characteristic of the Scandinavian model, both within and outside school: 'Such a strong awareness of citizenship rights helps minority adolescents to engage in personal struggles for recognition: they successfully negotiate needs for extra attention and support [...], despite recent cuts in welfare spending and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in both countries, their welfare states are still strong enough to provide support for familial advancement' (Szalai, p. 76). Szalai — and indeed the whole book — makes a case for the Scandinavian model; a combination of citizenship (individual and collective rights as citizens) and the welfare state (a mix of educational but also social, health and employment policies). Empirical support for this is provided by Schnell and Crul: 'Second generation Turks in Sweden more often achieve higher educational levels than their counterparts in the two other countries [Austria and the Netherlands], even if their parents are from similar educational background' (Schnell and Crul, pp. 40–41). Once more, Violetta Zentai presents Sweden as a champion: 'Sweden stands out as a pioneer on both grounds [educational stratification/equalisation policy and complex multicultural policy] followed by the UK, which makes deliberative efforts to offer citizenship by acknowledging difference and making efforts to ensure equal opportunities in schooling' (Zentai, p. 89).

As a logical consequence of in-depth field work, the book deconstructs essentialist misconceptions about ethnicity and otherness; it shows that in England 'tensions more often opposed British Afro-Caribbean and Asian students than majority and minority students', and mentions the negative stereotypes related to partially racialized subcultures such as emos and chavs (Law and Swann, p. 159). Continuing down the path of deconstructing essentialism, several authors insist on the hybridity of identity strategies 'which combine the desire for integration with the will to remain separated from the outer world' (Vincze, pp. 204–205), 'the categorization among Roma pupils' (Kostlán, p. 223), or the even more detailed observation of specific strategies of specific subgroups at the intersection of ethnicity, class and gender and in the context of given educational settings such as of female students' Maghreb parents' willingness to succeed (Szalai, p. 77), or, on the contrary, the issue of participation in class trips for Muslim girls: 'Often girls are not allowed to participate in class trips, although they are obligatory [...]' (Straßburger, p. 193.)

In terms of citizenship, the call by Szalai for the participation of both the welfare state and citizen rights (i.e., collective rights as a guarantee of equal

opportunities in education) is clear, and is supported by a French case study which shows that treating ethnicity as taboo does not necessarily result in equal opportunities for students with an ethnic/immigrant background, but the opposite 'in a school system which makes a point of ignoring their cultural and ethnic characteristics [while] certain minority groups are clearly over-represented among students enrolled in the least desirable schools and streams' (Schiff, p. 62). To restate an apparent truism with multiple consequences and complex patterns, 'ignorance-based policies' (Erőss, 2009) are, unsurprisingly, seldom successful in tackling inequalities. As a matter of fact, Vera Messing also underlines in her chapter that school systems that combine segregation with diversity-blind school policies score most purely in terms of minority children's educational achievement.

While it has been a common understanding of many trans-European research papers that Roma in Central Europe and immigrants in Western Europe are victims of similar structural oppression, including in the school system (be this ethnic segregation or segregation based on so-called 'special educational needs'), no systematic research has, until this volume, tried to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon and the patterns of minority pupils' segregation/integration across Europe. This makes the reviewed book a reference for generations of sociologists, anthropologists, education and minority studies researchers to come. It also delivers a strong, evidence-based message to decision-makers: follow the Scandinavian model of promoting social mobility for minorities through the school system, which is based on a combination of individual help, 'language support, upgrading the knowledge of minority students to the majority culture and applying practices for enhancing self-confidence' (Messing, p. 26), as well as collective rights, recognition, dignity and citizenship; more precisely, a synthesis of support for ethnic identity and the emancipatory values of the welfare state. 'Schools cannot escape their role in informing young people's identities as a core content of their citizenship' (Szalai, p. 243) and transforming, in the long term, ethnosocial segregation into — and here let us use a neologism — *ethno-civic* integration.

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ANDRÁS KÖRÖSÉNYI AND MIKLÓS SEBŐK *

# From Pledge-Fulfilment to Mandate-Fulfilment: An Empirical Theory

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## Abstract

The article presents a theoretical synthesis that could serve as the conceptual framework for empirical studies of the fulfilment of electoral pledges in modern democracies. Studies related to the program-to-policy linkage derived their hypotheses, for the most part, from an implicit, common sense model of mandate theory. The article presents a realistic version of positive mandate theory, one that is stripped of its normative assumptions and is suitable for empirical testing. It is informed by five theoretical building blocks: the concept of the binding mandate, the party theory of representation, the doctrine of responsible party government, modern normative mandate theory and the conceptual pair of delegation and mandate. The resulting framework incorporates the information content of the campaigns, the definiteness of the authorization and the strength of pledge enactment as its core components.

*Keywords:* Mandate Theory, Electoral Pledges, Pledge Fulfilment, Saliency, Mandate Slippage.

In modern democracies politicians are criticized on a regular basis for breaking their campaign promises.[1] It is widely believed that the pledge 'read my lips: no new taxes' cost George H. W. Bush the 1992 US presidential elections. The trustworthiness of the sitting president was called into question, even as he had made a seemingly honest attempt at reconciling his policy differences with Democrats in order to bring down the budget deficit.

So why does the public sanction politicians set out to uphold the 'public interest'? The answer lies in the role elections play in modern representative democracies. Elections provide a mandate (an at least partially bound authorization) to implement symbolic or policy-based pledges and act on salient issues. Any violation of this mandate may potentially backfire, even in cases where it is in line with some understanding of the public interest.

Nevertheless, extant literature assigns a more complex role to elections in representative democracy. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999b: 16) consider elections to be the vehicle for both the (*ex ante*) expression of popular preferences and the (*ex post*) exercise of control over representatives (the mandate vs. the accountability role). Other approaches highlight the role of elections in selecting political leaders (Fearon, 1999). In a parallel, empirical literature (from Royed, 1996 to Thomson et al., 2017) the rate of pledge-fulfilment is investigated in a range of comparative and country studies. These studies related to the so-called program-to-policy linkage (Thomson, 2001) derived their hypotheses, for the most part, from an implicit, common sense model of mandate theory.

What is missing in the literature is an attempt to bridge these two separate strands of research in an empirically testable theory of mandate-fulfilment. Whereas in most of the empirical literature electoral pledges are used as the main proxies for mandates, there is more to mandate-fulfilment than sheer pledge-fulfilment. The information content of the campaigns, the definiteness of the authorization and the strength of mandate enactment should all be core components of a testable theory of mandate-fulfilment.

The article presents a theoretical synthesis (called a realistic version of positive mandate theory) that builds on these and other elements and could serve as the conceptual framework for empirical studies of the fulfilment of mandates in modern democracies. This allows not only for the combination of pledge-based (see: Royed, 1996) and saliency-based (as in Budge and Hofferbert, 1990) empirical approaches but their embedding in a theoretical framework that is both more complex than implicit mandate theory and is informed by the rich tradition of conceptual thinking on the role of elections in a democracy.

In the following we elaborate our model in four steps. First, we explore the five conceptual building blocks of our synthesis account. Second, we outline our proposed framework, the realistic version of positive mandate theory. Third, we discuss potential problems related to the internal and external validity of our theoretical framework. The final section summarizes our results and evaluates our contribution to the literature.

[1] We are thankful for the comments of the anonymous reviewers. All remaining errors are ours.

## *1. Conceptual Origins*

Empirical studies of pledges-fulfilment that develop, or at least rely on an explicit theory of the mandate are few and far between. Indeed, the literature on mandate theory on the one hand, and empirical pledge research on the other hand have remained largely in their respective silos. A good example for this is an article by Thomson et al. (2017) which summarizes multiple decades of empirical work in the field. Its brief introduction only offers a few theoretical references and the rest of the text is consecrated to empirical research.

While the task of creating an empirical theory of mandate-fulfilment is far from straightforward, several strands in the representation and democratic theory literature offer clues for undertaking such a challenge of conceptualization and operationalization. Five approaches look particularly promising as potential building blocks for such an empirical framework: the theory of the bound and free mandate (Pitkin, 1967: 142–167), the party theory of representation (Judge, 1999: 70–71), the doctrine of responsible party government (Schattschneider, 1942), modern normative mandate theory (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999a) and the separation of delegation and mandate in the typology of political representation (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). In what follows, we provide a brief discussion of each of these building blocks.

## *2. The Theory of the Bound and Free Mandate*

The concept of the mandate is closely related to both the theory of representative government and that of democracy. Classic accounts of the topic tend to draw a distinction between the binding (or 'imperative') and free mandates of the representatives. The binding mandate has traditionally provided *democratic* legitimacy to political institutions, while the free mandate has been a cornerstone of *representative* government.

A key theorist of the former approach was Rousseau. In his reform proposal for the Constitution of Poland he was not only intent on maintaining the institution of delegation but went as far as to propose that deviating from the instructions given by the principals should be sanctioned by capital punishment (Rousseau, 1985 [1772]: xxiv). Edmund Burke, for his part, is often referred to as the founding father of the modern theory of the free mandate (cf. for example: Urbinati, 2006: 22). In his letter in 1774 to the Bristol electors he expressed the view that he would render them the best service if he was to exercise freely his powers of deliberation as opposed to slavishly following the opinion of people who elected him (Pitkin, 1967: 171).

These two approaches had long existed in parallel in countries with a representative government. The turning point came on 8th July, 1789, when the French Constituent Assembly 'banned' the binding mandate in the heat of a stormy debate (Fitzsimmons, 2002: 49). The ban on binding mandates has been 'one of the central tenets of modern representative government' (Pasquino, 2001: 205) ever since. The liberal parliamentarism of the 19th century followed this tradition of the relative independence of representatives who enjoyed a mandate that was to free to at least some extent (Manin, 1997: 163). In practice, this was realized through rules explicitly

prohibiting fully binding mandates (which existed either in the form of legally binding instructions by the electorate or in the guise of the discretionary revocability of representatives).

During the 20th century voters increasingly tended to vote for parties as party affiliation trumped candidates' personal qualities in electoral choice (even though this trend was less markedly manifest in the U.S. than in Europe). Instead of individual legislators, it was now the parties that increasingly became the subjects of representation. This process was captured in the theory of party representation (see: Judge, 1999: 71 and below). While representation had earlier been construed as a direct relationship of individuals (i.e. individual voters and individual representatives), when parties took center stage it was transformed into a relationship between aggregates of people (voters' groups) on the one hand and representatives' groups on the other. (We return to the more recent process of weakening party identification in the section on validity.)

This party-centered form of representation sent the pendulum back from the free (personal) mandate towards a partial realization of a binding mandate. In 20th century politics (at least in Western Europe), parties' election programs played a significant and empirically demonstrated role in shaping government policy (see the results of the Manifesto Research Group – McDonald and Budge (2005: 19). In this respect, and despite de jure prohibition, a de facto constraint for parties – the so-called 'outline-mandate' (Frognier, 2000: 29) – was very much in effect.

Despite these historical fluctuations of the dominant understanding of the mandate (both in theory and practice), it has been a relatively stable point of reference in representative government as an authorization that is binding to at least some extent. This generic mandate concept is content-specific and concrete, that is, it limits the scope of the strategic options available to the representative. This collective representative does not enjoy a blank check authorization – it does not become a 'trustee'. Figure 1 presents a conceptual of the partially binding mandate.

Figure 1. Conceptual levels of the electoral mandate




Source: The authors.

At the core we find the recipient of the mandate: a person or a party. As for its content, this mandate could be either implicitly or manifestly present in political debates. In the case of an explicit presentation of the mandate, its overall genre (an oral presentation, with a general approach focusing on symbolic proclamations as opposed to a written manifesto containing specific policy pledges) offers a further level of differentiation. Finally, the nature and structure of the written manifesto (such as the concreteness of the pledges and 'testability' of their fulfilment) allows for an even more detailed analysis (we will return to this figure in more detail). With the concept of the mandate briefly described, we now move on to the role of parties in representation theory as the 'owners' of this mandate.

## *3. The Party Theory of Representation*

The historical process described above was characterized by an increasingly group-based representation. As political parties emerged as central players in the representative relationship the corresponding 'party theory of representation' was also developed in British political thought and elsewhere. According to Judge (1999: 71), it was born simply as a rationalization of existing practice, that of parties competing in elections on their respective electoral programs ('manifestos'). This served a dual function. First, manifestos provide a common platform for the candidates of a party

and a distinguishing feature from the candidates of rival parties. Second, public policy pledges proved effective in mobilizing voters.

According to this theory, the winning party receives an (at least partly) concrete authorization, or mandate to, implement the election program. This is the electoral mandate, a concept which – in Judge's view – primarily served as a justification for the party discipline needed for governing in Parliament. This narrative also resolved a central problem of representation, i.e. that public representatives have a free mandate, while they also have a 'natural' yet legally non-enforceable duty to their constituency.

Since party discipline regularly overwrote this relationship (and the personal judgement of the representative), the resulting tension had to be released by a reference to an alternative justification: the electoral mandate (Birch, 1964: 115-118; Judge, 1999: 70-71). In a corresponding development the electoral mandate has also been used to justify the policies of the (party) government for the electorate. Based on these considerations – and building on those of the previous section – the concept of the electoral mandate can be defined as an authorization by voters granted to parties to implement a specific set of policy pledges and other pre-established criteria once in government.

## *4. The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government*

In 20th century political science the idea of the electoral mandate was not only developed in the context of the Westminster model but also in the American 'doctrine of responsible party government' (APSA, 1950; Ranney, 1954; Schattschneider, 1942; Sundquist, 1988). Along with the party theory of representation this became the dominant empirical paradigm for understanding modern democracy from the 1940s to the 1970s. Both approaches sought to make sense of the principle of the sovereignty of the people and that of majority rule in modern states with extended populations. In this line of thought people's sovereignty was interpreted not as the direct participation of the people, but as popular control over the government through the institution of the majority principle, and indirectly, through the role of the parties.

Based on Ranney (1954: 12) and Judge (1999: 71) the ideal type of responsible party government can be summarized as follows. At least (and preferably, not more than) two politically consistent and disciplined parties have clear and definite political programs to put the popular will into action. During the election campaign each party tries to convince the majority of electors that its program is more congruent with the preferences or interests of the voters. The electorate votes not on the basis of individual qualities but according to the party affiliation of candidates. The party winning the most seats in the legislation gains complete control over government power and thus bears exclusive responsibility for policy-making. If the translation of its electoral manifesto into political practice is judged in a positive light, it will be re-elected. If not, the opposition party will come into power at the next election.

This doctrine of responsible party government can both be interpreted as a normative and as a gradually evolving positive (descriptive) framework of modern democracy. As an empirical theory it showed mixed results at best (e.g. Birch, 1964: 119-120). In fact, Schattschneider (1942: 131-132) argued that the single most

important fact about American parties is that the ideal of responsible party government is not realized in practice. This criticism led to the development of a second-generation model of responsible party government. 'Conditional party government', as the new theory was called, highlighted a new precondition: the consistency of the preferences of the deputies of the same party.

