The marketization of family planning: the role of banks as policy actors in Hungarian reproductive policies

Abstract

This study is part of a doctoral dissertation that deals with the marketization of family policy in Hungary. The current system simultaneously serves selective pronatalism, the growth of inequalities and the creation of ‘traditional’ families. Since 2010, the state has been motivating upper-middle class families to have children, for which it provides significant amounts of state-subsidized loans. These subsidies can be applied for through banks, so they do not function as a classic social policy tool. A full presentation of all state-subsidized loans is not possible within the scope of this article, so the study focuses only on the baby-expecting loan (babaváró hitel), introduced in 2019, as one of the tools of marketization. The article presents, based on 62 semi-structured interviews, the new situations that the marketization system confronts Hungarian families with. The interviews were conducted with people who were involved in the loan in some way (e. g.: successful borrowers, unsuccessful borrowers). The results show that, on the one hand, the general consequences of fiscalization (weakening of social rights, increasing individual responsibility, strengthening of market actors) are appearing, and on the other hand, there is a strong biopolitical pressure, which may even come from banks.