Despite its limitations, the descriptive model of responsible party government can be seen as a suitable empirical approximation of ideal typical mandate theory. This more realistic mandate framework is located between a *strong* theory of the mandate (one that is based on a binding mandate) on the one hand, and trusteeship, the other extreme position on the palette of principal-agent relationships (see: Table 1 below).

Table 1. The binding character of representative relationships

| Binding mandate – | | Partially binding mandate – | | | Free mandate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delegation | Constant responsiveness | Mandate | | Ex post accountability | Trusteeship |
| | | Strong | Weak | | |

Source: The authors.

The doctrine of responsible party government, therefore, could serve as a natural starting point for an empirically relevant theory of the mandate. Its greatest added value lies in the adoption of 'weak mandate', which fills the theoretical gap between the all-encompassing ex ante mandate and the lack of any ex ante constraints (ex post accountability and trusteeship – see: Table 1). Nevertheless, it also has two deficiencies, which make its further elaboration necessary. One is related to the complexity of voting decisions and the corresponding ambivalence surrounding the role of the elections. The other concerns the source of mandate content. We address these issues with a discussion of our two remaining theoretical building blocks.

## *5. Modern Normative Mandate Theory*

The fourth theoretical source of our synthesis account is a modern normative version of mandate theory as presented by Manin et al. (1999a). One of the merits of this approach is that it embeds static representation theory in a dynamic framework by stressing the process-like nature of the mandate. Within this dynamic framework the moment of the elections is both the starting and closing point of the political process. Besides selecting representatives and offering the electorate a chance to 'depose' unworthy leaders, elections provide a chance to identify the public policies to be followed. Representative government is realized if the government pursues policies in line with the mandate received – if government policy is sensitive, or 'responsive' to the will of the electorate. Here, the will of the people is essentially equated with the public policy content of the authorization act (see: Figure 1).

This framework effectively addresses the abovementioned requirement of the consistency of voting decisions over time. Representative government is not a synonym of responsive government: government policy is not a derivative of the changes in public opinion or popular preferences. This rendering of mandate theory places most of the emphasis on the role of elections. For better or worse, there are

further similarities with the party theory of representation and the doctrine of responsible party government. They all claim that fulfilling the mandate should go hand-in-hand with realizing the public interest. It is a normative prescription which does not logically follow from the assumptions of the models. In fact, it introduces an element of tension into the theoretical framework.

This problem is also acknowledged by Manin et al. (1999b: 2-3): 'From a normative standpoint, the question is why exactly would the institutions characteristic of representative democracy be conducive to' the common good? The authors sketch four potential reasons: 1) Those who enter politics do so with the intention of serving the public good; 2) voters can effectively select these candidates; 3) voters can effectively threaten those who would stray from the path of virtue by throwing them out of office; 4) the institutional separation of powers limits deviations from acting in people's best interests.

It remains questionable how these conditions can be reconciled with an empirical mandate model of strong explanatory capacity. In fact, a number of theoretical approaches put a dent in this reasoning. These include studies on rational ignorance, political manipulation, as well as various public choice theories from rent-seeking through the asymmetries of information all the way to Schumpeter's asymmetric competence ('infantilism') and to political shirking. These considerations show that the unification of the notion of the public interest and that of the electoral mandate in a single logical framework may be unfeasible. While the dynamic aspects and the conceptualization of electoral choice of modern normative mandate theory may be useful additions to an empirical mandate theory, its normative aspects make it unsuitable for serving as the conceptual core for such an endeavor.

## *6. Delegation and the Mandate in Representation Theory*

Another residual issue from our discussion of the doctrine of responsible party government concerned the source of mandate content (this issue was also raised implicitly with regards to the tension between sensitivity to public opinion and the electoral mandate). This conflict is explicit in the contrast between the responsiveness and mandate approaches as they imply different assumptions on the relationship between the electorate and its representatives. In the case of responsiveness, the content of the 'contract' is derived bottom-up from voters' preferences ('What do the people demand?'). In the case of mandate theory, the pivotal role of the electoral program signals a top-down relationship.

This static distinction regarding the source of the mandate introduced by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) is a useful addition to the dynamic approach put forward by Manin and his co-authors. The authors tackle the complex relationship between the electorate and its representatives in an idiosyncratic classification of representation-types (see: Table 2, which may be considered to be an elaboration on the concepts presented in Table 1).

Table 2. Modes of political representation

| | | Control by voters | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Ex ante | Ex post |
| Defining the content of representation | From the top | Mandate | Accountability |
| | From the bottom | Delegation | Responsiveness |

Source: Andeweg and Thomassen 2005: 512, as modified by the authors.

The two dimensions of the conceptual matrix are related to controlling mechanisms and the definition of mandate content (here we only focus on the *ex ante* side of the table). We modified the table in one aspect: although Andeweg and Thomassen associate the upper left cell with 'authorization', we refer to it as the electoral mandate. We consider this term to be more accurate as the act of authorization also includes instances of blank check authorization, which is clearly inapplicable for an analysis of the *content* of representation.

As is manifested in this presentation, the mandate approach to representation is characterized by a top-down approach to creating the content of the principal-agent understanding. Delegation, on the other hand, realizes representation from the bottom up, as the government process takes its cues from detailed, binding expressions of the popular will. It is important to note, however, that delegation can only be realized when a number of very strict conditions are met: voters must have exogenous and stable preferences and the political agenda must be predictable. In this sense, the more flexible framework of the mandate relationship is also more realistic.

## *7. An Empirical Theory of Mandate-fulfilment*

In this article, we argued that there is a missing link between various theories of the mandate and empirical pledge-research. An empirically testable theory of mandate-fulfilment remains elusive even as a number of its potential components are well exposed in the conceptual literature. The previous section enumerated five such building blocks and in this section, we discuss these approaches with a view towards constructing a synthesis framework that is in direct conversation with empirical studies of pledge-fulfilment.

Our proposition takes away five key elements – five major criticisms – from the analysis so far. It builds on the 'weak' concept of the mandate. It treats parties as the main agents of representation. It makes use of the realistic tendencies of party government (without its reliance on its most prohibitive preconditions). It sets up a positive framework for studying representative government (doing away with normative elements). And finally, it relies on a top-down approach to ex ante authorization. We call this synthesis the realistic version of positive mandate theory. Table 3 provides a summary of its major aspects.

Table 3. The strong and realistic versions of mandate theory

| | Subject | Feature | Strong version | Realistic version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Mandate | Binding character of the mandate | Strong | Weak |
| 2 | Mandate | Scope of the public policy content | Complete | Reduced |
| 4 | Mandate | Source of manifesto policy content | Bottom-up (sensitivity to public preferences) | Top-down (formulated by party elite) |
| 5 | Authorization | Strength of authorization | Majority | Majority or plurality |
| 6 | Authorization | Agents of mandate-fulfilment | Clear responsibility (two-party system) | Potentially blurred responsibilities (e.g. coalition government) |
| 3 | Implementation | Policy change in the wake of government defeat | Radical | Not necessarily radical |
| 7 | Implementation | Role of the public interest | Incorporated (normative approach) | No public interest condition (positive approach) |

Source: The authors.

The first feature is the acknowledgment of the fact that for any mandate theory there should be a clearly defined concept of the mandate. Here, the mandate is an electoral authorization that is binding to some extent. The free 'mandate' (a blank authorization for the representative using elections as an ex post control mechanism) is an authorization only in a purely formal sense. The weak version of mandate theory puts the emphasis on the under-defined character of any real-life mandate as opposed to stronger versions of an all-encompassing character.

The weak version of mandate theory disposes of the notion of a binding mandate-fulfilment that covers the totality of policy issues. This weak mandate *as binding to some extent* is content-based and specific: it delineates the scope of action. On the one hand, the various conceptual levels of the mandate (see: Figure 1) create ample space for ambiguity and missing information. On the other hand, the partially binding character of the weak mandate also means that the ends – the perceived public interest – may not fully, and in all cases, justify the means.

For the problem of the source of the mandate we rely on the representation typology of Andeweg and Thomassen. In our modified presentation, we equated the *ex ante* top-down approach with the mandate. In this case, the content of representation (e.g., in the form of an election program) is defined by the political/party elites, as opposed to the exogenous preferences of the voters. This lends strategic room for maneuver for party leaders as they decide on the structural aspects and key pledges of the manifesto.

Moving on from the mandate formulation to the authorization phase of the political process, the realism of our approach is also highlighted by the fact that it does not assume that only overwhelming election victories provide a workable mandate. In

fact, it treats all party configurations capable of forming a government as 'winners' and expects them to fulfil their collection of pledges.

In modern mass democracies, authorization is not conferred by individual voters, but by a plurality or majority of voters. Similarly, the beneficiaries of authorization are also collective actors (in most cases: parties). The realistic approach to responsible party government renders the complexity inherent in 'strong' versions of mandate theory manageable. In the 'strong' ideal type of responsible party government only two parties compete. This setting mobilizes the electorate by providing the simplest choice possible: one between two clearly defined alternatives.

Multiparty systems defy these preconditions just as party platforms are incomplete or ill-defined. The mandate may be implicit (with party ideology used as a pointer) or explicit, and even in the explicit case it may be devoid of content on most policy domains. Similarly, the realistic version of mandate theory, as opposed to the strong one, does not require a radical change of direction in terms of public policy compared to the previous government led by the other competing party. As manifesto content may overlap, pledges and saliency may be shared between parties; thus this unrealistic requirement is omitted.

Besides realism, the positive-empirical ambition of our proposed synthesis is also in stark contrast with extant mandate theories. This approach circumvents the problem of normativity that upsets the logical structure of stronger versions of mandate theory. To illuminate the necessity of this adjustment, we briefly revisit the key features of modern normative mandate theory.

In the footsteps of the doctrine of responsible party government, the most salient feature of normative mandate theory is that representative government also entails governing in the public interest (Manin et al., 1999a; Pitkin, 1967). For this to happen, three descriptive (1-3) and two normative (4-5) assumptions should be met (Manin et al., 1999a: 30-33):

1) Election campaigns provide relevant information about the policies to be pursued ('informativity');
2) Voters expect that the government policy will be identical to election pledges – politicians will adhere to and fulfil their promises;
3) Voters are steadfast, i.e. that they will stand by their preferences (expressed through the elections) throughout the political cycle;
4) Pursuing the successful election program, i.e. the 'mandate', always serves the best interests of the electorate;
5) The interests of elected representatives coincide with those of the voters.

For our present purposes, the most important normative assumption is related to the correspondence of the mandate and the public interest (4). This postulate introduces an external element into the original theoretical framework which upsets its logical coherence. The theoretical basis for this correspondence is the utilitarian understanding of the public interest: the common good is what is good for the 'public', 'for the people' (in a technical sense: the median voter). And what is good for the people can be learned from their revealed preferences, from the choices people make. This utilitarian interpretation of the common good is questionable in itself.

From our perspective, however, the key objection is that preferences are not set over time and, therefore, the positions expressed earlier will not represent 'the best interests of the people' in the period following the election (cf. condition 3). Given that elections are held every few years, the explicit content of the mandate and the voters' revealed preferences (cf. responsiveness) can soon get into conflict, which upsets the internal structure of the five conditions.

At this point, theorists face two imperfect options to choose from. The first option is to dissolve the concept of the mandate – interpreted as an electoral authorization with a partially developed content – in the more general notion of responsiveness. This negates the pivotal role of elections in representative democracy. The other option is to separate the positive-descriptive elements ('Was the pledge fulfilled?') from the normative and prescriptive elements ('Does [meeting] the promise serve the public interest?'). As our aim was to build an empirically testable theory of mandate fulfilment, we opted for the second alternative. This choice was also supported by considerations related to research methodology (cf. the problems inherent in operationalizing the concept of the public interest).

## *Operationalization and validity*

Our final task in the process of formulating the empirical theory of mandate fulfilment is the operationalization of the realistic version of positive mandate theory. This realistic version simplifies the all-encompassing character of the strong ideal type by means of a series of compromises. What is gained in the process is a compact, yet empirically relevant theoretical framework. Its main components are not only theoretically informed but they are also in direct conversation with multiple empirical research agendas.

The operationalized rendition of the empirical theory of mandate fulfilment consists of three main research topics and the related research questions and empirical indicators. These are the information content of the mandate and campaigns; the definiteness of the authorization; and the strength of mandate implementation. Taken together, the three related theory-research question-measurement bundles provide an empirically testable theory of mandate-fulfilment. Table 4 provides an overview of the structure of this synthesis framework.

Table 4. Empirical research questions derived from the theoretical framework

| Theoretical problems | Research questions | Empirical indicators |
|---|---|---|
| I. Information content of the mandate (campaigns) | (1) How informed are voters of the mandate proposals? | The depth of the factual knowledge of voters of party manifestos |
| | (2) How comprehensive and concrete is the mandate? | The length and comprehensiveness of election program<br>The specificity of the pledges |
| II. Definiteness of the authorization | (3) How strong is the authorization? | Activity rate of voters (election turnout)<br>Vote share of winning program(s) (the degree of victory) |
| | (4) How unique is the authorization? | Differences between the two election program |
| III. The strength of mandate implementation | (5) How clear is the responsibility for implementation? | The extent of the constitutional separation of powers<br>The strength of party discipline<br>Other formal constraints (e.g. the electoral system) and informal constraints |
| | (6) What is the rate of mandate fulfilment? | Pledge enactment in terms of percentages ('pledge approach')<br>Enactment of the major, recurring provisions of the programme ('saliency approach') |

Source: The authors.

The first pillar in the framework concerns the information content of the mandate. In democratic countries with free and fair elections campaigns offer a wide variety of information sources for the electorate on the possible content of representation relationships. Parties often publish explicit manifestos revealing their ideological orientations and policy intentions. Even in cases where a written program is missing, oral statements may effectively provide a substitute. Proactive communications may be supplemented by reactions to proposals by other parties. This issue may be further divided into two parts with each of its empirical research questions: the knowledge of the electorate of the proposals on offer and the information content of the mandate proper. The former may be investigated in research designs aimed at the depth of the factual knowledge of voters. The latter can be investigated by an analysis of the comprehensiveness and concreteness of manifestos as well as by the specificity of individual pledges.

The second pillar of the framework is related to the definiteness of the authorization. This both concerns the strength of authorization and its uniqueness. The strength of authorization is measurable in a direct manner with turnout and electoral results while uniqueness is a function of the differences between party manifestos. This latter could be measured by the share of overlapping and idiosyncratic pledges of the total.

The third pillar of the framework concerns the strength of mandate implementation. This is the topic that is at the forefront of most of empirical pledge research. Yet even this aspect requires a more complex empirical research agenda in

order to elevate the level of abstraction from pledge to mandate fulfilment. The clarity of responsibility when it comes to implementing the mandate is both a function of formal and informal constraints. Prime examples of the former are constitutional rules regarding the separation of powers. Informal constrains may include cultural norms which often contribute to the strength or weakness of party discipline. Finally, the rate of mandate fulfilment may be calculated by analyzing the rate of pledge fulfilment (in percentages of the total) or the enactment of major legislation regarding recurring provisions of electoral programs (see: the 'saliency approach').

The empirical theory of mandate fulfilment – as defined by the pillars of Table 4 and the related discussion – needs further refinements before it can be directly applied to country case studies or comparative work. These mostly concern the institutional variety of electoral systems and the distinctive characteristics of party systems of various advanced democracies. In our presentation of the theoretical framework above we argued that the enforcement of the authorization (i.e. representation) is realized by collective actors, in most cases parties. We also contended that whichever party 'wins' the election should be held accountable according to its pledges and other mandate-relevant proclamations.

Needless to say, the notion of 'winning' does not adequately prepare our theoretical framework for empirical application. A general discussion of the effect on mandate-fulfilment of major regime types (presidential vs. parliamentary), electoral systems (majority vs. proportional) and party systems (two-party vs. multi-party systems) is therefore in order. We simplify this complexity to four models: the baseline scenario of the Westminster system, the plurality of European proportional systems (here approximated by the Dutch case), minority governments in parliamentary systems and U.S. presidentialism.

The Westminster model (here proxied by the political system of the United Kingdom) can be considered the baseline case for the empirical application of the proposed framework. Single-party governments are common (it is important to note that the proposed framework does not rely on any notion of the 'majority of the popular vote', which is not a precondition of forming a government in most countries anyway). As a general rule, manifestos are a must – and they have a real effect on both electoral results (see: the election of 2017) and government policy (as was the case with the election of 1997). Pledges and issue emphases tend to be party-specific and their implementation is frequently fodder for political debate.

Proportional electoral systems are a harder nut to crack (not counting single-party majority governments or coalition governments where one party has a majority on its own). As a general rule, the respective mandate content associated with participant parties adds up to form the government program. This is a relatively clear-cut solution for empirical research whenever pledges and issue emphases are not antagonistic (not to mention the cases where there is a clear overlap between coalition partners). In fact, coalition agreements can be understood as joint efforts of coalition participants to reconstruct the mandate (e.g. pledges that both parties share or at least no party objects to).

The empirical framework addresses these problems under the heading of the uniqueness of authorization and the clarity of responsibility (see: Table 4, research questions 4 and 5). In cases where conflicting mandate proposals are retained even

after forming a coalition the corresponding scores for uniqueness and clarity will decrease. As for minority governments in parliamentary systems, they need other parties' votes for passing legislation. In this respect they behave similarly to proportional systems from the perspective of our theoretical framework with one exception: the mandate proposal of 'supporting' opposition parties will not be considered the way those of junior coalition partners would as they do not take part formally ('responsibly') in party government.

Finally, the case of U.S. presidentialism, with its elaborate separation of powers structure, and other federal states necessitate further refinements of our theoretical framework. Once again, when both houses and the presidency are under one-party control (as in 2008-2010 and 2016-2018, for instance) the only difference with the one-party Westminster-type government lies in the fragmented sources of the mandate. Recent political history points towards the pre-eminence of presidential campaigns as agenda-setters in the political process and, therefore, a realistic mandate theory would primarily rely on the explicit or implicit manifestos of major presidential contenders. As for the cases of divided government (Congress vs. the presidency or when the two houses are divided in terms of party control) they once again restrict the validity of an empirical mandate theory (see: 'clear responsibility' in Table 4).

Certainly, this brief discussion of real-life political systems does not offer a point-by-point solution to all potential problems of the operationalization of a framework for specific research questions, countries and periods. Nevertheless, it also shows that the proposed realistic mandate framework is flexible enough to accommodate designs related to at least a fair share of electoral, party and constitutional system constellations of advanced representative democracies, if not all.

## *Conclusion*

In this article, we have presented an empirical theory of mandate-fulfilment in advanced representative democracies. In creating what we called the realistic version of positive mandate theory we started our discussion with the notion of the partially binding mandate, as contrasted with the free mandate approach to representation. In the next step, we defined the representation relationship as one established between collective actors and where the subjects of representation are parties. We also added the core concepts of responsible party government and modern normative mandate theory to our analysis. However, we proposed a number of adjustments to these frameworks in order to arrive at a realistic and positive version of mandate theory.

Most importantly, the proposed framework breaks with both normative and 'strong' renderings of mandate theory, for both theoretical and practical reasons (plausibility, internal validity and suitability for operationalization – see Table 3 for a summary of these adjustments). The result of this theoretical survey is a conceptual framework that is both logically coherent and empirically plausible, and which can be verified or refuted by the tools of positive political science (as indicated in Table 4).

We conclude our analysis by highlighting the contributions of this empirical mandate theory to the extant literature. First, in this article we argued that there has been no attempt to bridge theoretical accounts of the mandate with the empirical research agenda of pledge-fulfilment. We also contended that there is more to

mandate-fulfilment than sheer pledge-fulfilment – and that a theoretically relevant empirical research agenda should concern the former, not the latter. Furthermore, we stipulated that the three main components of our empirical model (information, definiteness and strength of implementation) are not only theoretically informed but are also in direct conversation with multiple empirical research agendas.

The most compelling example for this is the isolation of the saliency- and pledge-oriented approaches to studying mandate-fulfilment even as these clearly represent two sides of the same coin. There is also an abundance of examples as to how variables from empirical pledge research could fit seamlessly into our framework. In his review of the pledge literature of the preceding two decades, Sebők (2016: 149) provides a comprehensive list of the variables used in these studies.

Information on the mandate are regularly described by their policy content ('context area'), their direction ('expand or cut taxes') or the groups favored by the policy. The role of citizens' evaluations has also been studied recently (Thomson, 2011). A number of other variables – such as legislative majority and consensus between manifestos – are related to the second pillar concepts of authorization and uniqueness. Finally, the analysis of the strength of mandate-fulfilment went beyond counting pledge-fulfilment to include various institutional features (e.g. ministerial control) as control factors. The fact that these variables are regularly used in pledge research without invoking their roots in mandate theory is a reminder that an empirical theory of mandate-fulfilment could fill an important void in the literature.

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**DOROTTYA KISFALUSI** *

# Bullies and Victims in Primary Schools: The Associations between Bullying, Victimization, and Students' Ethnicity and Academic Achievement

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## Abstract[1]

This study examines the associations between four types of peer-reported bullying and peer-reported victimization (mocking, physical bullying, negative gossip, cyberbullying), and students' ethnicity and academic achievement among sixth-grade Hungarian primary school students. For data analysis, multilevel regression models are used. Based on the analysis of 27 classes, it was found that students' self-declared ethnicity is not significantly related to bullying and victimization among students with higher socio-economic status. In some models, however, a significant interaction term between ethnicity and low socio-economic status has been found, showing that among low status students, Roma ethnicity is more strongly associated with bullying and victimization than among high status students. Furthermore, there is no sign of the acting white phenomenon among the students in the study in general and among the Roma students in particular. In contrast, students having higher grades are less likely to be nominated as victims of any form of bullying except for mocking.

*Keywords:* Academic achievement, Bullying, Early adolescence, Ethnicity, Victimization.

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## *1. Introduction*

School bullying causes increasing concerns among teachers and parents in Hungary as well as in other countries. In the past few decades, more and more anti-bullying programs have been developed to handle the problem of harassment among children and adolescents and to help students who are victimized by their peers. Bullying is a serious form of aggression since it has several adverse effects on the victimized students. Victims are likely to experience anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, mental and physical health problems, and isolation from peers (Faris and Ennett, 2012; McKenney et al., 2006). Furthermore, victimization might have negative consequences on students' school performance (Eisenberg et al., 2003).

Various definitions of bullying have been proposed in the literature, and most of them agree that it is characterized by some form of aggressive behavior (Espelage and Swearer, 2003). According to the most widely referred definition, bullying is a repeatedly occurring negative act between one or more bullies and their victim, where a power imbalance exists between the students (Olweus, 1993).

Students display different types of aggressive behaviour towards peers. Direct or overt forms of aggression, on the one hand, involve verbal of physical acts that happen face-to-face among students and are visible to the peer group. Indirect or covert aggression, on the other hand, is not characterized by direct confrontation with the victimized student (Björkqvist et al., 1992; Card et al., 2008; Espelage and Swearer, 2003; Sijtsema et al., 2010). Negative gossip, exclusion, and harmful manipulations of one's social relationships are examples of indirect aggression (Crick, 1995; Little et al., 2003). Furthermore, cyberbullying is the newest form of harassment: children can use a wide range of electronic devices and platforms to bully their peers. Sending mean messages via phone or email and writing embarrassing posts or comments on social networking sites are typical forms of cyberbullying (Smith et al., 2008; Wegge et al., 2015).

Students with certain characteristics are more likely to be victimized than others. Socially and personally vulnerable students, for instance – e.g. disliked and rejected students (Knack et al., 2012; Veenstra et al., 2010), students having few or no friends (Faris and Felmlee, 2014; Hodges and Perry, 1996), students with behavioral problems (van Lier et al., 2012), low self-esteem (Sainio et al., 2012), or other characteristics disdained by their peers (Batsche and Knoff, 1994; Olweus, 1993; Wang et al., 2010) –, are at greater risk of being victimized. Students having high status in the class can also be targets of victimization if aggression is used instrumentally to reach high social status in the class (Faris and Felmlee, 2014). Some students, however, are more likely to be perpetrators than others. Popular students (Cillessen and Mayeux, 2004; Faris and Felmlee, 2011; Juvonen et al., 2003; Rodkin and Berger, 2008; Sijtsema et al., 2009), for example, are more likely to bully their peers than students who are less popular.

Researchers in the past decades also concentrated on the role of ethnicity in bullying and victimization (e.g., Fandrem et al., 2009; McKenney et al., 2006; Vitoroulis and Vaillancourt, 2014), but this association has received little attention in the Hungarian context. Majority and minority students might have different likelihoods to be bullies or victims, and this association might be moderated by the

ethnic composition of the class (Tolsma et al., 2013; Vervoort et al., 2010). Moreover, different ethnic groups might value high academic achievement differently; therefore, association between school performance and victimization might differ among majority and minority students.

The present study focuses on bullying and victimization among sixth-grade Hungarian primary school students. Various types of negative behavior among students are differentiated, such as physical aggression, mocking, negative gossip, and cyberbullying. Analyzing peer-reports of bullying and victimization, it is examined how students' ethnicity and academic achievement are associated with being a perpetrator or a victim in the different bullying relations. In the analysis, several characteristics of the students are controlled for, which have previously been found to be correlated with bullying and victimization.

In the next section I review the relevant theories and previous empirical findings on the associations between bullying, victimization, and students' ethnicity and academic achievement. I also summarize previous findings on the relation between bullying, victimization, and the control variables used in this study. Then I introduce the data and the procedure of the study and present the results of a descriptive analysis and a cross-sectional regression analysis. In the last section, I summarize the main findings of this paper, discuss the implications of the results, and formulate suggestions for directions for future research.

## *2. The associations between bullying, victimization, and students' characteristics*

### *2.1. The role of ethnicity in bullying and victimization*

As was emphasized earlier, there is usually a power imbalance between the bullies and their victims (Olweus, 1993). Minority groups in a society often also possess less power than the majority (McKenney et al., 2006; Vervoort et al., 2010) because of their marginalized economic and social position. Furthermore, minority students often experience prejudicial attitudes and discrimination. Prejudice might be expressed in the form of aggressive behavior towards minority students. Ethnic bullying is a special form of harassment and describes cases when students are bullied based on their ethnicity (Fandrem et al., 2009; Monks, Ortega-Ruiz and Rodríguez-Hidalgo, 2008; Verkuyten and Thijs, 2002).

Social misfit theory (Wright et al., 1986) suggests that minority students might be the targets of bullying particularly if there are large differences between the majority and minority culture (Tolsma et al., 2013; Vervoort et al., 2010). Students who do not accept the dominant group norms might be rejected in the class, and rejected students are frequently victimized (Knack et al., 2012; Veenstra et al., 2010). Students' ethnicity might be perceived as a salient dimension along which cultural norms differ (Tolsma et al., 2013; Vervoort et al., 2010), therefore, minority students might be more likely to be victimized than majority students. Hence, it is expected that Roma students are more likely to be victimized than majority students. This association is, however, anticipated to be moderated by the proportion of Roma students in the given class, as

majority students' cultural norms are expected to be more dominant in classrooms where Roma students are in a numerical minority.

Previous empirical studies presented mixed findings with regard to the associations between ethnicity, bullying, and victimization. While several researchers found no significant differences between ethnic majority and minority youth (e.g. Eslea and Mukhtar, 2000; McKenney et al., 2006; Monks et al., 2008; Wolke et al., 2001); in other studies, certain ethnic groups proved to be more likely to bully or be victimized than others (e.g. Fandrem et al., 2009; Hanish and Guerra, 2000; Strohmeier et al., 2011; Verkuyten and Thijs, 2002; Vervoort et al., 2010). In an analysis of bullying among Roma and non-Roma Hungarian secondary school students, Kisfalusi (2016) found no significant differences between the victimization of self-declared Roma and non-Roma students. Students perceived as Roma by their peers, however, were more likely to be nominated as both bullies and victims than students perceived as non-Roma.

### *2.2. Students' academic achievement and victimization*

High academic achievement can lead to victimization if an oppositional culture emerges within classrooms. The phenomenon of oppositional culture was described by Ogbu and his colleagues (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Ogbu, 1978), who stated that members of involuntary minorities (such as blacks in the United States) experience limited social and economic opportunities compared to whites and voluntary minorities. Realizing that their academic efforts are less rewarding, blacks develop oppositional attitudes towards schooling. Moreover, academically successful black students are considered to be 'acting white' by black peers and accused of wanting to meet the expectations of the white society (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). Although several empirical studies have challenged the key assumptions and predictions of the oppositional culture explanation and the acting white hypothesis (e.g., Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998; Harris, 2011; Horvat and Lewis, 2003; Tyson et al., 2005), similar mechanisms have been described in other countries (De Vos and Wagatsuma, 1966; Willis, 1977), and among other communities in the US (Fryer Jr. and Torelli, 2010; Gans, 1962) as well.

Roma people in Hungary also represent a group defined as involuntary minorities by Ogbu and colleagues (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Ogbu, 1978). Furthermore, the situation of the Roma minority is in many aspects similar to the situation of black people in the United States. Based on the Hungarian National Assessment of Basic Competences, for instance, Roma eighth-grade students have one standard deviation lower test scores on average than their non-Roma peers (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011). Roma students also receive lower grades from teachers than non-Roma students (Hajdu et al., 2015; Messing et al., 2010). Moreover, the dropout rate is considerable higher among Roma secondary school students than among the non-Roma. Due to these differences in educational opportunities and the wide-spread prejudice and discrimination against the Roma (Váradi, 2014), there is a significant gap between the Roma and non-Roma population regarding their employment rate as well (Kemény and Janky, 2006). Roma people therefore face limited economic opportunities compared to the non-Roma population. Based on the arguments of the

oppositional culture explanation, it would be thus reasonable to expect that the acting white phenomenon is present among the Roma students.

As high academic performance is not the most valued characteristic among adolescents (Coleman, 1961), and an oppositional culture towards schooling can develop not only among minority students but among other low-status students as well (Farkas et al., 2002; Willis, 1977), I investigate whether high academic achievement leads to being victimized in general, and among Roma students in particular. Hajdu et al. (2015) found no sign of an acting white phenomenon among Hungarian Roma students examining friendship and hostility relations. This study extends their research by focusing on the behavioral aspects of negative relations among students.

### *2.3. Further characteristics of bullies and victims*

Previous studies showed significant gender differences in bullying. Boys are usually more likely than girls to bully others (e.g., Rodkin and Berger, 2008; Veenstra et al., 2007), especially to use direct forms of aggression (Card et al., 2008). Girls have been found to be more likely than boys to use indirect, relational forms of bullying such as gossip and exclusion (Olweus, 1993), although the difference is small in magnitude (Card et al., 2008), and limited to specific age groups such as later childhood and adolescence (Archer, 2004).

Students' status has also been related to bullying and victimization. Two different types of peer group status are distinguished in the literature (Cillessen and Mayeux, 2004; Lafontana and Cillessen, 1999). Sociometric popularity, on the one hand, can be measured by asking students about their positive and negative affective relations towards their peers (e.g., Dijkstra et al., 2007; 2008). Whether students are accepted or rejected by their peers can be identified by calculating how many classmates actually like or dislike them. The concept of perceived popularity, on the other hand, measures students' perceptions about the popularity of their classmates by asking them to nominate peers who are popular in the class (e.g., Cillessen and Mayeux, 2004; de Bruyn et al., 2010; Lafontana and Cillessen, 1999).

Peer acceptance and perceived popularity are differently related to bullying and victimization. Rejected students (Knack et al., 2012; Veenstra et al., 2010), and students who have few friends (Faris and Felmlee, 2014; Hodges and Perry, 1996) were generally found to be more likely to be victimized than students having more supportive peer relationships. Research on the association between acceptance and being a bully, however, presented mixed findings (Newcomb et al., 1993; Price and Dodge, 1989; Salmivalli et al., 2000).

In several studies, perceivedly popular students were found to be more likely to bully others than less popular peers (de Bruyn et al., 2010; Juvonen et al., 2003; Prinstein and Cillessen, 2003; Rodkin and Berger, 2008; Sijtsema et al., 2009). This association was described in the cases of physical and relational forms of aggression (Cillessen and Mayeux, 2004) as well as in the case of gossip (Wargo Aikins et al., 2015). Findings about the relationship between students' peer status and victimization are again controversial. Whereas de Bruyn et al. (2010) found a negative relationship between popularity and victimization, Faris and Felmlee (2014) described a curvilinear, inverted U shape relation between network centrality and victimization.

Several other characteristics of students are associated with the involvement in bullying. Based on the results of a meta-analysis, lower socio-economic status seems to be associated with being a bully or a victim (Tippett and Wolke, 2014). Physical appearance (Janssen et al., 2004; Knack et al., 2012), physical strength, and athletic ability (Knack et al., 2012; Tolsma et al., 2013) also affects which students are more likely to be bullies or victims.

## *3. Method*

### *3.1. Procedure and participants*

The data stem from the fourth wave of a six-wave-long Hungarian panel study conducted between 2013 and 2017 among primary school students.[2] Fourth-wave data were collected in the spring of 2015, when students were enrolled in the sixth grade and were 13 years old on average (N=1054 students, 53 classes in 34 schools in 28 settlements). The main aim of the research was to investigate students' social networks, including negative relations such as disliking and bullying, with a special focus on interethnic relations. Schools with a high proportion of Roma students were therefore overrepresented in the sample. The schools were located in the central part of Hungary: in the capital city (N=5), towns (N=9), and villages (N=20).[3]

The fourth wave of the research was selected because in May 2015, one month after the data collection, students' basic competences in reading and mathematics were measured with a standardized national test: the National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC). The dataset I use is linked to the database of NABC.[4] Thus, for this wave of the study, not only students' grades are available to measure academic achievement, but standardized blind test scores can also be used. These test scores are unobservable to the classmates. Including both grades and test scores in the analysis, we can thus test whether victimization is associated with students' competences or if it is rather associated with students' efforts (i.e., whether controlling for the level of competence, students' grades are significantly associated with victimization). This distinction is crucial to analyze the acting white phenomenon.[5]

Before the data collection, students and parents were informed in an information letter about the aim and procedure of the research. Active consent from parents was requested: they were asked to indicate whether they would allow their child to participate in the study. Students with parental permission (96.9 per cent) filled out a self-administered tablet-based questionnaire during regular school lessons,

[2] The longitudinal research started in the autumn of 2013 among all fifth-grade students enrolled in the selected schools. Then, data were collected in the spring of 2014, the autumn of 2014, and in the spring months of 2015, 2016, and 2017.

[3] A detailed description of the sampling procedure can be found in the Appendix.

[4] Active parental consent was asked to connect the study to the students' competence test results. If parental consent was given, the students' identification codes used in this study were linked to their NABC codes with the help of the schools.

[5] Moreover, using both grades and test scores, it is possible to examine whether reversed causality occurs: if victimization affects academic achievement, it can be expected that it has a significant effect on test scores as well. If only the association between victimization and grades is significant, than causality might run from grades to victimization (Hajdu et al., 2015).

under the supervision of trained research assistants. Students were assured that their answers were kept confidential and were used for research purposes exclusively. They were also allowed to decline the participation in the study.

For the purpose of the present analysis, I selected those classes from the sample where the response rate reached 70 per cent, a questionnaire was completed with the head-master of the class, and students' standardized test scores and school grades were available for the researchers. The subsample therefore consisted of 544 students from 27 classes (21 schools) with a mean class size of 20 students (SD=5.4). The overall response rate reached 92.5 per cent in these classes.

### *3.2. Measures*

*Bullying and victimization.* Similarly to some other studies (Faris and Felmlee, 2014; Tolsma et al., 2013; Veenstra et al., 2007), bullying and victimization were asked from the perspectives of both the bullies and the victims. From the perspective of the bullies, the various forms of bullying were measured with the questions: 1) *'Whom do you usually mock or insult?'* (mocking); 2) *'Whom do you usually jolt, punch or beat up?'* (physical bullying); 3) *'About whom do you usually talk with your classmates behind his/her back?'* (negative gossip); 4) *'Whom do you usually pick on with SMSs, emails or on Facebook?'* (cyberbullying). From the perspective of the victims, the following questions were asked: 1) *'Who mocks or insults you usually?'* (mocking); 2) *'Who jolts, punches or beats you up usually?'* (physical bullying); 3) *'Who usually talks with your classmates about you behind your back?'* (negative gossip); 4) *'Who usually picks on you with SMSs, emails or on Facebook?'* (cyberbullying).[6] Students were provided with an alphabetic list of all classmates and were asked to nominate those to whom the statement applied. In the case of each question, students' incoming nominations (the so-called 'indegrees') were summed, and divided by the number of classmates to take into account the differences in the size of the classes. These measures of peer-reported bullying and victimization were included as the dependent variables in the regression models.

*Self-declared ethnicity.* In every wave, students could choose from the following categories: 'Hungarian', 'Roma', 'both Hungarian and Roma', or members of 'another ethnicity'. Students who identified themselves as Roma or both Roma and Hungarian at least once[7] in the first four waves of the study[8] were considered as Roma, students

[6] The items for bullying and victimization were selected and translated into Hungarian from the Dutch implementation of the KiVa anti-bullying programme (see e.g., Huitsing et al., 2014; the wording of the items was modified a little). In a pilot study, fifth- and sixth-grade students were asked to fill in self-administered questionnaires and to take part in group interviews to assess the frequency at which the different types of bullying occurred. The four most frequently mentioned forms of bullying were included in the final questionnaire.

[7] Only 7.9 per cent of the students consistently declared to be Roma only. 12.8 per cent declared to be Roma in some waves and both Roma and Hungarian in other waves, 5.4 per cent declared to be both Roma and Hungarian in every wave, and 23.2 per cent declared to be Roma and/or both Roma and Hungarian in some waves and Hungarian in other waves. These data are consistent with the phenomenon that many Hungarian Roma tend to declare both Roma and Hungarian identities if multiple choices are allowed (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011; Simonovits and Kézdi, 2014).

[8] At the time of conducting the analysis, data from the fifth and sixth waves were not available.

who never declared to be Roma or both Roma and Hungarian were considered as non-Roma.[9] 37.1 per cent of the students declared to be Roma. The mean of the proportion of self-declared Roma students in the classes was 41.5 per cent (SD=30.1, min=0 per cent, max=94 per cent).

*Grade point average*. At the end of each semester, students receive summary grades ranging from 1 (fail) to 5 (excellent) from every subject. For every student, grade point average was calculated based on the summary grades obtained at the end of the previous semester from five subjects: mathematics, literature, Hungarian grammar, history, and foreign language.

*Test scores.* Reading and mathematics test scores were obtained from the database of the National Assessment of Basic Competences. NABC tests measure every sixth-, eighth-, and tenth-grade students' reading and mathematical skills in Hungary. In contrast to grades, students do not know each other's competence scores. Both mathematics and reading scores are nationally standardized (mean = 1500, SD = 200). For every student, the mean of the two test scores were calculated.

*Gender*. Students were asked to declare their gender. 51.3 per cent of the students were male.

*Acceptance*. Students were provided with a list of all classmates and were asked to nominate their friends. For each student, incoming nominations were summed. Then, incoming nominations were divided by the number of classmates. This measure was used as an independent variable in the regression models.

*Perceived popularity.* Students were provided with a list of all classmates and were asked to nominate classmates they considered *cool*. For each student, incoming nominations were summed to measure perceived popularity in the classroom. Then, incoming nominations were divided by the number of classmates. This measure was used as an independent variable in the regression models.

*Socio-economic status.* A dummy variable indicates whether students are entitled to get regular child protection allowance based on their disadvantaged status.

*Physical appearance.* Students were provided with a list of all classmates and were asked to nominate classmates they considered a pretty girl or a handsome boy. For each student, incoming nominations were summed. Then, incoming nominations were divided by the number of classmates. This measure was used as an independent variable in the regression models.

*Athletic abilities.* Head-masters were asked to nominate students from the class who are *good at sports*. A dummy variable indicates whether the given student was mentioned by the teacher.

### *3.3 Analytical strategy*

The different types of bullying relations (mocking, physical bullying, negative gossip, cyberbullying), are analyzed in separate regression analysis. Moreover, peer-reported bullying and victimization are differentiated based on students' incoming nominations. The incoming nominations in the case of the *'Whom do you usually*

[9] Five students declared to belong to another ethnicity (two Rumanians, one Polish, one Russian and one Indian).

*mock or insult?'* question, for instance, can be considered as the measurement of peer-reported victimization. Similarly, the incoming nominations in the case of the *'Who mocks or insults you usually?'* question can be considered as the measurement of peer-reported bullying behavior.

For data analysis, multilevel linear regression models are used. Since the dependent variables are bounded between zero and one, fractional regression models (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Ramalho et al., 2011) would be more appropriate from a statistical point of view. However, multilevel linear models allows the inclusion of cross-level interactions and squared terms to examine curvilinear relationship between variables. Moreover, the parameter estimates of the linear model are easier to interpret than those of non-linear models (Mood, 2010). Taking into account all of these concerns, I decided to present the results of the multilevel linear model.[10]

## *4. Results*

### *4.1 Descriptive analysis*

Table 1 shows the proportion of students who were reported by at least one classmates as victim, bully, or both victim and bully of a certain type of bullying. Whereas cyberbullying is the least frequently occurring form of bullying with 34 per cent of the students involved as bully, victim, or bully-victim, almost everyone participates in gossiping.

*Table 1. The proportion of students who are nominated as a bully, a victim, or both a bully and a victim in the different types of bullying*

| | bully | victim | bully-victim |
|---|---|---|---|
| cyberbullying | 9.9 | 11.6 | 12.5 |
| gossip | 5.9 | 19.1 | 63.2 |
| physical bullying | 15.4 | 17.1 | 24.6 |
| mocking | 16.4 | 21.7 | 40.1 |

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about incoming nominations in the different types of relations. Self-declared Roma students are more often reported by others as both perpetrators and victims of mocking, physical bullying, and cyberbullying than self-declared non-Roma students. Roma students, moreover, are more frequently reported as gossiping about their classmates than non-Roma students.

[10] As a robustness check, I compared the results of the fractional regression models and the OLS regression models (with cluster-robust standard errors, but without the cross-level interactions and squared terms). Parameter estimates pointed in the same direction, although p values differed in the case of some independent variables, leading to different conclusions concerning statistical significance.

Girls are more frequently nominated than boys as gossiping about their classmates. In contrast, boys are more frequently reported than girls as both perpetrators and victims in direct physical and verbal incidents of bullying.

Students with disadvantaged socio-economic background are more frequently reported by others as perpetrators of mocking, physical bullying, and cyberbullying than students with higher status. Low status students, furthermore, are more often reported to be victims of physical aggression than high status students.

*Table 2. The associations between the number of bully/victim nominations and the categorical independent variables*

| | female | | male | | | Non Roma | | Roma | | | good at sports | | not good at sports | | | low SES | | not low SES | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | mean | sd | mean | sd | | mean | sd | mean | sd | | mean | sd | mean | sd | | mean | sd | mean | sd | |
| cyberbullying: bully | 0.25 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.66 | | 0.20 | 0.51 | 0.44 | 0.64 | *** | 0.30 | 0.55 | 0.29 | 0.66 | | 0.24 | 0.53 | 0.45 | 0.67 | ** * |
| cyberbullying: victim | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.27 | 0.27 | | 0.19 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.60 | *** | 0.28 | 0.52 | 0.20 | 0.49 | | 0.24 | 0.49 | 0.31 | 0.58 | |
| gossip: bully | 2.87 | 2.32 | 2.21 | 1.78 | ** | 2.36 | 2.10 | 2.78 | 2.00 | ** | 2.47 | 2.08 | 2.73 | 2.08 | | 2.50 | 2.11 | 2.60 | 2.01 | |
| gossip: victim | 1.69 | 1.94 | 1.62 | 1.71 | | 1.70 | 1.94 | 1.60 | 1.66 | | 1.68 | 1.88 | 1.58 | 1.61 | | 1.74 | 1.89 | 1.41 | 1.58 | |
| physical bullying: bully | 0.41 | 0.73 | 1.19 | 1.63 | *** | 0.63 | 1.19 | 1.09 | 1.47 | *** | 0.78 | 1.33 | 0.92 | 1.35 | | 0.74 | 1.29 | 0.99 | 1.43 | * |
| physical bullying: victim | 0.36 | 0.67 | 0.99 | 1.20 | *** | 0.54 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 1.18 | *** | 0.70 | 1.04 | 0.62 | 0.98 | | 0.62 | 1.00 | 0.88 | 1.09 | ** |
| mocking: bully | 0.88 | 1.19 | 2.34 | 2.45 | *** | 1.37 | 2.08 | 2.04 | 2.03 | *** | 1.49 | 1.95 | 2.08 | 2.39 | * | 1.51 | 2.12 | 1.94 | 1.92 | ** |
| mocking: victim | 0.89 | 1.34 | 1.34 | 1.50 | *** | 1.08 | 1.51 | 1.23 | 1.36 | * | 1.18 | 1.52 | 0.92 | 1.08 | | 1.12 | 1.51 | 1.12 | 1.21 | |

Notes: †p < 0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 for a Mann-Whitney-test of differences in mean ranks. N=544 students, 27 classes

Table 3 presents bivariate correlations between acceptance, students' popularity, perceived attractiveness, academic achievement, and the different types of victimization and bullying. Cyberbullying is significantly associated with students' academic achievement only: lower grades and test scores are associated with higher involvement as both bullies and victims in cyberbullying. Grades and test scores are in most cases negatively associated with bullying and victimization. Students having more friends are less involved as both bullies and victims in any form of bullying except for cyberbullying than students having fewer friends. In the case of mocking and gossiping, popularity is negatively associated with being a victim, but it is positively associated with being a perceived perpetrator in verbal bullying. Perceived attractiveness, in general, is negatively associated with being reported as a bully or victim. However, the more students are nominated as attractive, the more they are reported to gossip.

*Table 3. Correlations between the dependent and the continuous independent variables*

| | cyberbullying: bully | cyberbullying : victim | gossip: bully | gossip: victim | physical bullying: bully | physical bullying: victim | mocking: bully | mocking: victim |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| acceptance | -0.071 | -0.054 | -0.183*** | -0.329*** | -0.206*** | -0.117** | -0.142*** | -0.332*** |
| popularity | -0.033 | -0.045 | 0.053 | -0.181*** | 0.072 | -0.074 | 0.190*** | -0.212*** |
| attractiveness | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.124** | -0.184*** | -0.173*** | -0.217*** | -0.132** | -0.302*** |
| GPA | -0.303*** | -0.265*** | -0.128** | -0.063 | -0.308*** | -0.309*** | -0.303*** | -0.167*** |
| test score | -0.198*** | -0.164*** | -0.159*** | 0.003 | -0.235*** | -0.169*** | -0.183*** | -0.088 |

Notes: †p < 0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. N=544 students, 27 classes

A significantly higher proportion of Roma students is entitled to get regular child protection allowance compared to non-Roma students (57.4 per cent vs. 7.4 per cent, p<0.001). Compared to non-Roma students, Roma students have lower grades (2.7 vs. 3.7, p<0.001) and test scores (mathematics: 1358 vs. 1502, reading: 1299 vs. 1493, p<0.001) on average. There are no significant differences between the Roma and non-Roma students with regard to the number of friends, popularity, physical appearance, and athletic abilities.

### *4.2 The analysis of peer-reported bullying and victimization*

Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the random-intercept multilevel linear models. The dependent variables are the proportion of students who nominated the given students as a bully or a victim in the examined types of bullying. Ethnicity does not have a significant association with any form of peer-reported bullying and victimization among students having higher socio-economic status. Nor does the proportion of Roma students in the class moderate the association between ethnicity and peer-reported bullying or victimization. In some models, however, a significant interaction term between ethnicity and low socio-economic status has been found. Among low status students, Roma ethnicity is more strongly associated with cyberbullying, verbal forms of bullying (mocking and gossip), and victimization in physical and cyberbullying than among high status students.

Students having higher grades are less likely to be nominated as victims of any form of bullying except for mocking (at the 0.1 significance level). Students with higher grades, moreover, are less likely to be nominated as perpetrators of verbal (mocking and negative gossip) and physical bullying. Test scores are not significantly associated with bullying and victimization except for the positive relationship between scores and being nominated as a victim of negative gossip. Additional analysis (not presented in the tables) also shows that neither school grades nor test scores are significantly associated with victimization among Roma students, if only nominations from their Roma peers are taken into account. These associations suggest that there is no sign of an oppositional culture in these classrooms.

Boys are more likely than girls to be nominated as perpetrators of direct verbal (mocking) and physical forms of bullying. Moreover, boys are more likely to be nominated as perpetrators of cyberbullying. Boys are also more likely to be reported as victims of mocking and physical bullying. Girls, on the other hand, are more likely than boys to be nominated as gossiping about their classmates. Although these gender differences are significant, they are not large in magnitude (around 1–5 percentage points).

Students with more friends are less likely to be nominated as victims of mocking and malicious gossip, but this association was not found in the case of physical and cyber victimization. Students with more friends, moreover, are less likely to be nominated as perpetrators of any form of bullying.

An inverted U shape relation has been found between peer-reported gossiping, mocking, and physical bullying activity. Thus, students are more likely to be nominated as perpetrators of physical bullying until they are nominated as popular by 52 per cent of their classmates, they are more likely to be nominated as perpetrators of mocking until they are nominated as popular by 60 per cent of their classmates, and they are more likely to be reported as cyberbullies until they are nominated as popular by 80 per cent of their classmates. In the case of students above this popularity level, bullying declines. In contrast, there is a U shape relationship between popularity and peer-reported victimization in the case of negative gossip and mocking. Thus, students who are the least popular and students who are the most popular are the most likely to be reported as verbally victimized.

Socio-economic status is negatively associated with physical and verbal victimization (mocking) among the non-Roma, whereas attractiveness is positively associated with cyberbullying and with victimization in the gossip network (at the 0.1 level).

*Table 4. The results of the regression models predicting peer-reported bullying*

| | Cyberbullying | | | Gossip | | | Mocking | | | Physical bullying | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Estimate | SD | p | Estimate | SD | p | Estimate | SD | p | Estimate | SD | p |
| constant | -0.001 | 0.015 | 0.961 | 0.122 | 0.049 | 0.013 | 0.055 | 0.046 | 0.234 | 0.079 | 0.034 | 0.020 |
| boy | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.001 | -0.039 | 0.010 | 0.000 | 0.042 | 0.011 | 0.000 | 0.028 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Roma | 0.006 | 0.008 | 0.410 | 0.015 | 0.024 | 0.527 | 0.008 | 0.025 | 0.762 | 0.028 | 0.018 | 0.123 |
| acceptance | -0.024 | 0.013 | 0.066 | -0.213 | 0.040 | 0.000 | -0.240 | 0.042 | 0.000 | -0.134 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| popularity | 0.024 | 0.022 | 0.263 | 0.277 | 0.065 | 0.000 | 0.442 | 0.069 | 0.000 | 0.240 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| popularity$^2$ | -0.039 | 0.028 | 0.160 | -0.173 | 0.084 | 0.039 | -0.366 | 0.089 | 0.000 | -0.230 | 0.063 | 0.000 |
| GPA | -0.003 | 0.002 | 0.146 | -0.011 | 0.006 | 0.071 | -0.026 | 0.006 | 0.000 | -0.011 | 0.005 | 0.022 |
| test score (divided by 100) | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.455 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.222 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.127 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.830 |
| low SES | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.827 | -0.003 | 0.015 | 0.857 | 0.002 | 0.016 | 0.899 | 0.016 | 0.012 | 0.167 |
| Roma*low SES | 0.015 | 0.009 | 0.094 | 0.075 | 0.027 | 0.005 | 0.052 | 0.028 | 0.067 | 0.005 | 0.020 | 0.796 |
| attractiveness | 0.035 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 0.022 | 0.035 | 0.521 | -0.017 | 0.036 | 0.644 | -0.008 | 0.026 | 0.749 |
| good at sports | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.699 | 0.009 | 0.010 | 0.332 | 0.014 | 0.010 | 0.148 | -0.000 | 0.007 | 0.950 |
| proportion of Roma students | 0.008 | 0.013 | 0.552 | -0.028 | 0.058 | 0.629 | 0.017 | 0.042 | 0.691 | -0.013 | 0.033 | 0.698 |
| Roma*proportion of Roma | 0.004 | 0.016 | 0.823 | 0.060 | 0.049 | 0.224 | 0.011 | 0.050 | 0.832 | -0.032 | 0.036 | 0.374 |
| intraclass correlation | 0.254 | | | 0.531 | | | 0.266 | | | 0.343 | | |
| $R^2$ | 0.111 | | | 0.195 | | | 0.311 | | | 0.228 | | |

N=450

*Table 5. The results of the regression models predicting peer-reported victimization*

| | Cyberbullying | | | Gossip | | | Mocking | | | Physical bullying | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Estimate | SD | p | Estimate | SD | p | Estimate | SD | p | Estimate | SD | p |
| constant | -0.003 | 0.012 | 0.830 | 0.105 | 0.042 | 0.013 | 0.083 | 0.034 | 0.015 | 0.006 | 0.025 | 0.823 |
| boy | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.297 | 0.003 | 0.009 | 0.735 | 0.033 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.036 | 0.006 | 0.000 |
| Roma | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.688 | 0.000 | 0.021 | 0.995 | -0.009 | 0.018 | 0.620 | -0.007 | 0.013 | 0.573 |
| acceptance | -0.010 | 0.011 | 0.376 | -0.203 | 0.035 | 0.000 | -0.131 | 0.030 | 0.000 | -0.019 | 0.022 | 0.397 |
| popularity | 0.015 | 0.018 | 0.403 | -0.190 | 0.058 | 0.001 | -0.129 | 0.050 | 0.009 | -0.023 | 0.036 | 0.534 |
| popularity$^2$ | -0.011 | 0.023 | 0.642 | 0.228 | 0.074 | 0.002 | 0.123 | 0.064 | 0.054 | 0.008 | 0.047 | 0.871 |
| GPA | -0.003 | 0.002 | 0.054 | -0.013 | 0.005 | 0.015 | -0.007 | 0.005 | 0.114 | -0.008 | 0.003 | 0.020 |
| test score (divided by 100) | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.163 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.047 | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.638 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.171 |
| low SES | -0.006 | 0.004 | 0.164 | -0.013 | 0.014 | 0.351 | -0.027 | 0.012 | 0.023 | -0.017 | 0.009 | 0.050 |
| Roma*low SES | 0.017 | 0.007 | 0.022 | 0.033 | 0.024 | 0.159 | 0.014 | 0.020 | 0.479 | 0.057 | 0.015 | 0.000 |
| attractiveness | -0.000 | 0.010 | 0.987 | 0.052 | 0.031 | 0.090 | 0.031 | 0.026 | 0.233 | -0.002 | 0.019 | 0.933 |
| good at sports | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.582 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.707 | -0.012 | 0.007 | 0.102 | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.569 |
| proportion of Roma students | 0.022 | 0.011 | 0.052 | -0.007 | 0.047 | 0.878 | 0.067 | 0.033 | 0.044 | 0.020 | 0.024 | 0.397 |
| Roma*proportion of Roma | -0.001 | 0.013 | 0.958 | 0.045 | 0.043 | 0.300 | 0.009 | 0.036 | 0.803 | 0.041 | 0.027 | 0.121 |
| intraclass correlation | 0.268 | | | 0.461 | | | 0.333 | | | 0.315 | | |
| $R^2$ | 0.107 | | | 0.094 | | | 0.165 | | | 0.209 | | |

N=450

## *5. Discussion*

This study examined the associations between peer-reported bullying, victimization, and students' ethnicity and academic achievement among sixths-grade Hungarian primary school students. Although ethnicity did not play a significant role in bullying and victimization among students with higher socio-economic status, Roma ethnicity has been found to be more strongly associated with cyberbullying, verbal forms of bullying (mocking and gossip), physical victimization and cyberbullying among low status students. It thus seems that low status Roma students are more likely to be involved in certain forms of bullying as both bullies and victims than high status Roma students or low status non-Roma students. The intra- and interethnic nature of bullying, however, was not taken into account in the analysis (Tolsma et al., 2013). Future research should focus more on who bullies whom in primary schools, since the analysis of dyadic relations would allow same-ethnic and cross-ethnic victimization to be differentiated.

There was no sign of the acting white phenomenon among the students in the sample in general, and among Roma students in particular. These results are in line with the findings of Hajdu et al. (2015) who analyzed friendship and hostility relations among Roma and non-Roma Hungarian students. They found that Roma students did not reject their high-achieving Roma peers. The present study showed that Roma students do not bully their Roma classmates with high school grades either.

In line with theoretical explanations and previous literature (Card et al., 2008), boys were found to be more likely to use direct forms of aggression, such as mocking and physical aggression. Girls, however, were more likely to spread negative gossip about their classmates. Although the dyadic relations were not taken into account in the analysis, the fact that boys were more likely to be nominated as both victims and perpetrators of direct forms of bullying suggest that this kind of harassment might more likely occur in same-gender relations than in cross-gender ones.

Similarly to previous findings (Faris and Felmlee, 2014; Hodges and Perry, 1996), students with fewer friends were more likely to be victimized than students having more friends, although this association was only found in the case of verbal forms of bullying such as mocking and gossip. These results suggest that social exclusion and victimization often co-occur with each other. In contrast, a U-shape relation was found between popularity and victimization in the case of verbal forms of bullying, in line with the argument that two types of bullying can be differentiated: normative targeting and instrumental targeting (Faris and Felmlee, 2014). Whereas unpopular students might be bullied because of the intention to maintain the group norms, instrumental bullying is targeted towards high status students with the intention of gaining higher status among peers.

The major limitation of the study is that reversed causality was not taken into account. Not only social exclusion can lead to being victimized, but victimized students might lose their friends over time. Similarly, while students with lower grades might be more likely to be victimized, it is also possible that victimized students get lower grades over time just because they are victimized (Juvonen et al., 2011). Longitudinal analysis of more waves of the data collection might gain further insights into the underlying causal mechanisms. The fact that victimization is negatively

associated with grades and not with test scores might however suggest that causality runs from grades to victimization and not from victimization to academic achievement.

Another limitation is that information on relevant factors contributing to bullying and victimization were not available in the dataset. Psychological characteristics, for instance, or victimization at home might also explain why certain students are more likely to bully others, or to be victimized in schools, than their classmates.

A third limitation is that the student population in the sample does not represent the Roma and non-Roma student population in Hungary. Schools with a high proportion of Roma students were overrepresented in the sample, and the characteristics of the Roma population living in other areas in Hungary might be different from those of Roma students included in the sample (Kemény et al., 2004). Thus, the association between ethnicity, bullying, and victimization might show different patterns in other areas in Hungary.

Moreover, bullying and victimization was measured with four different items in the questionnaire. Several forms of bullying, however, were not measured in the study. It was not asked, for instance, whether students are bullied specifically because of their ethnic background. Further research is needed to assess the robustness of the findings, focusing on different measures of bullying and victimization.

Despite these limitations, the findings of this study provide important contribution to the understanding of the associations between bullying, victimization, and students' characteristics. It has been shown that ethnicity has a stronger association with bullying and victimization among students with low socio-economic status than among high status students, and that gender, popularity, and academic achievement of students are significantly related to being a bully or a victim in various forms of bullying in the school.

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## *Appendix: Description of the sampling procedure*

As the research focused on social networks, the sampling procedure followed the tradition of other network studies such as the *Teenage Friends and Lifestyle Study* (Pearson and West, 2003), the *Dutch Social Behavior Data Set* (Houtzager and Baerveldt, 1999), or *The Arnhem School Study* (Stark and Flache, 2012; Stark et al., 2013). Instead of having a large representative sample of the Hungarian primary school students or classes, the main aim was to collect data on every student of the selected classes in order to get information on complete networks of the classrooms. Due to lack of financial resources, it was not possible to select a representative sample of school classes in Hungary. Therefore, a heterogeneous sample was selected with regard to certain characteristics to minimalize the costs of data collection.

As a first step of the sampling procedure, a database containing the characteristics of primary schools in the central part of Hungary (Budapest, Pest, Nógrád, Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom) was created based on the KIR-STAT database (http://www.kir.hu/kir_stat/). Secondary schools with six- and eight-grade training programmes and minority nationality schools were excluded. First, schools of those settlements were selected where the proportion of the Roma minority was higher than 5 per cent according to the 2011 Census, or the estimated proportion of Roma minority students were higher than 10 per cent according to the database of the National Assessments of Basic Competences. Second, schools of those districts of Budapest were selected where the proportion of Roma minority was higher than 1 per cent according to the 2011 Census. Then, schools were stratified according to the size of the settlement (Budapest, other town, village) and the proportion of students with disadvantaged socio-economic status (0–20 per cent, 21–40 per cent, higher than 41 per cent). The distribution of the target schools can be found in Table A1. Table A2 shows the expected number of classes in the sample according to the type of settlement and the proportion of students having disadvantaged socio-economic status.

*Table A1. The distribution of the target schools (number of classes in parenthesis) according to the type of settlement and the proportion of students having disadvantaged socio-economic status.*

| | Budapest | Other town | Village | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| < 20% | 117 (239) | 27 (69) | 9 (9) | 153 (317) |
| 21–40% | 7 (15) | 7 (16) | 14 (18) | 28 (44) |
| > 40% | 0 (0) | 4 (8) | 23 (25) | 27 (33) |
| Total | 124 (254) | 38 (88) | 46 (52) | 208 (394) |

*Table A2. The expected number of the classes in the sample according to the type of settlement and the proportion of students having disadvantaged socio-economic status*

| | Budapest | Other town | Village | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| < 20% | 8 | 8 | 5 | 21 |
| 21–40% | 7 | 9 | 7 | 23 |
| > 40% | 0 | 7 | 10 | 17 |
| Total | 15 | 24 | 22 | 61 |

Instead of using a probability sample, the following aims were taken into account in the process of the selection of schools:

- To reach the expected number of classes in each cell (presented in Table A2);
- To ensure the variability of schools in each cell according to the proportion of students having disadvantaged socio-economic status;
- To ensure the variability of settlements in each cell according to the proportion of the Roma minority;
- To ensure the comparability of schools by selecting schools from neighbouring settlements or in the same district in Budapest.
- Every fifth-grade class of the selected schools was included in the sample. If a school rejected to participate in the study, another school was selected based on the following criteria:
- the proportion of students with disadvantaged socio-economic status is similar;
- same type of settlement;
- same county (if possible);
- the proportion of the Roma minority in the settlement/district is similar.

Based on these selection criteria, the sample consisted of 63 classes from 35 schools in the first wave. After the second wave, one school from Budapest with four classes was dropped from the sample because of low response rate. The number of classes decreased to the fourth wave because in several schools, classes were merged after the second wave of the study.

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# Official Statistics and Big Data

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## Abstract

More than five years ago Eurostat started a project with the aim to 'tame' sources of Big Data in a way that they can be incoporated into official statistical systems. In order to solve the problems a statistician might be faced with during the official statistical application of Big Data, first of all, we give an overview of traditional data collection, and then point to the differences one has to face when dealing with Big Data. We introduce common sources of data (traditional, administrative) and highlight the ways huge sets of data are different compared to them. Next, we discuss characteristics of Big Data versus traditional statistical methods based on the qualitative criteria of official statistics, and we also elaborate on the problems of analysing Big Data. Finally, we provide a list of use cases for Big Data in official statistical data collections.

Keywords: Big Data, official Statistics, big Data Paradigm, Big Data quality standards.

Opinions differ concerning how much data there is in the world. Some IT-specialists say that 2.5 exabytes ($2.5 \times 10^{18}$ B or 2.5 EB) of data are created every day (5 exabytes would be enough to store all words ever spoken by human beings), while the experts of IBM estimate that today the total amount of data in the world is doubled every two years – that is, today in 24 days the same amount of data is created as previously throughout our entire history. From this it is clear that thanks to the development of the information and communication technologies a huge amount of data is created, and for data scientists it is a waste not to exploit this huge amount. Big Data is special not only because of the great amount of data but also – mainly due to the spread of social media and mobile phone services – their changeable nature. Although today with development of technology it is increasingly possible to collect, process, store and organise this large amount of data, official statistics is still struggling to hammer out and apply methodologies that are based on Big Data. Almost five years ago, Eurostat – the main statistical organisation of the EU – started a project the aim of which is to 'tame' sources of Big Data in a way that they can be incorporated into official statistical systems.[1] Furthermore, by exploiting the opportunities provided by these large sets of data, the project also aims at producing statistical data faster and of a better quality than before in order to make data analyses more diverse and, in some cases, more detailed, and to draw more accurate conclusions and prepare more accurate forecasts, at the same time decreasing the burden on data providers. To achieve these goals, Big Data must become an integral part of official statistical data collection.

## *1. Definitions and the taxonomy of Big Data*

The Oxford Dictionaries define Big Data as follows: 'Extremely large data sets that may be analysed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human behaviour and interactions."[2] Meanwhile in Wikipedia one finds: 'Big data is a term for data sets that are so large or complex that traditional data processing application software is inadequate to deal with them.'[3] Gartner, Inc. (2017) provides the following definition: 'Big Data are high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing that enable enhanced insight, decision making, and process automation.' Based on the above, Big Data can be characterised by the following three concepts (the 3V-definition): volume, variety, velocity (Glasson et al., 2013) Besides the 3V-definition, the literature mentions other characteristics as well: from the point of view of statistics the velocity of data is of special importance. This term refers to how good the quality of the data is, and to what extent they reflect reality (DeVan, 2016). In the case of the traditional, statistical way of data collection high data quality

[1] This issue has special importance within the EU, as is also illustrated by the fact that one of the basic projects of the European Statistical System is the 'ESS. VIP Big Data' dealing with the development of Big Data for official statistical purposes.
[2] https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/big_data
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data

is one of the most important criteria, however at the same time it is also a great challenge.[4]

Big Data sources can be grouped in several ways (Glasson et al., 2013). First of all, as mentioned earlier, based on their generation, there are three types of data (Vale, 2013). These three types are also different in terms of the participants of the communication process: human-sourced information[5] is created through communication between human beings, process-mediated data[6] result from communication between human and machine, while machine generated data[7] are of course the result of communication between machines.

## *2. The Big Data Paradigm*

From the foregoing, it is already quite clear that compared to traditional data collection procedures and methods, Big Data is of a completely different nature, and operates based on a different 'logic'. This problem includes questions of information technology and professional dilemmas. The former is not discussed here in detail, it is only touched upon in a couple of points.

[4] Concerning the definition of Big Data variability, visualisation, value (that is valuable, useful results from the data), validity and volatility (that is the period of validity) are also important (DeVan, 2016).

[5] Human-sourced information means the subjective records of human experiences. Earlier these records were stored in the form of books, works of art, then photographs, videos and audio storage devices, but today in almost all cases they are generated digitally (on personal computers or social media). Official statistics only have limited access to these, usually weakly structured, uncontrolled sets of data. Facebook comments, likes and posts, tweets, blogs, vlogs, personal documents, pictures and videos shared on photo or video sharing sites (Pinterest, Instagram, YouTube), searches on the Internet, text messages sent by mobile phones and emails belong in this category.

[6] Process-mediated/transaction data are data generated in the course of certain (mainly business) processes. These are well-structured, usually RDBMS-data (data from relational database management systems) or metadata. One type of these data come from databases of usually governmental institutions (e.g. public offices), electronic healthcare databases, medical records, databases of hospital visits, insurance records, data of banks and stock data, business data of enterprises (if legislation requires the storage of their records). Transaction data form another type of process-mediated data: they are generated through transactions between two entities. These are, for example, commercial transactions (e.g. online shopping), debit and credit card transactions, data from e-commerce (including transactions launched from mobile devices), etc.

[7] Machine generated data are typically referred when the phenomena behind the trendy expression IoT (the Internet of Things) is being discussed. Log files and data of fixed and moving sensors also belong in this category. This type of information could be defined as the data of billions of sensors measuring and recording the events of the physical worlds. As globally more and more sensors are introduced and activated, the amount of data created by sensors is growing, too. All in all this is the type of data the amount of which is growing the fastest. Sensor data are data of sensors on household devices, weather or air pollution sensors, satellite data or data of traffic monitoring systems/web-cameras. Also there are data generated by tracking devices such as route/tracking or geolocation data of mobile phones (e.g. GPS data). Data from computer systems (logs and web-server logs) are created in the course of the operation of computers, in a text format, about system events.

### *2.1 Issues of information technology*

It is easy to see that in order to be able to manage Big Data, to collect, store, prepare and process the continuously flowing information certain prerequisites must be fulfilled.

1) It is necessary to have an increased computing capacity, which can be managed with MPP-solutions (massive parallel processing).

2) Also, tools of data redistribution and parallel processing are indispensable (knowledge and usability of MapReduce, Hadoop, Hortonworks Data Platform, RStudio, etc.).[8]

3) Furthermore, it is very important to use and know data reduction software technologies, which are not exclusively based on SQL (structured query language). At the same time for statisticians it is always a question what type of IT-skills are necessary for the application of Big Data.

### *2.2 Professional issues*

In order to clear up problems which a statistician might be faced with during the official statistical application of Big Data, first of all we shall give an overview of traditional data collection, and also the differences one has to face when dealing with Big Data. After that we introduce the types of data sources and we shall point out in what way huge sets of data are different compared to them. Finally we shall discuss the characteristics of Big Data versus traditional statistical methods based on the qualitative criteria of official statistics, and also we shall elaborate on the problems of analysing Big Data.

### *2.3 Data collection and Big Data*

Traditional approaches: the top-down paradigm. In accordance with the general practices of official statistics, before any data collection takes place, one must specify what kind of information they wish to collect, and for this hypotheses must be set up. After that one needs to go through the following steps: (1) design the data collection, (2) collect the data, (3) preparation of the data, (4) data analysis, (5) obtain information from the database leading to rejection or confirmation of the hypotheses.

In the top-down paradigm the researcher focuses on specifying the goal(s) of analysis during the design of the data collection. Planning, which is a key element of traditional data collection, involves the following: (1) creating the variables and definitions, conceptualisation and operationalisation, (2) choosing the statistical population (this can be a complete population or it can also be based on sampling), (3) application of lists or registries in order to reach the population, (4) the preparation of typologies and questionnaires.

[8] The programme of the SETI Institute is an excellent example of parallel processing, where with the help of volunteers, signals arriving from space are analysed in the search of traces of extra-terrestrial intelligence (or at least some patterns). The volunteers run the software on their own computers thereby multiplying the speed of the analysis.

For achieving the analytical goals, one must obtain specific information and set up (a) specific hypothesis/hypotheses. After that a model must be set up. At the end of the process one can provide some descriptive statistics, an estimate or a forecast. The Big Data approach: the bottom-up paradigm In the case of the Big Data paradigm one needs to follow a completely different logical pattern. Here data collection does not have to be designed in the traditional way (this is because the data are already given, or rather: they are present everywhere), and the usual order is turned upside down. In this case, instead of planning, one must start by (1) collecting the data, and then (2) prepare these data. The next step is (3) data mining (this usually means looking for correlations) and (4) customising the algorithms (by choosing scalable algorithms in the first place and avoiding aggregation). The final step is the discovery of new knowledge and the validation of the results (using heuristic [pattern search] technologies for forecasts/estimates).

In the case of this latter approach emphasis is laid on discovering accessible data in order to find valuable information which has not been extracted from the data yet. Obviously this methodology mainly offers solutions for problems researched by data scientists,[9] who are interested in questions like 'What is happening?' instead of 'Why?' and 'How?'. Due to the aforementioned special characteristics of Big Data, it is quite difficult to integrate it into the framework of traditional statistics.

### *2.4 Comparison of the types of data sources*

After discussing the data collection paradigms, let us take a look at based on what factors we can define primary and secondary statistical data sources. Primary data sources are data collections where questionnaires are used (e.g. censuses), irrespectively of whether data collection is complete or is based on sampling. Secondary data sources are Big Data-type data sources, consisting of data collected from administrative sources.[10] Chart 1 summarises the main aspects of how different types of data sources are described.

Chart 1: The characteristics of data sources

| Characteristic | Primary statistical data source | Secondary statistical data source | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Administrative data source | Big Data-type data source |
| The data are designed for (a) statistical purpose(s) | yes | no | no |
| The concepts, definitions and typologies are clear and well-known | yes | often | rarely |
| The target population is well-defined | yes | often | no |
| Metadata are provided | yes | often | no |
| The data are structured | yes | yes | rarely |

[9] This is a relatively new profession, which requires mathematical and statistical knowledge, programming skills, as well as experience and reliable expert knowledge in the given field.

[10] Istat (the Italian National Institute of Statistics) refers to these as tertiary data sources.

| Characteristic | Primary statistical data source | Secondary statistical data source | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Administrative data source | Big Data-type data source |
| The data apply to the statistical population | yes | usually | no |
| A preliminary processing is necessary for 'extracting' the statistical data | no | no | yes |
| Relevant/interesting data are directly accessible | yes | often | no |
| Extra variables are directly accessible | yes | often | no |
| The data completely cover the statistical population to be examined | yes (census)<br>no (survey) | often | not yet |
| The data are representative or can be rendered representative or certain analyses | yes | often | no |

Source: Istat ESTP, 2016.

It turns out from the chart that – considering their adequateness in terms of definition or typology, or (in some cases) also their structuredness – Big Data-type data sources do not live up to the requirements set up for traditional data collection methods completely. If we want Big Data to fulfil the quality requirements of official statistics, we need to improve the definability of the statistical population and the specificity of the target population (problems of 'data coverage'). If we manage to improve on the above criteria, that is, to measure their quality and to incorporate appropriate methods in the statistical data generation process, then we will also come closer to solving the problem of representativeness. The definition of metadata and extra variables also depends on how we manage to solve the issues mentioned above. For this it is necessary to increase computing capacities, to re-discuss ethical dilemmas and dilemmas of data protection, to set up a new set of rules and to discuss these issues at an international level.

### *2.5 Big Data and quality standards*

In official statistics data and institutions must fulfil a number of quality standards. Out of these standards we shall now take a look at those that might be relevant when applying Big Data.

In official statistics representativeness is of key importance. Well-chosen representative samples used in traditional sampling describe the population quite well. In the case of Big Data the data are already given, however, according to the statistical definition they are not complete at all. Concerning the complete target population the problem of lack of coverage or over-coverage might occur, which in turn leads to distortion. Therefore Big Data sources can be seen as non-representative databases, for which reference data, necessary for the examination of validity, are essential. The

selectivity/representativeness index is also important.[11] This shows how data from the Big Data source are different from the actual population. By setting up the criteria of 'ignorability' it is possible to address distortions related to coverage, sampling, measurement and respondents (for more information, see: Couper, 2013).

In official statistics, the comparability of data is another key factor. Due to the fact that in different countries statisticians work with differing concepts (e.g. the definitions of household, family or unemployment are not identical), sometimes it is difficult to render different specific statistics comparable in terms of time or space. When it comes to the comparability of Big Data and data from traditional collections, we have to face similar challenges:

• Differences between definitions. In official statistics, thanks to the harmonisation of official statistical services and EU and national standards and rules, the concept to be measured is defined very precisely. However, we have to keep in mind that the concept behind a variable set up based on a Big Data-type source is usually not identical to the concept used in official statistics, therefore our primary task is to harmonise the different concept structures.

• The concept of population. In official statistics a (statistical) population is a set of items to be examined. These items can be characterised by providing their features. In the case of Big Data-type sources, the accessible population is usually not identical to the population to be characterised. Therefore, we need to establish methodologies for producing the latter based on the former. For example, in the case of a mobile service provider if the given population consists of the users of the service, but the population to be examined is somewhat different, then the two concepts are not identical, and distortion will occur (if the population we wish to examine consists of the inhabitants of Hungary, then there will be persons whom it will be impossible to observe through this way [e.g. those <children or elderly people> who do not have a mobile subscription], and also, there might also be people who have several accounts. This way the population to be examined will be distorted).

• The concept of the statistical unit. Based on the collected data official statistics defines, analyses and gives information about different units or groups of units. However, when applying Big Data, we must check if every piece of information necessary for the management of different statistical units is available. This is important because the relevance and statistical units of a Big Data source are different from those of traditional statistics, so in order to produce the necessary information further methods and models are needed. A good example of this is when in a Big Data-type data source the statistical units are the cell phone subscriptions and not the people. In this case, as the statisticians would like to make statements about the behaviour and habits of the people, it might pose a problem that some people have more subscriptions, while some do not have any.

[11] Selectivity/representativeness is one of the most important dimensions of concern. A non-representative database may be useful for certain purposes but not suitable for others. The question is whether there are reference data that can be used to validate the validity.

### *2.6 Methodological issues: the pros and cons of using Big Data*

Chart 2 summarises and complements the foregoing by introducing those experiences which are for and against the usage of Big Data in official statistics.

Chart 2: Arguments for and against the Big Data Methodology

| Pros | Cons/Challenges |
|---|---|
| No sample | No sample – representativeness |
| Real time | Coverage (overcoverage/lack of coverage)→distortion |
| Real behaviour, not based on self-declaration | Measurement of the quality of input and output data |
| Less burden for the respondent | The method of using the data source, loss of potential validating data source |
| Can be combined with other databases | Comparability (with current statistics) |
| Discovery of new knowledge | IT infrastructure, support |
| Expenses (in the long run) | Expenses (in the short term) |
| | Accessibility of the data |
| | Data protection |
| | Stability |

Source: Our own compilation.

In Chart 2 the lack of samples is listed among the pros, as well as the cons of Big Data. On the one hand it is good, as the possibility of sampling errors can be excluded. However, on the other hand, as pointed out earlier, from the point of view of representativeness this is a problem. As in this case, we know very little about the statistical population, and therefore the identity of the sample units is not clear either. Without a deep knowledge about the statistical sample it cannot be guaranteed that the researcher can produce statistics which apply to the whole target population; this means that one of the main advantages of qualitative research is lost here.

The issue of stability is also among the challenges: this is also a problem for traditional data collection (e.g. a high level of non-response rate can destabilise a survey). Big Data is a flow of data which can change easily and fast; therefore, it might happen that a homepage ceases to exist, someone deletes the data-collecting application from their smartphone or they deny access to their device, etc.

At the same time, it is a clear advantage of Big Data that it is real-time. These types of data might even be accessed real-time and they can be analysed much faster than data collected in the traditional way. However, the collection of real-time data can also be blocked, and as a result this advantage can be lost. This is because for official statistical institutions it is a problem that Big Data are possessed by other institutions, organisations or persons, therefore in some cases it is costly to access them, and access to real-time, individual and personal data can be difficult due to ethical or data protection issues. In the majority of cases these data are highly unstructured, and in almost all of the cases there are also 'useless' pieces of data among them. Therefore, if this 'noise' cannot be excluded from the database, the quick usability of the data might be hindered.

Another advantage of Big Data is that in contrast to self-declared data, they show people's real behaviour. This makes it possible to avoid some significant sampling errors of traditional data collection (such as non-response, respondent error, distortion and effect of the interviewer).[12]

Today – as mentioned earlier – it is an important goal of traditional statistics to reduce the burden on respondents. Therefore, if the responses to the questions of surveys are partly or completely also available from (an)other data source(s) (such as Big Data or administrative data sources) or if they can be deduced from them, then the respondent is not saddled with the questionnaire and expenses are reduced, too.

It also supports the usage of Big Data that these types of databases can easily be combined with other databases. According to the present state of knowledge, Big Data sources can be used in official statistics in a complementary or validating function, with the help of data fusion procedures

### *2.7 Problems of analysis*

Although we have already shown several Big Data-related problems, here we would like to present some more problems which one might be faced with during the analysis of data.

In the case of Big Data traditional procedures of data analysis do not work. Firstly, during the analysis of huge amounts of data one will be faced with the limits of complexity and computing capacity (e.g. matrix inversion, the principle of least squares estimators, GLM maximum likelihood vs. Newton–Raphson algorithm). Most traditional algorithms are difficult to parallelise, so it is very cumbersome to have several processors work on the details at the same time (e.g. Hadoop cannot cope with such a task). However, due to the size of the data set computing capacities cannot be increased in any other way. Secondly traditional statistical procedures are very sensitive to data errors and extreme values, so it is obligatory to perform checks and data cleansing. However, a significant part of Big Data is 'noisy' and unstructured, what is more, the size of the data set is so huge, that it is impossible to edit, add new input or manage outliers in a simple way. The management of duplicates is also a difficulty. In statistical offices, the traditional data management procedures, the well-structured monitoring systems and data cleansing algorithms can guarantee that the databases generated from surveys do not contain any duplicates. In the case of Big Data, different types of procedures must be created for this.

It is also a problem that the majority of Big Data-based analyses rely on the examination of correlations. However, this method also involves the possibility of false correlations (see ecological misconceptions); and if correlations are not clear, then this leads to the 'death of the cause' (Scannapieco, Virgillito and Zardetto, 2013).

If we use Big Data for statistical purposes, thereby substituting data based on statistical data collection, then the aforementioned problems will be more nuanced, as Big Data will also have to be subjected to the same procedures (data preparation,

[12] For the sake of completeness here it must be mentioned that Big Data might involve certain distortions which are unknown and therefore cannot be corrected.

micro-validation, outlier management and aggregation) as data used in traditional data collection. However, complexity and capacity still pose a problem.

The currently used methods of official statistics (designed sampling methods built upon models, regression, general linear models, etc.), which are successful or unsuccessful depending on specific characteristics of traditional baseline data are capable of managing and analysing data of high quality, but (compared to Big Data) in very small quantities.

Based on the foregoing it might seem that the currently used methods of analysis have nothing to do with Big Data. What could then be the solution? Literature agrees that in order to be able to manage Big Data, we need a radical paradigm shift in statistical methodology:

- We need to use robust procedures – even if to a certain extent they erode accuracy: At the same time the criteria of accuracy and quality have to be laid down in every case: The level of accuracy can only decline if at the same time other qualitative components are improved:
- The methodology for analysing Big Data have to rest on approximating and not exact techniques, which can cope with the noisy target functions.[13]
- We need a paradigm shift. We need to accept that Big Data allows different types of analyses (Scannapieco, Virgillito and Zardetto, 2013).

However, these compromises are also affected by the fact that even if we want to develop, produce or publish official statistics based on Big Data only partially, then we have to make the latter live up to the same requirements as official statistics. As a result, the moment Big Data becomes part of official statistics, it will (partly) lose its Big Data-nature.

## *3. The utilisation of Big Data in official statistics: international experiences*

The Italian and Dutch statistical offices are leading in developing and using methods based on Big Data. Here we shall introduce some projects the results of which are already being used successfully by official statistical service providers.

### *3.1 The analysis of social media by official statistics*

In the Netherlands ca. 70 per cent of the population use one or more social media sites (Daas and van der Loo, 2013), out of which Facebook and Twitter are the most popular. Research studies have analysed tweets posted on the Dutch Twitter – the forum where the most public Dutch language content is available – with the aim of

[13] Very often the quadratic function (also in the case of Big Data) is determined by measurement data containing measurement errors (noise) to a greater or lesser extent. The target function can be estimated directly from the raw measurement data (historic estimate) or in a way that a distribution function is run on the raw data first (parametric estimate).

finding out more about the correlation between their content and 'general mood'.[14] The tweets showed a strong correlation between the general mood of the public and the economic situation and consumer confidence.[15] The correlation with the situation of the economy was so strong that the researchers examined it on a weekly and monthly basis, (As a criticism of the results, like several other studies, such as Pléh and Unoka, 2016, we would like to point out that social media posts do not necessarily reflect the real opinion of the individual, they rather show a conformity with an expected norm, which presents the given person in a more positive light compared to reality.[16])




Figure 1. Development of daily, weekly and monthly aggregates of social media sentiment from June 2010 until November 2013, in green, red and black, respectively. In the insert the development of consumer confidence is shown for the identical period.
Source: Daas and Puts, 2014.

[14] From the analyses, it also turns out that almost 50 per cent of dialogues are pointless 'babbling'; the topic of the remaining discussions was about free time (10 per cent), work (7 per cent), TV and radio (5 per cent) and politics (3 per cent).
[15] In sociology, the association between particular and generalised trust is a debated issue. While the former brings economic development, the latter inhibits it (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Raiser et al., 2001). In official statistics, the level of trust is dealt with by well-being studies.
[16] The social media messages sent in December were much more positive than those sent in the periods before and after.



Dash: daily aggregates

### *3.2 The application of data generated by sensors in official statistics*

In the Netherlands traffic sensors collect data about a road network of more than 6,000 km, process almost 24 thousand pieces of data a minute, and publish them within 75 seconds, as a result making it possible for drivers to avoid traffic jams and increasing road safety. By analysing these detailed data, official statistics can make important traffic estimates (e.g. it is possible to give estimates about the number of personal cars moving into and out of the country, broken down by vehicle types, as well as the amount of freight traffic, broken down by nationality of the vehicle) and complement their own data collections. Currently it is a problem of the project that with traditional statistical tools it is possible to process a day's amount of sensor data, however, in order to process an amount of three months, one needs to use Big Data-type tools.[17] In the future, this problem can be solved by increasing computing capacities.

Satellites also provide sensor data. By using them, it is possible to check the characteristics of land use frequently and accurately. The Austrian statistical office's land use study is based on satellite images, and is a very good example for this (Tam and Clarke, 2015). This study provides useful data for the whole of official statistics, as well as environmental statistics. Satellite images are used for identifying what land is used for also in Australia. In the framework of the research programme the images are analysed according to land use characteristics in order to estimate the ratio of crops. Land use characteristics are identified with the help of an algorithm (Daas and van der Loo, 2013).

### *3.3 The application of data generated by mobile devices in official statistics*

In the framework of a consortium project the Bank of Estonia, the University of Tartu and Positium LBS have established a solution for using data generated by mobile devices for the purposes of official statistics. Positium LBS (which was founded exclusively for this purpose) collects and processes anonymous data of mobile service providers, thereby providing reliable information on border crossings (into and out of Estonia). With the help of a PDM software (Product Data Management software) – which is partly in operation within the system of the service providers and is controlled by them, and is partly controlled by Positium LBS as data mediator – business secrets and personal data are protected, as the respondents receive a randomly chosen nickname/code, and it is impossible to identify the telephone number/owner. Data collection is based on active and passive tracking. In the case of active tracking the mobile devices are located and tracked using the MPS (Mobile Positioning System), while in the case of smart phones this is done with the help of GPS. In the case of passive tracking (which is mainly used for inside business or marketing purposes) the data are automatically stored at the mobile service providers (either in a memory or a log file).

[17] In one minute ca. 460,000, in one hour ca. 27 million, in a day ca. 600 million and in a year ca. 240 trillion pieces of data are generated.

The cooperation of these three institutions is hampered by the fact that mobile service providers are sales driven, and they are interested in keeping their customers, whose secrets they would like to keep in order to retain their credibility. Therefore, the partners have to face several professional, methodological and legal challenges in order to collect the positioning data.

After the collection of the data Positium LBS concludes a quality assessment, during which characteristic errors must be filtered out and corrected. After that the company performs spatial interpolation by using a special geographical information module. The collection of statistics by analysing the usage of mobile devices in time and space shows several methodological characteristics. The use of mobile devices is equally widespread in developed and developing countries, irrespectively of income, age or other social characteristics (but of course depending on network coverage and density). Thanks to this data can be collected easily and from a broad range of users. The method is cost-effective, as the results are recorded automatically, and as the respondents do not have to be contacted directly (like in traditional data collection), this reduces the costs even further (Daas and van der Loo, 2013).

## *4. The possible use of Big Data in the Central Statistical Office*

As we have shown earlier – some of the European statistical offices are already using Big Data-based methods or combining Big Data and traditional techniques. Now we shall introduce those areas where the Hungarian Central Statistical Office could successfully use the results of the above-mentioned projects – either by complementing data collection with Big Data sources or by validating the data collected so far. We shall list the possibilities of use according to the types of Big Data sources: transactions generated by the Internet, sensors or processes (see: Appendix F1).

### *4.1 The possibilities of using data generated by mobile communication in Hungarian official statistics*

The Hungarian Central Statistical Office collects data on domestic and international migration on a yearly basis, in the framework of the OSAP programme (National Statistical Data Collection Programme). The data sources are the census, the micro-census and the LUSZ programme (about the population's travelling habits). The first two are held every ten years, while the latter is held annually. However, if we used positioning data, we could get information on the mobility of the population more often, even if these data would not be complete due to problems of network coverage mentioned earlier.

Data collected from mobile phones could also be used in tourism statistics collected more frequently than a year or in creating an estimating process, which is more accurate than today's methods. Therefore, they could be used especially well in monitoring border crossings. This would be useful as with the establishment of the Schengen area and the cessation of border control we have less information on the number and nationality of border crossers than earlier. For these problems – similarly to the Estonian project shown earlier – access to mobile phone information could

provide a solution. However, due to Hungarian data protection legislation access to these data is highly problematic, and (currently) it is also very costly, although this area holds a lot of opportunities (and as pointed out earlier, Estonian migration research already uses passive positioning data in practice).

Currently there is already a methodological research study in the pipeline at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office dealing with the usage of mobile phone data, in the framework of a Eurostat grant, with an aim of using these mobile data instead of the data collected for our time balance survey collected in the traditional way. In order to achieve this, we would like to create a mobile app, with the help of which we will be able to compare the GPS data of smartphones with the answers of persons who fill in the time balance survey.

### *4.2 The possibilities of using sensor data in Hungarian official statistics*

In surveying travelling and mobility we could use sensor-based Big Data. As we have shown earlier, the Netherlands has a road sensor network, and Hungary has more and more such sources (e.g. the video footage of the National Toll Payment Services Plc. or the National Police Headquarters). Based on this, by using the appropriate coding and data protection techniques not only the number of border crossings, but also migration, commuting and tourist habits could be observed.

In terms of transportation and vehicle statistics, the data are often produced by collecting data from administrative data sources. By using sensors, this could be done more often and faster and the data could be analysed based on other criteria, too (area, nationality, type). Sensor data could be used not only in official statistics but also in other areas like city planning or the transformation of transportation.

Smart meters are capable of storing the data collected from the environment (temperature, air pressure or CO2 levels), and these data could serve the work of energy and environmental statistics. This type of problem is rooted in the fact that although the sensors are already in operation and make measurements every second, data are forwarded less frequently (in the majority of cases the Central Statistical Office receives monthly, quarterly or yearly data). However, if these data could be connected with other types of data, one could get a real-time view of a city's operation, and this way energy consumption and traffic could be measured based on different dimensions, too.[18]

### *4.3 The possibilities of using the web crawling method in Hungarian official statistics*

Currently a significant part of the data needed for calculating the price index is collected by the colleagues of the Central Statistical Office in some appointed shops, and a smaller part of these data comes from on-line surfaces. However, with the help of the web crawling method, where with a special software, data can be scraped from web surfaces in a structured format, the data of real estate agencies could be

[18] The Senseable City Lab project of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology monitors the events of the city in real time (energy consumption, traffic) with the help of sensors.

downloaded and the changes of the real estate market could be estimated. The office could obtain information on the most components of the index of consumer prices the same way.

Furthermore, by web crawling the homepages of companies the office could collect information on infocommunication tools used by businesses. Currently this type of information is collected through questionnaires.[19] Based on the experiences of the Italian National Institute of Statistics data collected through web crawling can complement traditional data collections quite well (Barcaroli et al., 2014).

Using this method, it is possible to gain information on job vacancies from job sites (in which city/at what type of company what kind of jobs are needed). These data can be used for the statistical estimation of the number of job vacancies.

### *4.4 The possibilities of using process generated data in Hungarian official statistics*

In official data collections, the Central Statistical Office's household budget data collection serves as a basis for examining the consumption patterns of Hungarian households. The respondents in the sample must write a consumption diary throughout the year, where they are asked to make an itemized list about the quantity and price of the purchased products. This is a significant burden on the shoulders of the respondents, however, without such a data collection we would not have any information on the consumption characteristics and expenditures of the households. However, process generated data (e.g. data resulting from bank card payments or sales data of the shops, where we can see when, where, for how much and how many items were purchased) would significantly improve the quality and accuracy of statistical data on consumption.

The cash machine data of the National Tax and Customs Administration are also process generated data. Based on their quantity and frequency, these data can be considered as Big Data, and they could complement the data collections of the Central Statistical Office.

### *4.5 Monitoring of the daily air ticket prices in Hungary and the calculation of prices, using the web crawling method*

The monitoring of air ticket prices is one of the small components in calculating the index of consumer prices[20] in Hungary. Currently for this purpose data are collected manually, but this way only a limited amount of data can be collected, and it is not possible to closely follow the fast changes of prices. The monitoring of air tickets with a Big Data-based method offers a solution for these problems. A current project at the Central Statistical Office uses the web crawling method to automatically collect data through Google. The frequency of 'data crawling' can be set depending on

[19] OSAP 1840: Az információs és kommunikációs technológiák állományának minőségi és mennyiségi adatai.

[20] The index of consumer prices is an indicator showing the average changes of the products and services purchased by the population (the households), that is the changes of the level of consumer prices.

the purpose of the research: price changes can be checked several times a day or even every hour or every minute.

With this project the Central Statistical Office intends to 'reproduce' the current, manual data collection method. The web crawling method not only accelerates but also simplifies the process, that is, besides improving quality this reform of data collection improves efficacy in itself (this method does not require any human resources, and the released labour force can be used for other types of analysing and development tasks). This way it is possible to gain information quickly and in a cost effective way (that is for free) and the daily changes of the prices can be compared.

It is a disadvantage of the method that currently the colleagues at the office are not monitoring all of the web pages selling air tickets.

## *5. Methodology*

The project monitors the prices of tickets to four destinations from Budapest to Rome, Berlin, London and Paris. The travelling period was set as days 10-11 of the month, plus/minus two days. The price data are collected in the five-month period before the reference month (e.g. for a journey in July the data are collected from February to June, on a daily basis), and the price index is calculated from the average of these prices.

With the traditional method, the office can collect one price a month for each of the destinations, however, with the web crawling method data are collected on a daily basis, therefore the possibilities of processing can be extended, too. It is possible to calculate the average of the daily minimum prices, the standard deviation of prices or also a daily price index can be calculated. The reference period can be changed, too: either the same period last year or any of the months from the previous year.

## *6. Results*

In order to calculate the monthly price indices, the Central Statistical Office collects data throughout the five months preceding the reference month. During the pilot project we only managed to collect a two months' data, so the price index calculated from these data cannot be analysed with the office's methodology, but the characteristics of the change patterns can be analysed already (however, in the case of a continuous web crawling the results could already be compared). Figure 3 shows the price index calculated from the daily price index, the monthly average price index calculated from the daily price indices and the price index calculated from the data of the 21st day of each month. This way the daily and monthly price indices can be compared.




Figure 3 The price index of flights from Budapest to Paris, 21 March 2016 – 26 May 2016 (reference period: December 2016).
Comment: The figure shows the ticket reservations for flights to Paris in July 2016.
Source: Our own figure.

In this case the Big Data-based solution offers higher quality and accuracy, as well as faster results. The project was launched only recently. In the next step the Central Statistical Office would like to analyse the data over a longer period of time and it would like to compare the results with those data that were obtained manually.

## *7. Summary*

The following questions are discussed in numerous fora dealing with statistics: 'Why is Big Data so interesting for official statistics?' and 'Why is not it enough to use the traditional data collection methods?' Based on the foregoing these questions can be answered with the following arguments:

*Financing pressures.* The 2007 economic crisis forced the private as well as the public sphere to find more cost effective solutions for financing their activities. Traditional data collections might be costly, therefore official statistics must find other, alternative data sources. Big Data is an alternative data source with the help of which it is possible to exploit the potential of administrative data, hopefully without any expenses spent on data collection. The use of Big Data-type sources is a reaction to social and market changes, but it can also actively transform the way people work with official statistics. These changes might affect mainly the following areas:

*Improving the quality of traditional data collections.* Those working with the traditional method must overcome several challenges. Through Big Data it is possible to obtain additional information which help us to create a better sample frame which can be managed more easily, to further develop our sampling methods, to create more accurate calibrating, estimating and imputation methods, to validate data from other sources (e.g. from traditional data collections or data adoptions), to reduce non-response rates or describe their pattern (with questionnaires certain social groups tend to be less accessible or are not accessible at all), and also to enrich out toolbox used for data analysis.

By using Big Data, we could *reduce the burden for respondents*. This aspect speaks for itself. Every respondent – private individuals and corporations alike – welcomes shorter questionnaires and forms, as this way they are able to spend less time on providing data for official statistics. If data are accessible from different sources as well, it will be unnecessary to ask data providers.

By actively using Big Data, it is possible to gain new information and new types of data, which were not accessible through traditional methods, and also new connections can be discovered, which could not have been discovered without these huge amounts of data. Also, this way innovative tools and methodologies can be created, which can later become milestones in official statistical procedures. With regard to short-term goals, we believe that by using Big Data it is possible to develop new welfare indicators; to link general economic, agricultural and environmental statistics from multiple aspects; to supplement data collections on household consumption and earnings by developing new measurement techniques; to measure consumer confidence and to understand consumer behaviour better.

The points listed here are only a fraction of how Big Data may be put to use. However, we still have many questions, both technical and professional. We are sure that statistical data collection is facing a paradigm shift that radically changes the status of official statistics.

Answering the following questions can help in setting our heading: 'What is our purpose – reproduction or creating a new calculation method?'; 'What to do if a statistician does not have the right IT tools and IT expertise to handle Big Data?'; 'In order to handle the new approach effectively, should statisticians become more knowledgeable in their respective fields, or rather develop their IT skills (such as programming language knowledge)?'; 'Can Big Data be built into the current data generation process?'; 'Will statistical results grow more reliable and accurate by the use of Big Data?'; 'Speed vs. Accuracy, what is the role of official statistics? Which of the two is more important?'

In our opinion, a balance between the latter two factors must be found, since the aim is to ensure not only quick results but also a methodological guarantee.

In our view, Big Data, like the online surveys that have become an integral part of the data capture method, will also find its place in official statistics without making conventional data collection procedures superfluous.

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## *Appendix*

F1 Possible application for Big Data in the Official Statistics

| Type of data | Statistics | HCSO– Name of data collection/Published data |
|---|---|---|
| Mobile communication | | |
| Mobile data | Tourism, Population statistics, Migration statistics | Census – (Publishing mobility data every ten years)<br>OSAP 2290 – Data of the permanent population by settlement (broken down by sex and age)<br>OSAP 2228 – Data of citizens participating in international migration<br>OSAP 1943 – Tourism and other expenses of foreigners in Hungary<br>OSAP 1114 – Basic data to the physical and non-physical workers' working time balance<br>Time Use Statistics |
| Internet | | |
| Internet searches | Labour force statistics, Migration statistics | OSAP 2238 – Monthly labour report<br>OSAP 2009 – Report on the number of jobs and job vacancies<br>OSAP 1114 Basic data to the physical and non-physical workers' working time balance |
| E-commerce webpages | Price statistics | OSAP 1006 – Consumer price survey (Consumer Price Index)<br>OSAP 1712 – Report on housing and building site market turnover (housing prices)<br>OSAP 1007 – Price survey on industrial products and services<br>OSAP 1831 Prices of construction activities Construction price statistics<br>OSAP 2193 – Data services on foreign trade turnover outside the European Union (Foreign trade prices) |

| Type of data | Statistics | HCSO– Name of data collection/Published data |
|---|---|---|
| | | OSAP 2130 – Quarterly survey on the output prices of business services |
| Enterprises webpages | Information society statistics | OSAP 1840 – Qualitative and quantitative data on the inventory of information and communication technologies |
| Enterprises webpages | Business register (GSZR) | Clarification of Business Register (GSZR) pontosítása |
| Job advertises' websites | Job vacancy statistics | OSAP 2009 – Report on the number of jobs and job vacancies |
| Websites for real estate ads | Price statistics (real estate market) | OSAP 1712 – Report on housing and building site market turnover<br>OSAP 2418 – Construction cost estimation on standard dwelling types |
| Social media | Consumer satisfaction, GDP, Information society statistics | GDP calculation |
| Sensor data sources | | |
| Traffic sensors | Transport statistics, Tourism | OSAP 1390 – Transport infrastructure: local roads and bridges<br>OSAP 2297 – Fleet of road vehicles<br>OSAP 1183 – Data on road passenger transport<br>OSAP 1189 – OSAP 1654 – Road and fixed-line passenger transport performances<br>Census – (Publishing mobility data every ten years)<br>OSAP 2290 – Data of the permanent population by settlement (broken down by sex and age)<br>OSAP 2228 – Data of citizens participating in international migration<br>OSAP 1943 – Tourism and other expenses of foreigners in Hungary |

| Type of data | Statistics | HCSO– Name of data collection/Published data |
|---|---|---|
| | | OSAP 1114 – Basic data to the physical and non-physical workers' working time balance |
| 'Smart' measuring devices | Energy statistics | Energy and environment<br>OSAP 1321 – Energy balance, industry<br>OSAP 2221 – Energy balance of energy sector, energy commodities<br>OSAP 1329 – Monthly energy balance report<br>OSAP 1335 – Survey on energy use |
| Satellite imageries | Agriculture, land use, enviromental protection statistcs | Land use:<br>OSAP 1082 – Land area and sown area, 1 June<br>OSAP 2218 – June survey of private holdings<br>OSAP1709 – Data on Protected Areas by National Law and 'Natura 2000' sites |
| Aircraft movements | Transport and air pollution statistics | Air transport<br>OSAP 1725 – Traffic data of airports<br>OSAP 1966 – Report on the traffic of airports<br>OSAP 2160 – Inland waterway, air and pipeline transport performances<br>OSAP 1066 – Air quality data |
| Process generational transactions | | |
| Supermarket scanner and sales data | Price statistics, Household consumption statistics | Consumer Price Index<br>OSAP 1006 – Consumer price survey<br>OSAP 2153 – Household Budget and Living Condition Survey, monthly diary keeping<br>OSAP 2154 – Household Budget and Living Condition Survey, annual interview<br>OSAP 1045 – Report on the sales turnover of retail trade and catering<br>OSAP 1646 – Report on the sales of retail trade and catering by commodity groups<br>OSAP 2130 – Quarterly survey on the output prices of business services |
| | | |

| Type of data | Statistics | HCSO– Name of data collection/Published data |
|---|---|---|
| Financial transactions | Household consumption statistics | OSAP 2153 – Household Budget and Living Condition Survey, monthly diary keeping<br>OSAP 2154 – Household Budget and Living Condition Survey, annual interview |
| Volunteered Geografic Information (VGI, websites (OpenStreetMap, Wikimapia, Geowiki) | Land use | OSAP 1082 – Land area and sown area, 1 June<br>OSAP 2218 – June survey of private holdings |

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